The following works are cited by the author’s name alone: Taylor, A. E., Plato: The Man and His Work (London 1926Google Scholar); Wolz, H. G., ‘Philosophy as Drama: An Approach to Plato’s Symposium’, Ph & Phen R 30 (1970), 323–53Google Scholar; Clay, D., ‘The Tragic and Comic Poet of the Symposium’, Arion n.s. 2 (1975) 238–61Google Scholar; Cornford, F. M., ‘The Doctrine of Eros in Plato’s Symposium’, in G. Vlastos (ed.), Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame 1978), ii. 119–31Google Scholar; Neumann, H., ‘Diotima’s Concept of Love’, AJP 86 (1965), 33–59Google Scholar; Anton, J. P., ‘The Secret of Plato’s Symposium’, Diotima 2 (1974), 24–47Google Scholar; Rosen, S., The Symposium of Plato (New Haven 1968Google Scholar); Gagarin, M., ‘Socrates’ Hybrisand Alcibiades’ Failure’, Phoenix 31 (1977), 22–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Penwill, J. L., ‘Men in Love: Aspects of Plato’s Symposium’, Ramus 7 (1978), 143–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar; R. A. Markus, ‘The Dialetic of Eros in Plato’s Symposium’, in G. Vlastos, op. cit., ii. 132–43; Vlastos, G., ‘The Paradox of Socrates’, in G. Vlastos (ed.) The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays, (New York 1971), 1–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Robin, L., Platon: Oeuvres Completes, Vol. IV: Le Banquet (Paris 1929Google Scholar); Strauss, L., The City and Man (Chicago 1964Google Scholar); Burnet, J., Greek Philosophy, Part I: Thales to Plato (London 1924Google Scholar); Cummings, P. W., ‘Eros as Procreation in Beauty’, Apeiron 10.2(1976), 23–28Google Scholar; Bacon, H. H., ‘Socrates Crowned’, Virginia Quarterly Review 35 (1959), 415–30Google Scholar; Friedländer, P., Plato: The Dialogues. Second and Third Periods, tr. H. Meyerhoff (London 1969Google Scholar). All textual references are cited from the edition of Dover, K., Symposium (Cambridge 1980Google Scholar). The translations are my own.

1. Taylor, 209.

2. Taylor, 216: ‘There is nothing here [in the hiccoughs episode) which calls for a “serious” explanation.’ Aristophanes’ speech ‘is simply humorous and dramatic’ (219).

3. Wolz, 325.

4. Clay, 246. The critic who has been most successful with the part of the dialogue preceding the speeches is Paul Friedländer (7–8). Cf. n.6 below.

5. For want of a sufficient term, to kalon. has generally been translated in the article as ‘Beauty’ or ‘the Beautiful’ and the adjective as ‘beautiful’. But cf. n.33 below.

6. To my knowledge, Friedländer (7–8 and 21) is the only other critic to comment on the connection between the initial scene with Aristodemus and the later exchange with Agathon. As in the case of other interpretations which treat the prologue, however, Friedländer construes the initial scene in figurative terms (it foreshadows an important motif which occurs later) and does not recognize the fact that Socrates expresses two different views within the dialogue.

7. Comford, 122. Others who have expressed this view are listed by Neumann, 33n.5.

8. Other evidence which has been presented for the fabrication of Diotima includes the improbability of such a meaningful name and area of origin (Mantinea/mantis) and the fact that we have no information about her which is not dependent on Plato. It could be argued that although a historical Oiotima had refuted Socrates’ former beliefs and then taught him correctly, Socrates ‘forgot’ his lessons (207e6–208a8) and had to ‘relearn’ (cf. the discussion of meletē below p.95) them at the beginning of the dialogue. This is not an economical interpretation. Why should we hold on to this idea of a historical Diotima?

9. Taylor, 224–5; Anton, 31. I assume the basis for this date is the statement that Diotima delayed the Athenian plague for ten years (201 d3–5).

10. For other reasons Rosen (17) argues that Aristodemus resembles Eros. He also provides a fanciful explanation for why Aristodemus did not deliver a speech (18).

