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Neo-Skinnerian Psychology: A Non-Radical Behaviorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Terry L. Smith
Terry L. Smith*
Affiliation:
University of the District of Columbia
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Extract

Radical Behaviorism makes the implausible claim that “the appeal to mind explains nothing at all” (Skinner 1971, p. 186). Clearly, such a claim (if accepted) would lend strong support to the Skinnerian research program, if only because it would eliminate the major competition. But what support remains when such a claim is not accepted? This paper shall argue that the Skinnerian research program need not depend upon the supposition that there is something scientifically illicit or vacuous about the explanations offered by mentalistic psychology. Distinguishing Radical Behaviorism from a position that grows out of Skinner’s writings from 1938 through 1950, it asserts that the latter position provides a conception of the behavior analytic program that is compatible with the basic claims of cognitive and folk psychology.

We may give a rough definition of this position by following Cummins (1983) in distinguishing between two types of scientific theory.

Type
Part V. Perception and Psychology
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 143 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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