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Acceptance in Bayesian Philosophy of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 June 2023

Patrick Maher*
Affiliation:
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Extract

The Oxygen Theory made its way with extraordinary rapidity among the best philosophers. In 1785 … Berthollet … declared himself a convert … Fourcroy promulgated its doctrines under the name of “La Chimie Francaise” … Guyton de Morveau, who had at first been a strenuous advocate of the phlogistic theory, was invited to Paris, and brought over to the opinions of Lavoisier …. Priestley alone, of all the chemists of great name, would never assent to the new doctrines. (Whewell 1858, vol. 2 pp. 278f.)

Type
Part V: Bayesian Philosophy of Science
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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