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Instrumental Evaluation in Scientific Knowledge

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

F. John Clendinnen
F. John Clendinnen*
Affiliation:
University of Melbourne
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Extract

Unlike some recent authors, Hilary Putnam recognizes that we can not avoid inquiring about the normative force of the principles that guide scientific reasoning. His answer is in terms of values. In presenting his case for “Internal Realism”, he argues that values are presupposed in statements of fact (1981, pp. 128-134). The central thesis in his argument is that truth is not a correspondence with an “unconceptualized reality” and that “the claim that science seeks to discover the truth can mean no more than that science seeks to construct a world picture which, in the ideal limit, satisfies certain criteria of rational acceptability” (p. 130). We adopt these criteria because having a theory which conforms to them is valuable to us; it is part of human flourishing (pp. 133-134).

Type
Part IV. General Philosophy Of Science (A)
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 217 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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References

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