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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 July 2014
The short Platonic dialogue, the Ion, has suffered a strange fate. Its authenticity has been doubted, and its content considered slight or repetitious. The greatest and most surprising setback the work has encountered is that critics have never even been able to agree on its subject. Therefore, an analysis of the dialogue requires that we first investigate whether the dialogue questions the knowledge of poets or critics, the two subjects proposed. Second, Socrates' argument denying an area of expertise to rhapsodes needs examination; and, finally, the implications of the Ion's argument, especially in regard to the connections between literary criticism and philosophy, deserve attention.
The main argument of the Ion is anticipated by two questions posed at the beginning of the work. Socrates asks Ion whether he is as skilful (deinos) in discussing Hesiod and Archilochus as he claims to be in regard to Homer (531a1-2). When the rhapsode responds that his talent is limited to Homer, Socrates concludes that Ion's ability to speak about Homer is not based upon technical knowledge (tekhnē) or a scientific method (epistēmē) but upon divine inspiration. Shortly afterwards, Socrates asks whether Ion or a seer could better assess Homeric and Hesiodic passages about soothsaying (531b3-6). This question anticipates the argument in the last third of the dialogue where Socrates insists that Ion has no particular expertise in regard to the Homeric works and that in fact specialists in various technical fields are better qualified to judge Homeric passages. The question also prefigures the important role divination will play in the dialogue.
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Pacific Northwest at Seattle in 1986. I am grateful to the audience at that meeting for comments and especially to the members of that organisation for their support at the next year’s meeting in regard to unforeseen events.
2. For the question of authenticity, see the reviews by Méridier, L., Platon: Oeuvres compètes Vol. 1 (Paris 1931), 18Google Scholar; Verdenius, W.J., ‘L’lon de Platon’, Mnemosyne ser. 3 11 (1943), 233–62Google Scholar at 233; Skiades, A.D., ‘Über des Wesen des Dichters im platonischen Ion’, SO 46 (1971), 80–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 82, n. 1. Taylor, A.E. (Plato: The Man and his Work 6 [New York 1956], 38Google Scholar) and Moreau, J. (‘Les thèmes platonisiens de l’“Ion”’, REG 52 [1939], 419–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 419) believe the dialogue adds nothing to our knowledge of Platonic thought.
3. For the difference between tekhnē and epistēmē, see Verdenius (n.2 above), 242f.
4. Socrates leads Ion to this conclusion. After the rhapsode initially says that the other poets do not treat their material the same as Homer does (oukh homoiōs, 531d6), Socrates asks if the others are worse, to which Ion agrees. Ion’s initial statement need not have indicated quality, however. He could have meant, for instance, that Homer emphasises the story while Hesiod presents an obviously didactic message. Cf. Roussel, L., Pan! Sur l’Ion de Platon (Montpellier 1949), 24fGoogle Scholar.
5. Cf. La Drire, C., ‘The Problem of Plato’s Ion,’ JAAC 10 (1951–52), 26–34 at 33Google Scholar.
6. Friedländer, P., Plato, tr. H. Meyerhoff (New York 1964), ii.129Google Scholar; Diller, H., ‘Probleme des Platonischen Ion’, Hermes 83 (1955), 171–87 at 174Google Scholar; Flashar, H., Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis Platonischer Philosophie (Berlin 1958), 34Google Scholar; Bloom, A., ‘An Interpretation of Plato’s Ion’, Interpretation 1 (1970), 43–62Google Scholar (reprinted in Giants and Dwarfs [New York 1990], 138–61Google Scholar) at 44.
7. This hexameter is attributed to Homer’s ‘autobiographical’ epitaph: Homeri Opera V, ed. T.W. Allen (Oxford 1912)Google Scholar, 216.516, 242.74, 246.25, 250.52, 253.64, 259.55. Aristotle may be the source (Allen 240.25, 244.10, 247.6, 251.13 and 31).
8. Homer, the andrōn hērōōn kosmētōr, depicted heroes who are themselves called kosmē-tore laōn (‘marshallers of the troops’, found only in the singular or dual, Il. 1.16, 1.375, 3.236; Od. 18.152). The Platonic use of the concept kosmētōr with the notion of ornamenting the ornamenter suggests the idea of being an intermediary of intermediaries (535a7–8) and also the argument of being increasingly distant from the muse and reality (533dl–536d3, cf. Rep. 595c7–603d8).
9. aidete 532d8, ēisen, 535a1; aidēis, 535b4; aidēi, 536b6.
