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The Formal and the Informal

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

William Berkson
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Extract

I became acquainted with Lakatos’s work in 1965 when I started studying at London School of Economics—where Lakatos taught. As his work was developed over the succeeding years until his death in 1974, one thing always puzzled me: his work seemed to contain such conflicting tendencies. He would continue developing his ideas along a progressive line, and suddenly would insert an element which appeared to me quite reactionary. By ‘reactionary’, I should hasten to add, I mean imbued with the spirit of Positivism—a person of different bias might reverse the labels!

When I was given this opportunity to reflect again on Lakatos’s work I did not try to resolve the puzzle by looking into Lakatos’s intellectual history1; rather I attempted to separate clearly those aspects of Lakatos’s work which seemed to me driving in the right and the wrong directions. Both aspects concern the research program which has dominated both philosophy of science and philosophy of mathematics in the twentieth century.

Type
Part VIII. Lakatos’ Philosophy of Mathematics
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 296 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © 1981 Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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