11. One wants to read the sentence (175d3–7) as a contrary to fact, which is possible but rare in construction (Goodwin, Moods and Tenses 443b). The following condition with present indicative (175d7-el) has no implication as to fulfilment.

12. Rosen, 21ff., 37ff., 197–277; Anton, 46–47; Gagarin passim (the discussion of the contexts in which Socrates is charged with hubris is quite good); Penwill, 159.

13. It is very difficult for me to take seriously the charge that Socrates’ desire for virtue (not sleeping with Alcibiades) or knowledge is hubristic; ‘The philosopher is essentially hubristic, seeking to transcend his humanity …’ (Penwill, 159); cf. Gagarin, 37. This type of indictment seems equivalent to the charge of the nurse in Hippolytus 474–5, that Phaedra’s attempt to vie with the gods in virtue is hubristic (also cited by Gagarin [25] for other reasons). Plato asserts that the gods admire the proper search for knowledge (212a5–7); but that what is presumptuous is the attempt to acquire knowledge not by the arduous process outlined in Socrates’ speech, but by exchanging bronze for gold or hoping for a windfall. To sell one’s body for the truth about beautiful things, according to Socrates, is outright pleonexia (218e3–219al).

14. Cf. Dover, K. J., ‘Aristophanes’ Speech in Plato’s Symposium’, JHS 86 (1966), 48CrossRefGoogle Scholar: ‘The subject of Smp. is Eros; translators (who deserve our sympathy, for they cannot be consistent without misleading us) convey the impression that its subject is love.’

15. Apology 20e6–22e5. Gagarin (28) entertains this interpretation but rejects it because he wants to argue that Socrates is truly knowledgeable. Cf. Penwill, 173n.46. For Vlastos’ approach to Socrates’ claim of ignorance, cf. n.49 below.

16. 191c5–8 and especially 193c8–5 in the peroration. Nevertheless, we are told that satisfaction is impossible at this time (193c2–8).

17. Cf. Markus 135, who characterizes Aristophanes’ thesis as ‘perhaps the profoundest statement in the dialogue of love thought of as a need or lack’. Cf. n.21 below.

18. Like other dramatic incidents and interludes, the exchange between Socrates and Agathon before the latter’s speech has several purposes. The only one relevant to this discussion involves the question of who should fear or feel shame. After Agathon has expressed his trepidation at speaking before the wise few in contrast to the hoi polloi, Socrates begins to question him with the obvious conclusion that one should be embarrassed about one’s faults or misdeeds before any audience. Similarly, we might add, the person with talent can be content amid both wise and ordinary. In other words, if Agathon is truly good, he need not wish for sophia; but if he is deficient, he should desire competence. Hence, the motif that desire is felt only by those who are lacking something occurs in the exchange with Socrates both before and after Agathon’s speech.

19. The question of whether desire can persist after obtaining what is desired has been treated by Robin (lxxxvii-lxxxviii and xcvi-xcvii) and Markus. Although Markus does not refer to Robin’s discussion, both critics come to about the same conclusion, that desire continues because it changes in nature from wanting to giving (cf. n.54 below). Markus (136) seems to believe incorrectly that in Aristophanes’ speech desire is said to cease after the lover and beloved find each other.

20. There are four major points for those critics who believe that it is a mistake for Agathon to accept Socrates’ identification of the Good with the Beautiful (201cl-3). See Guthrie, W. K. C., History of Creek Philosophy Vol. IV (Cambridge 1975Google Scholar), 247n.l.

21. In fact, the adage quoted by Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue is true of the gods: The good seek out the good without invitation. It is mortals who need Eros. Also, by forcing Agathon to agree that desire always has an object, Socrates has changed the portrait of Eros from one who produces desire in others to one who suffers from it. Agathon had viewed Eros in terms of Aphrodite, who produces passion in others but rarely experiences it herself.

