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The Cognitive and Social Sides of Epistemology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Alvin I. Goldman
Alvin I. Goldman*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Extract

Any plausible treatment of human knowledge must acknowledge two shapers of opinion: the psychological and the social. The formation of almost any belief, even the mere perception of familiar objects or recollection of recent events, involves the execution of a complex array of mental operations or computations. So the psychological component in belief-formation is ubiquitous. The social component, while not quite ubiquitous, is almost as crucial. A large proportion of the mature cognizer's beliefs are acquired from others; and typically the vehicles of acquisition — public language, and internal techniques for assessing the claims of others — are themselves socially or culturally acquired. Scientists, of course, are no different in these fundamental respects. They too are cognizers with human brains, and they work in professional communities. Their beliefs result from use of their psychological equipment, and from the scientific lore and methodology that is largely indebted to interpersonal training and communication.

Type
Part IX. Epistemology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 295 - 311
Copyright
Copyright © 1987 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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