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Pragmatic Incommensurability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

John Collier
John Collier*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Extract

Thomas Kuhn (1962) proposed that there are theories which are not only incompatible but also semantically incommensurable in order to explain historical evidence that scientists who hold consecutive theories often fail to come to terms with each other, being unable to resolve differences by appeal to evidence, authority or convention. Despite Kuhn's objections, this thesis has generally been interpreted by friends and foes alike so as to preclude direct rational communication across revolutionary divides in science. In this paper, I will sketch a weaker form of incommensurability which allows eventual comparison of incommensurable theories, but is consistent with Kuhn's model of science.

According to Kuhn, mature science normally operates within a disciplinary matrix which determines the nature of both scientific problems and their solutions. Such a matrix is composed of an articulated formalism, together with a set of standard problems called “exemplars”, and a set of preferred analogies for extending the exemplars to new applications.

Type
Part V. Progress and Incommensurability
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 146 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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