22. If I am not mistaken, Rosen (220) is the only other critic to have noticed this point, but he strangely does little with it. It is curious because his work is greatly influenced by Strauss, who had argued (cf. 2) that the correct interpretation of a Platonic dialogue often requires the identification and correction of a ‘specious’ argument expounded by Socrates. This methodology is echoed by Wolz (348): ‘It frequently happens in the writings of Plato that the correction of a logical fallacy or the criticism of a position or argument brings the reader closer to the insight which gives meaning to the dialogue as a whole.’ Dover in the commentary to his edition (ad 201b1–2, b5, and b6) knows that something is wrong with the passage but is unable to identify correctly what it is. Allen, R. E., ‘A Note on the Elenchus of Agathon: Symposium 199c-201c’, The Monist 50 (1966), 460–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar, asserts, ‘The lover, who lacks and is by so much imperfect, cannot be divine or good.’ After appealing to the Republic and Phaedrus, however, he concludes, ‘If desire is considered genetically, in abstraction from any particular kind of object, it is “intermediate”. This is the very view of Pausanias in the Symposium (180e4–181a6), clearly appropriated by Socrates.

23. Agathon’s lack of sophistication is clear from the fact that he does not notice that Socrates freely interchanges the proposition ‘one lacks what one desires’ (suggested at 200a5–6) with ‘one desires what one lacks’ (200e8–9 and often). Not only does the healthy person not desire the illness which he lacks; but it is explicitly stated at a later point that, although all who desire knowledge lack it, not all who lack knowledge desire it (204al-b2).

24. Since the present interpretation argues that Diotima is fabricated by Socrates, no attempt is made to distinguish between what he asserts he learned from her and what Socrates says himself.

25. 206e2–3. The argument is that one does not merely wish to possess beauty but to create in its presence. See the discussion below, pp. 93–96.

26. The thesis of Hackforth, R., ‘Immortality in Plato’s Symposium’, CR 64 (1950), 43–5Google Scholar, that the philosopher begets ‘true virtue (sc. in another’s soul)’ essentially merges the philosophical route to immortality with that of reputation; the philosopher’s ideas become immortal in human memory (cf. Neumann, 44). The problem of the relation between creativity and instruction and the perception of Beauty, as raised by Neumann (who concurs with Hackforth), is discussed below.

27. This point is made by another critic, but I am unable to find my reference. But cf. Cornford.

28. Plato, in fact, is fond of joining the intensive and reflexive pronouns. Throughout the Phaedo, for example, the combination (usually separated by a preposition) is consistently utilized to refer to either Being or soul. It would be interesting if this practice began as an allusion to Heraclitus.

29. Burnet, 190; Taylor, 210; Rosen. 8. The evidence is based on Andocides 1.13, 15 and 35 and IGi ² 325–34, re-edited with additional fragments by Pritchett, W.K. in ‘The Attic Stelai I’, Hesperia 22 (1953), 225–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar (subsequent epigraphical supplements and corrections are not relevant to the present point).

30. Strauss treats the ironic choice of Socrates’ interlocutors as follows (63): ‘In the Laches … Socrates discusses courage with generals defeated or about to be defeated and in the Charmides … he discusses moderation with future tyrants; in the Republic he discusses justice in the presence of victims of … most unjust men …’

31. This interpretation of 209e5–210a2 goes back at least as far as Hermann, K. F., Geschichle und System der ptalonischen Philosophie (Heidelberg 1839; rep. 1976) i. 523Google Scholar.

32. Compare the wonderful sentence of Burnet, 140: ‘The man who saved the life of Alcibiades … was fresh from the contemplation of a far higher beauty than his.’ Although Burnet clearly indicated the vital connection between the description of Socrates’ trances and the culminating step of the philosophical hierarchy, subsequent criticism has, for the most part, ignored this point. While the vision of the Form itself may have lost clarity, there is every reason to believe that the steps leading up to it remain clear to Socrates.

33. Plato’s non-traditional use of theophilēs is discussed by Vidal, Maurice in ‘La neophilia dans la pensée religieuse des Grecs’, Recherches de Science religieuse 47 (1959), 161–202Google Scholar, which traces the concept from Homer to Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria. According to Vidal, this special word ‘chez Platon est habituellement I’expression de la beauté morale’ (173); ‘theophilēs n’est plus synonyme de fortuné, de riche, de glorieux, mais d’honnête, de juste, de beau (kalos)’ (ibid.); cf. Dirlmeier, F.. ‘THEOPHIUA-PHILOTHEIA’, Philologus 90 (1935), 61fGoogle Scholar. Hence, this is the perfect adjective to apply to one who has become imbued with to kalon, which might be roughly translated as ‘moral beauty’. It is the special aptness and significance of this word which draws one’s attention to its similarity with the name Diotima. The subject of theophilia is first broached by Eryximachus and Aristophanes, like Socrates, in their perorations (188el, 193b4).