10. M. Pohlenz, ‘Die Anfänge der griechischen Poetik’, NAkG (1920), 171; F. Wehrli, ‘Der erhabene und der schlichte Stil in der poetisch-rhetorischen Theorie der Antike’, in Phyllobolia für Peter von der Mühll (Basel 1946), 21; Diller (n.6 above), 181f.; Flashar (n.6 above), 68f. (who also suggests medical authors as a source). The Gorgias passage cited is DK 82 B11.9.
11. Od. 4.704f., 10.247f., 19.471f., 20.348f.; Il. 24.358f. For hē kardia pēdai (‘my heart jumps’), cf. Sappho 31.6, Sophron 20, Aristophanes Clouds 1392, and Plato Symp. 215e1–2.
12. Without discussing examples of diction, Pappas, N., ‘Plato’s Ion: The Problem of the Author’, Philosophy 64 (1989), 381–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar (esp. 384f.), argues that Ion’s knowledge is entirely derived from Homer to the extreme point that the rhapsode rejects all other sources of knowledge.
13. This view is first attested in Athenaeus (11.114.506). Critics sympathetic with the idea are Wilamowitz, Schleiermacher, Méridier, Friedländer, Geffcken, Delatte, Dorter and Moore. Verdenius (n.2 above, 239) presents a history of this view.
14. The most eloquent exponents of this interpretation are: Collingwood, R.G., ‘Plato’s Philosophy of Art’, Mind n.s. 34 (1925), 154–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Moreau (n.2 above, esp. 421 and 426); Verdenius (n.2 above); La Drière (n.5 above); Flashar (n.6 above).
15. This point goes back to Hermann, K.F., Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosphie (Heidelberg 1839: repr. New York 1976), 438Google Scholar n.269. Although often considered by those who believe that poetry is the subject of the dialogue, this problem is never successfully answered (e.g. Méridier [n.2 above], 21f., in contrast to 11–14). One possible response is that the dialogue does not attack poetry in general but Homer in particular. Therefore only a rhapsode can stand in for the poet (cf. Moore, J.D., ‘Limitation and Design in Plato’s Ion’, PCPS 8 [1973], 45–51 at 48Google Scholar; Ferrari, G.R.F., ‘Plato and Poetry’, in Kennedy, G.A. [ed.], The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism I [Cambridge 1989], 92–148 at 94Google Scholar).
16. Collingwood (n.14 above), 165.
17. Greene, W.C., ‘Plato’s View of Poetry’, HSCP 29 (1918), 1–75 at 17f.Google Scholar; Ronta, J., ‘The Drama of Plato’s “Ion”’, JAAC 26 (1967–68)Google Scholar, 219–29, esp. 220–24; Verdenius (n.2 above), 236–38 (who ultimately rejects the view that Ion is a caricature); Ferrari (n.15 above), 97.
18. Another example of his moderation is his modesty about winning at the Panathenaic Games (530b3), although his statement may be conventionally required, if for no other reason than to ward off nemesis.
19. Cf. Skiades (n.2 above), 82f.
20. Flashar (n.6 above, 67 and 73) makes another type of attack, when he argues that Ion is not genuinely enthused but as deceptive as a false priest or seer. Cf. Roussel (n.4 above), 62. Nevertheless, Ion’s comments on his emotional response to Homer (535c4–8) belie this interpretation, nor is the rhapsode’s rational observation of his audience incompatible with inspiration (535e1–6).
21. Cf. Verdenius (n.2 above), 252.
22. Cf. Flashar (n.6 above), 83–84, who, however, does not believe that Plato expects or desires the reader to assume the interlocutor’s role. Klosko, G., ‘Thrasymachos’ Eristikos: The Agon Logon in Republic I’, Polity 17 (1984), 5–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 8, asserts that ‘There can be no doubt that Socrates’ interlocutors in a number of elenctic dialogues—Laches, Euthyphro, Ion, to name three—are “mere children in argument” …’.
23. Dorter, K., ‘The Ion: Plato’s Characterization of Art,’ JAAC 32 (1973–74), 65–78Google Scholar at 69f., does not appear to realise that Plato considers Phemius and Demodocus rhapsodes when he asserts that although Ion might have claimed as his specialty the Homeric passages on rhapsodising, there are no such passages. Cf. Roussel (n.4 above, 32), who discusses some of the ramifications of rhapsodes judging other rhapsodes.
