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Why There Can't Be a Logic of Induction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2022

Stuart S. Glennan
Stuart S. Glennan*
Affiliation:
Butler University
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Extract

Carnap's attempt to develop an inductive logic has been criticized on a variety of grounds, and while there may be some philosophers who believe that difficulties with Camap's approach can be overcome by further elaborations and modifications of his system, I think it is fair to say that the consensus is that the approach as a whole cannot succeed. In writing a paper on problems with inductive logic (and with Camap's approach in particular), I might therefore be accused of beating a dead horse. However, there are still some (e.g., Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines 1993) who seem to believe that purely formal methods for scientific inference can be developed. It may still then be useful to perfonn an autopsy on a dead horse when establishing the cause of death can shed light on issues of current concern.

Type
Part II. Explanation, Induction, and Linguistic Representation
Information
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association , Volume 1994 , Issue 1: Volume One: Contributed Papers 1994 , 1994 , pp. 78 - 86
Copyright
Copyright © 1994 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

1

I would like to thank Erich Reck and Mike Price for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and Howard Stein for discussions on Carnap's views on induction.

References

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