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Why the Law Enforcement Model is a Problematic Strategy for Dealing with Terrorist Activity Online

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2017

Susan W. Brenner*
Affiliation:
University of Dayton School of Law

Abstract

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Type
Combating Terrorist Uses of the Internet
Copyright
© American Society of International Law 2005

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References

1 U.S. Institute of Peace, The Diplomacy of Counterterrorism: Lessons Learned, Ignored and Disputed (2002) available at .http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr80.pdf

2 For more on this, see Brenner, Susan W. , Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech . L. 2 (2004) available at .http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/index.htm Google Scholar

3 See Diplomacy of Counterterrorism, supra note 1 (why a law enforcement strategy is preferable to other alternatives).“Traditional crimes ” denotes proscribed conduct which is outlawed because it threatens“civilian ” interests such as physical safety and the security of property. See Brenner, supra note 2. Those who engage in this category of proscribed conduct do so for “ personal ”reasons, i.e., they kill for personal gratification or out of personal animus and they rob out of a desire to enrich themselves. Terrorists often engage in identical conduct but they do so for “ political,” not for personal reasons. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2331(1).

4 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, Criminal Division: Annual Report 2004 6-7 (2004) available at .http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/CRMAnnualReport2004.pdf

5 Id.

6 See Brenner, supra note 2.

7 See, e.g., Weimann, Gabriel , How Modem Terrorism Uses the Internet, U.S. Institute of Peace (March 2004), .http://www.usip.org/pubs/speciaIreports/srll6.pdf Google Scholar

8 See, e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, supra note 4.

9 See, e.g., Swartz, Jon, Terrorists' Use of Internet Spreads, USA Today (February 20, 2005) available at .http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-02-20-cyber-terror-usat_x.htm Google Scholar

10 See, e.g., Sipress, Alan , An Indonesian's Prison Memoir Takes Holy War into Cyberspace, Washington Post (December 14, 2004) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A62095-2004Decl3.html Google Scholar

11 See, e.g., Weimann, supra note 7.

12 For more on this, see Brenner, supra note 2.

13 One difference is that real-world terrorists often inflict harm on a massive scale, defying the default one-toone assumption. Another is that it may be more difficult to identify patterns than it is with crime.

14 See, e.g., Weimann, supra note 7.

15 See, e.g., O'Hagan, Maureen , A Terrorism Case That Went Awry, Seattle Times (November 22,2004) available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2002097570_sami22m.html (prosecution of Saudi student who used his computer skills to run a website for a Muslim charity lined to terrorists).Google Scholar

16 See, e.g., Weimann, supra note 7.

17 Thomas, Timothy L. , Al Qaeda and the Internet: The Danger of “Cyberplanning,” Parameters 112 (Spring 2003) available at . http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03spring/thomas.htm Google Scholar

18 See, e.g., Swartz, supra note 9.

19 For more on this, see Brenner, supra note 2.

20 Id.

21 Id.

22 Id.

23 Id.

24 See Diplomacy of Counterterrorism, supra note 1.