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Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Kevin T. Kelly
Kevin T. Kelly*
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Extract

Consider the following collection of familiar questions in the philosophy of science.

Underdetermination: What collections of theories can be reliably distinguished from one another on a given sort of evidence presentation? How do differences in evidence presentation, background knowledge, and hypothesis vocabulary affect underdetermination?

Realism: How plausible is it that the methods employed by science are capable of arriving at the truth in a given domain of inquiry? If not, is it plausible that there exist such methods? How does the answer differ from domain to domain?

Scientific progress: Is it possible that scientific knowledge could be continually improved, even if it is never perfectly correct? Is there any sense to be made of the increasing verisimilitude of inquiry?

Methodology: How do standard methodological directives interact? Do different directives interfere with one another or do our favorite ideas about method complement one another? Is experiment really more powerful than passive observation?

Type
Part XIII. Formal Learning Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 413 - 423
Copyright
Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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