Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-lrf7s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-31T09:12:33.905Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Reasons, Causes, and Empathetic Understanding

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

J.K. Derden Jr.
J.K. Derden Jr.*
Affiliation:
Humboldt State University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

The dispute concerning whether reasons are causes and related controversies continue unabated. The conflict manifests itself in various ways. Reasons are not causes: because reasons are not logically independent of actions; because no inductive evidence is required for establishing a reason for why I do something; and because no generalizations are required to explain why someone does something on the basis of reasons. It is also maintained that historical explanation is not explanation by appeal to covering laws and that empathetic understanding is more than an heuristic device for generating hypotheses to explain why people do what they do. It is further maintained that the social sciences are on the wrong track if they see themselves as more akin to the natural sciences, as opposed to philosophy (conceptual analysis) and the humanities.

The amazing fact is that the contradictory of each of the above stated positions has been seriously maintained.

Type
Part V. Explanation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1978 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1978 , 1978 , pp. 176 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © 1978 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Care, Norman S. and Landesman, C. (eds.). Readings in the Theory of Action. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” The Journal of Philosophy LX (1963): 685–700. (As reprinted in [1]. Pages 179-198.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dray, William. Laws and Explanation in History. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957.Google Scholar
Dray, William. “The Rationale of Actions.” In [1]. Pages 255–280. (This is a slightly revised version of Section 1-5, Chapter V, in [3].)Google Scholar
Hempel, Carl G. “Rational Action.” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association XXXV (1962): 5–23. (As reprinted in [1]. Pages 281-305.)Google Scholar
MacIntyre, Alasdair. “The Idea of a Social Science.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XLI (1967): 95–114. (As reprinted in [9]. Pages 15-32.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, Ernest. The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryan, Alan. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences. London: MacMillan, 1970.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryan, Alan. (ed.). The Philosophy of Social Explanation. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.Google Scholar
Shaffer, Jerome A. Philosophy of Mind. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1968.Google Scholar
Winch, Peter. The Idea of a Social Science. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963.Google Scholar