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Discovery, Rationality, and Progress in Science: A Perspective in the Philosophy of Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
If we examine some relatively sophisticated area of science at a particular stage of its development, we find that a certain body of information is, at that stage, taken to be an object for investigation. On a general level, we need only think of the subject-matters called ‘electricity’, ‘magnetism’, ‘light’, or ‘chemistry’; but both within and outside such standard fields, there are more specific examples - such as, for instance, what are taken to be subfields of the preceding subjects. Further, those general subjects themselves are, in many cases, considered to be related in certain ways. (For example, in the nineteenth century, reasons accumulated for believing that electricity, magnetism, chemistry, and light were related, and in such a manner that it was reasonable to search for a common account of all these subjects.)
- Type
- Part XI Symposium: Discovery, Rationality and Progress in Science
- Information
- PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1972 , 1972 , pp. 407 - 419
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company
Footnotes
*
This paper was originally presented in a symposium at the Second Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing, Michigan, on October 29, 1972, with Stephen Toulmin as co-symposiast and Imre Lakatos as commentator. Written under a grant from the National Science Foundation, the paper surveys certain central aspects of some of my recent work, chiefly that in the following articles: ‘Notes Toward a Post-Positivistic Interpretation of Science’, in P. Achinstein and S. Barker (eds.), The Legacy of Logical Positivism, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore 1969, pp. 115-160; ‘Scientific Theories and Their Domains’, to appear in F. Suppes (ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories; University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1973; and ‘On the Relations Between Compositional and Evolutionary Theories’, to appear in a volume of proceedings of the Serbelloni Conference on Reduction in the Biological Sciences, Macmillan, London, 1973, edited by T. Dobzhansky and F. Ayala.
References
Note
1 The first three of these cases have been examined in detail in ‘Scientific Theories and Their Domains’ and ‘On the Relations Between Compositional and Evolutionary Theories’.