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Ratifiability and Causal Decision Theory: Comments on Eells and Seidenfeld

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Willia Harper
Willia Harper*
Affiliation:
university of Western Ontario
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Abstract

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Type
Part IV. Causal Decision Theory
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1984 , Issue 2: Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers 1984 , 1984 , pp. 213 - 228
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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