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The Scope of Psychology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Keith Butler
Keith Butler*
Affiliation:
Washington University
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Extract

Psychology is a scientific discipline whose universe of discourse is the mind. What could be so controversial about that? Plenty; and (almost) all of the controversy involves questions about the scope of mind. The traditional view on this matter is most closely associated with Descartes. Though Descartes supposed that the mind is essentially nonmaterial, this dualism is not a part of the legacy Descartes left to the modern student of mind. What modern cognitive science has inherited from Descartes is the view that the mind is a private place, separated (in a number of respects) from the body and the environment that lies outside the physical boundries on an individual. There is, however, a rising tide within the philosophy of psychology that seeks to push the boundries of the mind outside the skin (or at least the cranium).

Type
Part XI. Philosophy of Psychology and Perception
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 428 - 436
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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