34. Neumann, 43f. and 54.

35. Republic 580dl-583all.

36. E.g. Robin’s ‘instruction propédeutique’ (xcii). As mentioned above, the philosopher and timocrat may begin with the same dialectical training; but it is ridiculous to assert that the philosopher must first be a glorious warrior, poet and codifier of laws before he can begin the philosophical process of abstraction. The intent of 199e5–210a2 is only to assure us that the philosophical route to immortality is the most difficult.

37. Cummings, 25.

38. Of the most recent critics one might cite Gagarin, 35–36 (and cf. 28), who asserts that Socrates ‘achieves the goal of true knowledge of Beauty and thus becomes a wise man’. Penwill (157 and 173n.46) places him in the daimōn class when he argues that Socrates does not have knowledge but true opinion; the philosopher merely repeats what Diotima told him.

39. Plato is most explicit in expressing this point when he has Diotima declare that Socrates would want to observe and associate with the loved one continuously, ‘if it were possible, and not to eat and drink’ (21 ld7). But, she continues, using the same verbs, so much more is the case with the observation and association with the Form. For the very same reason, the prisoner in the Myth of the Cave must forsake his vision of the sun and return to the cave, which his body probably never left.

40. Taylor, 232. Cf. Festugière, A. J., Contemplation el vie contemplative selon Platon (Paris 1950), 227Google Scholar.

41. For the role of poets and poetry in this dialogue, see Bacon and Clay.

42. Tarrant, Dorothy, ‘Style and Thought in Plato’s Dialogues’, CQ 42 (1948), 28–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially 34; and cf. the debate over whether the words for desire and love are consistently distinguished in the Symposium between Hyland, Drew A., (‘Erōs, Epithumia and Philia in Plato’, Phronesis 13 [1968], 32–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar) and Joseph Cummins, W. (‘Eros Epithumia and Philia in Plato’, Apeiron 15 [1981], 10–18Google Scholar).

43. Understood in this context hotan euporēsēi (‘when he is full’) makes perfect sense in this position, and there should be no temptation to place the phrase after anabiōsketai (‘comes to life again’) as suggested by Wilamowitz, , Platon (Berlin 1920), ii. 360Google Scholar.

44. As an example of how Plato introduces major concepts in less significant contexts (see above, p.95), it might be noted that the idea of ‘purity’ employed in the description of the Form (eilikrines, 211e1) is first introduced by Pausanias when he discusses the ‘purity’ of pederasty (eilikrinōs, 181c7).

45. As Robin (xcvii) mentions in another context, Plato rarely relinquishes the erotic metaphor in the Symposium. There are obvious sexual analogies to the philosopher’s need to reascend the hierarchy. Cf. also Cummings, 25.

46. Homer critics will recognize this phrase.

47. The parallel between Aristophanes’ lovers with their impossible desire and the philosophers, who yearn for association with Being on a continuous basis, is emphasized by ‘Diotima’ when she interrupts her discussion of participation in the Form and speaks of lovers whose only desire is to see and ‘associate with’ (suneinai) the loved one without eating and drinking, ‘if somehow it were possible’ (211d5–8).

48. It is interesting that Eryximachus also argues that desire and possession are not mutually exclusive. He asserts that the job of a physician or musician is to preserve or produce the correct desire. The healthy body, for instance, enjoys harmony as a result of its proper desire for harmony. Hence the phrase erōta kai homonoian (‘love and concord’) is found more than once as the goal of an art or profession (e.g. 187c3–4). Eryximachus could have argued that erōs is the desire for harmony, which once obtained no longer requires the desire. As always in such cases, the reason that Plato did not have Eryximachus argue in such a way is explained by Socrates’ speech.