24. It seems unlikely that in this dialogue Plato is collapsing the roles of rhapsode and poet, as he does in Rep. 600d5–6, where Socrates states that Homer and Hesiod went around Greece as rhapsodes (rhapsōidein), a statement that recalls Hesiod fr. 357MW. Pindar comes close to equating rhapsode and bard at Nemean 2.2. On the basis of these passages, Stephanie West, in Heubeck, A. et al. (eds.), A Commentary on Homer’s Odyssey I (Oxford 1988), 35 n.6Google Scholar, argues that rhapsōidein could denote the performance of original compositions. Cf. Méridier (n.2 above), 7 n.3.
25. Point 1: 537d3–e4; point 2: 537c5–6, 538a2–5, 540a3–4; point 3: 537c6–8, d1–2, e1–9, 538a5–b1.
26. Cf. Delcourt, M., ‘Socrate, Ion et la poésie: La structure dialectique de l’Ion de Platon’, BAGB 55 (1937), 4–14 at 11Google Scholar; Roussel (n.4 above), 66. Bloom (n.6 above, 55f.) also believes it is fallacious to say that no two arts overlap in subject matter, because ‘master arts’ (presumably philosophy) overlap with the arts. Cf. Dorter (n.23 above), 70f.
27. Roussel (n.4 above), 67–69.
28. Bloom (n.6 above, 49) also seems to allude to this point (he asserts that Socrates identifies poetry ‘with its subject matter and not with its medium’) but does not use the observation to reassess the main argument.
29. Roussel (n.4 above), 77, who earlier (70f.) had pointed out that a didactic poem like the Works and Days should be distinguished from the Homeric poems, where use of ‘technical’ information is intended to produce a poetic effect. Cf. Ferrari (n.15 above), 97.
30. Delcourt (n.26 above), 11f.
31. Cf. Flashar (n.6 above), 81, who cites Phdr. 244b-d, Pol. 290c4–6, Lach. 195e and 198e, Charm. 173a, and Tim. 71e–72b for the distinction between the technical and inspired aspects of divination.
32. Ferrari (n.15 above, 95) writes that ‘Socrates does not actually deny that poetry and rhapsody are arts; he denies that what poets and rhapsodes say (as professionals) is said with art and understanding on their part.’ While this comment seems appropriate to augury, it is difficult to see how the critical (as distinct from the performance) part of rhapsody can be called an art if it involves no expertise. The question is best treated by Flashar (n.6 above), 33, 36, 54 and 80.
33. Delcourt (n.26 above), 5f.
34. E.g. Rep. 394d7–9 and 506e1–3, in the latter of which Socrates speaks of the present impulse (parousan hormēn). These and similar passages can be dismissed with recourse to Socratic irony and other arguments (e.g. Socrates cannot tell Glaucon about the Idea of the Good because the youth lacks sufficient knowledge), but the number of comments about such things as impulses necessarily raises the question of inspiration. In addition, the source of Socrates’ voice (daimonion) should be considered.
35. Vlastos, G., Platonic Studies (Princeton 1981), 27 n.80Google Scholar, the context of which is Vlastos’ calling attention to the ‘extraordinary fact that [in the Phaedrus] erōs [desire] is not only described, but defined, as mania [madness] by our ultra-rationalist, Plato, and is associated as mania in the closest terms with philosophy no less than with the mystic cults … This convergence of mania and nous in love does not seem to intrigue commentators’ (his emphasis). A recent exception to this dictum about lack of ‘intrigue’ is Nussbaum’s, M.C.The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge 1986), esp. 213–21Google Scholar. Ferrari, G.R.F., Listening to the Cicadas (Cambridge 1987), 274 n.89CrossRefGoogle Scholar, explicitly refuses to become intrigued with the ‘extraordinary fact’ Vlastos observes.
36. Flashar (n.6 above), 133, who continues by arguing that enthousiasmos should not be equated with irrationality but rather as the collected parts of the soul including rational and irrational parts. Earlier (125–31) he had shown the congruence of enthousiasmos and philosophical erōs [yearning]. Cf. Jr.Griswold, C.L., Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus (New Haven 1986), 151–155Google Scholar.
37. This question is treated by Gundert, H., ‘Enthusiamos und Logos bei Plato’, Lexis 2 (1949) 25–46Google Scholar; Flashar (n.6 above), 121–39; and Wyller, E.A., ‘Platons “Ion”: Versuch einer Interpretation’, SO 34 (1958), 19–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. 36f.
38. A passage that supports this point and its interconnections occurs in the Phaedrus (242b8ff.), when Socrates first states that his daimonion has spoken to him, next asserts that he is some sort of seer (mantis), and then provides the most philosophic of the speeches in that dialogue.
