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The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Jarrett Leplin
Jarrett Leplin*
Affiliation:
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
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Extract

Scientific Realism, as I shall understand it, holds that (a) the purportedly referential terms of current theory are genuinely referential, and (b) the theoretical, lawlike statements of current theory are at least approximately or partly true. Realism recommends itself as an explanation of the success of current science at the level of explanations and predictions of experientially accessible phenomena. That is, the case for realism assumes:

  • (1) Current theory in fact achieves such success, and achieves it on balance, i.e., is free of serious disconfirmations.

  • (2) Realism explains such success; i.e., the truth of (a) and (b) would justify us in expecting current theory to be successful.

  • (3) There is no viable nonrealist explanation of the success of current theory.

  • (4) No features of current theory independent of predictive failure discredit (a) or (b).

I shall comment briefly on each of these assumptions.

Type
Part III. Scientific Realism and Observation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1982 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1982 , 1982 , pp. 88 - 97
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1982

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References

Giere, R. (1979). Understanding Scientific Reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.Google Scholar
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van Fraassen, B.C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar