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Scientific Reasoning or Damage Control: Alternative Proposals for Reasoning with Inconsistent Representations of the World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Joel M. Smith
Joel M. Smith*
Affiliation:
Indiana University
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Extract

Logical analyses of scientific representations of the world have usually focused on axiomatized or axiomatizable theories. As practiced, science seldom employs such theories. Rather, we find aggregations of claims, the logical relations of which are not as neat as philosophers of science might like them to be. Indeed, a common feature of such aggregations is the presence of certain “theoretical anomalies,” statements that are in some way incompatible with the remainder of the corpus. Huygens’ description of light as exhibiting an asymmetry with respect to its direction of propagation in polarization phenomena was such an anomaly because of its inconsistency with his account of light as longitudinal waves in a medium. (See Sabra 1981, pp. 226-227.) Although the occurrence of these anomalies is indicative of a problem that must be dealt with, inconsistent representations of the world are not without significant heuristic value.

Type
Part VIII. Formal Sciences
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1988 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1988 , 1988 , pp. 241 - 248
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1988

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