Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-pfhbr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-15T23:24:56.187Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Formal Structure of Genetics and the Reduction Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

A. Lindenmayer
Affiliation:
Theoretical Biology Group, University of Utrecht Padualaan 8, Utrecht , 3508 TB, The Netherlands
N. Simon
Affiliation:
Theoretical Biology Group, University of Utrecht Padualaan 8, Utrecht , 3508 TB, The Netherlands

Extract

An often heard remark is that “discovery of the molecular basis of heredity means that all life processes are now or will shortly be explainable on a molecular basis.” This extreme view is defended with surprising vehemence by one faction of biologists. The opposing view, just as extremely expressed is that “no interesting biological phenomena have yet been explained by molecular mechanisms, not even genetic phenomena.” These two positions have been called the “reductionist” and “antireductionist” points of view. Since “reductionism” is given in the philosophy of science many different meanings, we choose the one which in our opinion could shed some light on the problems underlying this controversy. In our view all the emotion-laden epithets aside, “reductionism” has still primarily to do with “theory reduction” in the logical empiricist (or positivist) sense. Clearly this concept is inextricably tied up with that of “explanation”, and fundamentally it is explanations that this controversy is about.

Type
Part VI. Reduction in Biology and Psychology
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Dawe, C.M. (1979). Intertheoretic Relations in Genetics. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of London, Birkbeck College.Google Scholar
Goosens, W.K. (1978). “Reduction by molecular genetics.Philosophy of Science 45: 7395.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Haraway, D.J. (1976). Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields. Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth Century Developmental Biology. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Hull, D.L. (1974). Philosophy of Biological Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Hull, D.L. (1979). “Discussion: reduction in genetics.Philosophy of Science 46: 316320.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kemeny, J.G. (1959). A Philosopher looks at Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kimbrough, S.O. (1979). “On the reduction of genetics to molecular biology.Philosophy of Science 46: 389406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Morgan, T.H. (1926). The Theory of the Gene. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Nagel, E. (1961). The Structure of Science. London: Kegan Paul.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ruse, M. (1975). “Woodger on genetics, a critical evaluation.Acta Biotheoretica 24: 113.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schaffner, F.K. (1974). “The Peripherality of Reductionism in the Development of Molecular Biology.Journal of the History of Biology 7: 111139.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schaffner, F.K. (1977). “Reduction, Reductionism, Values and Progress in the Biomedical Sciences”. In Logic, Life, and Laws. (University of Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6.) Edited by Colodny, R. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pages 143171.Google Scholar
Whitehead, A.N. and Russell, B. (1910). Principia Mathematica Volume I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Woodger, J.H. (1952). Biology and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Woodger, J.H. (1959). “Studies in the foundations of genetics.” In The Axiomatic Method. Edited by Henkin, L. and Suppes, P. and Tarski, A.. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company. Pages 408428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar