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Selectivity and Theory Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2023

Mattl Sintonen
Mattl Sintonen*
Affiliation:
University of Helsinki and the Academy of Finland
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Extract

In his 1982 Presidential Address to the PSA Ernan McMullin proposed that the Kuhnian “revolution” in the philosophy of science amounts, in part, to the growing awareness that theory-appraisal is to be modelled on decisions and value judgments rather than rule-governed inferences (McMullin 1983). This viewpoint has its attractions but needs developing before it can satisfy skeptics, such as Larry Laudan. For Laudan complains that Kuhn has provided no general model to back up his value-geared account, and that the view leads to untenable subjectivism which Kuhn has tried to avoid.

I shall try to show that neither complaint stands to criticism, by joining two ideas. The first – that of modelling theory decisions along decision theory – is not a novel one, but even its supporters have failed to see that it makes Kuhn’s subjectivity a live but respectable possibility.

Type
Part VI. General Philosophy of Science (B)
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1986 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1986 , 1986 , pp. 364 - 373
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1986

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