39. Because first principles (arkhai) cannot be proven or demonstrated, how does the philosopher reach them? Is the process of acquisition akin to inspiration, with the results subjected to systematic analysis (but not proof)? Compare Aristotle’s distinction between nous, the intuition by which first principles are grasped, and epistijmē, the knowledge demonstrated from these principles (An. Post. 100b10–17 and EN 1140b31–41a8). For unhypothesised first principles and their truth without demonstration, see Rep. 511b3–c2 and R. Robinson’s discussion of that passage in Plato’s Earlier Dialectic 2 (Oxford 1953), 146–79Google Scholar, esp. 169–77.
40. Poetry and constitutions are mentioned in the discussion of obtaining immortality by means of fame. Nevertheless, the philosopher alone is capable of acquiring immortality by all three routes mentioned in the Symposium (procreation, reputation, wisdom). See Lowenstam, S., ‘Paradoxes in Plato’s Symposium’, Ramus 14 (1985), 85–104Google Scholar at 94.—In regard to this article, this may be the place to note that, contrary to the statement placed above note 1 in that work, I was not responsible for the translations made from the Greek I submitted. In particular, I would have translated Erōs and erōs as ‘Desire’ and ‘desire’ rather than as Love/love. It was my typographical error that led to ‘look to’ for ‘lack’ on page 90, line 26.
41. epitēdeumata and nomoi (Symp. 210c3–4, 211c5). Cf. Lowenstam, S., ‘Aristophanes’ Hiccups’, GRBS 27 (1986), 43–56Google Scholar at 49f.
42. epistēmai, mathēmata (Symp. 210c6 and 211c6). As Comford, F.M. (‘The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium’, in The Unwritten Philosophy and Other Essays [Cambridge 1950], 77Google Scholar) points out, ‘intellectual beauty in the mathematical sciences’ includes geometry and astronomy. Evidence is found at Rep. 522c1–530c3.
43. As stated in reverse in Rep. 537c7, ‘the person with the overall view practises dialectic’ (ho men gar sunoptikos dialektikos).
44. Cf. Moreau (n.2 above), 428, and Flashar (n.6 above), 41f. and 79f. On the concept of the master or synoptic arts in regard to the Ion, see Delcourt (n.26 above), 1 If.; Bloom (n.6 above), 56; Dorter (n.23 above), 70f.
45. Compare 209a5–8 and d4–e2 to 210c3–5, and see Lowenstam (n.41 above), 49f.
46. Méridier (n.2 above), 11f.; Moreau (n.2 above), 426f.; Verdenius (n.2 above), 244–54 and 262; Moore (n.15 above), 49.
47. Cf. Klosko, G., ‘Criteria of Fallacy and Sophistry for Use in the Analysis of Platonic Dialogues’, CQ n.s. 33 (1983), 363–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar at 367: ‘The reader should be wary of assuming that Plato believes everything he has Socrates say.’
48. George Klosko has particularly drawn attention to these problems in ‘Towards a Consistent Interpretation of the Protagoras’, AGPh 61 (1979), 125–42Google Scholar, and ‘Plato and the Morality of Fallacy’, AJP 108 (1987), 612–26Google Scholar, as well as the articles cited in notes 22 and 47 above. He argues in the 1984 (n.22 above) and 1987 works that some dialogues present eristic contests, in which it is considered proper to defeat one’s opponent by any means including the use of fallacious arguments. Earlier treatments of the problem include: Robinson, R., ‘Plato’s Consciousness of Fallacy’, Mind 51 (1942), 97–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sprague, R.K., Plato’s Use of Fallacy (New York 1962)Google Scholar and ‘Plato’s Sophistry’, PAS Suppl. 51 (1977), 45–61Google Scholar; and Wolz, H.G., ‘Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to Plato’s Symposium’, Ph&PhenR 30 (1970), 323–53Google Scholar, esp. 348.
49. Compare the use of the same method in Lowenstam (n.40 above), esp. 90f. and 102 n.22.
50. The problem of expressing important philosophical ideas in writing is treated in Phaedrus 274b6–277a5 and the Seventh Letter 341c4–345a4. The idea that fallacies are intentionally placed in Plato’s dialogues to allow the reader to carry on dialectic with Plato and hence to allow Plato to write without fixed doctrine is treated by several authors; see for instance Bloom (n.6 above), 55: ‘Socrates knows what poetry is; the argument is intended to be defective.’ It would be possible to express this point without being caught in the intentional fallacy, but ultimately it is important to deal with the question of whether one believes that the specious arguments are unwittingly or deliberately imbedded.