49. Compare the interpretation of Vlastos (10), who argues that when Socrates disclaims knowledge he means he has no knowledge which is so certain ‘that further investigation of its truth would be superfluous’. Anything Socrates believes can always be re-opened for consideration. This definition of knowledge, according to Vlastos (ibid), ‘is used in formal contexts by earlier philosophers’. The question is, however, whether what Vlastos is discussing should be called knowledge or opinion. In the Symposium knowledge is not merely a belief; it involves knowing why it is true (202a5–7). However, it is the interconnections, the logos of why something is true, which are lost as time intervenes between the philosopher’s visions.

50. The rejected view is that of Hug, Arnold, Platons Symposium (Leipzig 1884), lxviiGoogle Scholar.

51. 215cl-d6. Alcibiades states that Socrates’ audience is amazed and ‘overpowered’ (ekpeplēgmenoi). ‘Diotima’ had said that Socrates was currently ‘overpowered’ by boys (ekpeplēxai, 211d5) but that the Form was even more amazing.

52. The qualities described by Agathon which Alcibiades does not explicitly ascribe to Socrates can be filled in. Most important is Socrates’ poetic quality, for which see Bacon and Clay. Although his justice is implied, it is presumably omitted because Alcibiades is pretending that he was dishonored. This latter point indicates the difficulty of Plato’s task in realistically characterizing Alcibiades. Socrates’ temperance can be fully described by Alcibiades because he is at the same time pointing out the temptations of his own beauty (pace CM. Grube, A., Plato’s Thought [Boston 1958], 90Google Scholar). Similarly the account of Socrates’ military record reflects well on the recounter; but how could Alcibiades praise the philosopher’s sense of justice when he is asserting, half seriously, that it was wrong to spurn his attractions?

53. This point is brought out in the text in a rather curious way. Near the end of the dialogue, Socrates is enticing Agathon to leave Alcibiades, who is reclining between them, and to lie by him. Socrates argues that since he has been eulogized by Alcibiades, Agathon now must be to his right to be praised. ‘If Agathon reclines by you,’ Socrates asks Alcibiades, ‘will he not have to praise me again before I can praise him?’ (222e11–13). This statement makes it sound as if Agathon’s first speech was an encomium of Socrates, which it was indirectly; but what Socrates means to say is that it will be the second time he is eulogized.

54. Many critics have elaborated in philosophical terms on the notion that Socrates is the beloved, not the lover. Gagarin (28) believes that Socrates has gone from lover/philosopher to beloved/wise man. Speaking of Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue. Clay (245) asserts ‘this Socrates is not fair; he has become fair to join the company at Agathon’s’ (original italics). Both Robin (xcvii) and Markus (139) argue that the nature of ‘love’ changes: Robin states, ‘Quand I’ amour s’ évanouit à titre de tendance vers ce dont il est encore depourvu, il subsiste néanmoins, en retour, comme effusion bienveillante, come faveur concedée, comme grâce condescendante’ (original italics); Markus asserts that erōs goes from desire ‘for something to be obtained … [to desire] for giving something from itself’. The essential point, however, is that desire and being desirable are complementary in the philosopher. Neither aspect disappears or changes into the other.

55. Bacon’s comment on Agathon’s request is that it is ‘a dramatic anticipation of the theme of the first five speeches that in the sexual relation of lover and beloved lies one of the chief means to wisdom and virtue’ (423).

56. Cf. Republic 508e1–509a5. Hence it turns out that the reverse of what Socrates had asserted at the beginning of the dialogue is true (he had said that he had beautified himself to approach the Beautiful). Instead one becomes kalos from approaching to kalon.

57. If virtues are not static, it would appear that Socrates is most virtuous when he is closest to the Forms. It is clear from the dialogue, however, that Socrates remains virtuous on a daily basis to a high degree. The explanation for this retention of virtue must be that he devotes all his time to philosophy. Nevertheless, we are to assume that when he approaches an ethical problem in which he feels uncertain (i.e., has ‘forgotten’), contemplation, perhaps even to the level of immortality, is required to regain his knowledge.