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Cognition and Epistemic Reliability: Comments on Goldman

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Gary Hatfield*
Affiliation:
The Johns Hopkins University

Extract

Goldman has offered a novel conception of epistemology, or, to use his terminology, epistemics. Although the project is complex and terminologically intricate, the central point that sets it apart from traditional epistemology is his conception of the objects of epistemic evaluation. Goldman claims that the objects of epistemic evaluation include not merely the beliefs a person holds and the relation of these beliefs to the evidence, but the processes and methods that are used in arriving at the beliefs. Processes and methods are epistemically commendable, on Goldman's view, to the extent that they reliably produce true beliefs, where “truth” is defined independently of epistemic norms. It is the role of the cognitive and social sciences to identify the processes and methods that are to be evaluated; the cognitive and social sciences thus have an essential role to play in epistemology, though they can by no means replace it.

Type
Part IX. Epistemology
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

The text of the paper is as presented at the October meeting in Pittsburgh, except that time constraints required some abridgment of the last few paragraphs in the spoken version. The notes have been added.

References

Fodor, LA. (1983) The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books/The MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Geertz, Clifford. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Goldman, Alvin I. (1986) Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar