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On Explaining Experiences of a Quantum World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Richard Healey
Richard Healey*
Affiliation:
Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh and University of California, Los Angeles
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Extract

“the view advanced by H. W. Everett (1957)—that there simply is no reduction—quite fails to account for the actual phenomena of physics, which we may summarize as the appearance of reduction: namely, our experience of definite observations.” (Stein 1983, p. 573.)

In an interesting recent paper, Geroch (1984) has sought to state the content of, “and to some extent to advocate” a view toward quantum mechanics which is at least closely akin to the view advanced by Everett, known popularly (but, arguably, misleadingly) as the many-worlds interpretation. While sensitive to objections along the lines of that by Stein quoted above, Geroch believes that these can adequately be answered. The key to answering such objections is to argue that physics is not responsible for accounting for our experience of physical phenomena—it is enough that it account for the physical phenomena themselves. It is this last argument that I wish to examine in this paper, both in general, and specifically in its application to Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Type
Part II. Philosophy of Psychology and Philosophy of Physics
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 56 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

1

This paper was written during the tenure of a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for Independent Study and Research: I thank the NEH for their support. I am indebted to those at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh during the Winter of 1984, especially Roberto Torretti, for helpful discussions: and to Robert Geroch for a stimulating exchange of ideas.

References

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