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The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Deborah G. Mayo
Deborah G. Mayo*
Affiliation:
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
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Extract

The foundations of a number of scientific theories are more or less relevant to philosophy. The better a theory is at elucidating the structure of science and scientific method the more a study of its foundations is relevant for philosophers, particularly philosophers of science. But while philosophers have studied probability and induction, statistics has not received the kind of philosophical attention mathematics and physics have. Although the terms “philosophy of induction” and “confirmation theory” are common, the term “philosophy of statistics” is rarely used; and despite the fact that modern statistical methods have been used increasingly in a number of sciences, specific developments of statistics have been little noted in the philosophy of science literature.

Statistics has been fundamental for determining such things as whether a substance causes cancer, which method of psychotherapy gives the most recoveries, whether censorship causes the instability of nations, whether a fossil belongs to a man or a chimpanzee, whether there is regularity in the oscillations of the velocity of gas in the sun's atmosphere, whether an individual authored a piece of writing, whether the economy will improve, and numerous other issues involving uncertainties.

Type
Part IV. Statistics, Probability and Likelihood
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1980 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1980 , 1980 , pp. 96 - 109
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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