Hostname: page-component-84b7d79bbc-g5fl4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-29T23:17:18.870Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

When is a Physical Theory Relativistic?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Roland Sypel  and
Harvey R. Brown
Roland Sypel
Affiliation:
Oxford University
Harvey R. Brown
Affiliation:
Oxford University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

It may be thought that the question ‘when is a physical theory relativistic?’ has a fairly straightforward answer, namely: ‘when it is Galilean invariant’ (for classical mechanics) or ‘Lorentz invariant’ (for special relativity). In the context of the modern ‘spacetime theory’ approach to relativity physics, the answer is more elaborate, in the interests of greater precision. In this paper, we examine two recent discussions of the issue, or aspects of it, found in a 1990 paper of Arntzenius and the well-known 1983 study of Friedman.

Arntzenius constructs a ‘sure-fire method’ of constructing a Lorentz invariant spacetime theory from a non Lorentz invariant one. We argue that if the original theory is anything like a typical dynamical theory in physics, its ‘completeness’—in a sense to be defined—will render the new theory underdetermined.

Type
Part XIII. Spacetime
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1992 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1992 , 1992 , pp. 507 - 514
Copyright
Copyright © 1992 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

1

We wish to thank Tim Budden for stimulating discussions related to the issues raised here.

References

Arntzenius, F. (1990), “Causal Paradoxes in Special Relativity”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41: 223-243CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Barbour, J. (1989), Absolute or relative motion? Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Brown, H.R. (forthcoming), “Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics in the Emergence of Special Relativity” in Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics, French, S., and Kamminga, K. (eds.).Google Scholar
Brown, H.R. and Maia, A. (forthcoming), “Light-speed constancy versus Light-speed Invariance in the Derivation of Relativistic Kinematics”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.Google Scholar
Earman, J. (1974) “Covariance, Invariance, and the Equivalence of Frames”, Foundations of Physics 4: 267-289.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Earman, J. (1987), “Locality, Nonlocality, and Action at a Distance: A Skeptical Review of some Dogmas”, in Kelvin's Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics, Kargon, R., and Achinstein, P., (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press, pp.449-490.Google Scholar
Earman, J. (1990), World Enough and Spacetime. Cambridge: MIT Press, appendix to Chapter 2.Google Scholar
Friedman, M. (1983), Foundations of Space-Time Theories. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wigner, E. (1956), “Relativistic Invariance in Quantum Mechanics”. II Nuovo Cimento 3: 517-532.CrossRefGoogle Scholar