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Realist Foundations of Measurement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Henry C. Byerly*
Affiliation:
University of Arizona

Extract

A not uncommon conclusion of philosophers studying the conceptual foundations of measurement is that scales of measurement, though subject to requirements of consistency, convenience, and simplicity, are essentially based upon conventions, and thus cannot be said to refer to relationships among existing quantities. Brian Ellis, for example, in one of. the most searching contemporary analyses of measurement concepts, claims that

certain metaphysical presuppositions made by positivists and nonpositivists alike, have played havoc with our understanding of many of the basic concepts of measurement, and concealed the existence of certain more or less arbitrary conventions. ([4], p. 3)

Some aspects of measurement are clearly conventional in the strong sense of resting on essentially arbitrary agreements. Thus to ask which of the scales of temperature, Centigrade or Fahrenheit, is the ‘true’ scale would be like asking which are the true words for the first three integers - ‘one, two, three’ or ‘eins, zwei, drei’.

Type
Part X Truth and Realism in Science
Copyright
Copyright © 1974 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Footnotes

*

The author wishes to thank Vincent Lazara for helpful suggestions.

References

Allen V., Astin, ‘Standards of Measurement’, Scientific American, 1968.Google Scholar
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