Article contents
Truth or Consequences? Generative Versus Consequential Justification in Science
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 February 2022
Extract
For the past century the Central Dogma of confirmation theory has been:
All empirical support (of a theoretical claim) = empirical evidence = empirical data = successful test results = successful predictions or postdictions = true empirical consequences (of the claim plus auxiliary assumptions).
According to the Dogma, all empirical support derives from empirical testing of predicted consequences. I shall attack this pure consequentialism and defend the importance of generative justification in science.
One question which has been widely debated through the years is whether “postdicting” or explaining already known phenomena provides as much epistemic support for an hypothesis as predicting new phenomena or, indeed, whether explanation provides any support at all. I believe that explanation is on a par with prediction, but I want to address a different question here. Both explanation and prediction (as usually construed) involve consequential reasoning.
- Type
- Part XII. Confirmation
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1989 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
This paper is dedicated to the memory of my colleague, Willard Day, for his helpful comments and his exemplary life. I thank my co-symposiasts for a good discussion and the National Science Foundation for research support.
References
- 4
- Cited by