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La Politique de Dette Subordonnée comme alternative au IIIe Pilier de Bâle II: est-elle faisable ?*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 August 2016
Résumé
Les récentes propositions de réforme de la réglementation bancaire, initiées tant par la Banque des Règlements Internationaux que par le Système des Réserves Fédérates américain, incluent des éléments de discipline de marché qui complètent naturellement les instruments réglementaires traditionnels. Plus précisément, une politique par laquelle les grandes banques sont forcées d'émettre régulièrement un certain montant minimal de dette subordonnée (sous forme de titres homogènes) peut s'avérer efficace pour atténuer les effets de l'aléa moral. Cet article se focalise sur la structure d'incitations des créanciers subordonnés et ses implications en termes de Politique de Dette Subordonnée. En particulier, le but de notre analyse est de mettre en lumière le dualisme du comportement des créanciers subordonnés : d'une part, comme « allies » des régulateurs, en protégeant leurs investissements par une surveillance active et une punition immédiate des stratégies excessivement risquées, d'autre part, comme « ennemis » des régulateurs, en favorisant d'une manière similaire aux actionnaires l'adoption d'une politique aventurée en matière de risque.
Summary
The recent proposals of reform put forward by the Bank for International Settlements and the Federal Reserve System include specific elements of market discipline that are naturally added to the traditional tools of banking regulation and supervision. More precisely, a mandatory Sub-Debt Policy by which certain large and sophisticated banking organizations are forced to issue some minimum amount of subordinated debt on a regular basis, can prove itself effective in mitigating moral hazard and regulatory forbearance in banking industry. In this article, we provide some interesting and useful insights into the incentives structure of sub-debt holders by using a standard framework for option pricing applied to the banking firm. In particular, under ‘normal’ conditions of bank solvability the subordinated creditors act indeed as natural ‘allies’ of regulators, mitigating the risk taking incentives of bank shareholders. On the contrary, as the bank approaches its default point, they may exacerbate the moral hazard problems and complicate the tasks of supervisory authorities. In this second case, the sub-debt holders behave in fact as ‘enemies’ of the government supervisor. Finally, we derive some major policy implications in terms of market discipline and optimal bank regulation design.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 71 , Issue 2 , January 2005 , pp. 193 - 222
- Copyright
- Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2005
Footnotes
*
Une première version de cet article a fait l'objet d'une communication aux Journées d'Économie Monétaires et Bancaires GDR, Birmingham, 5 et 6 juin 2003. L'auteur tient à remercier A. Barbier-Gauchard, D. Barkat, J. Couppey-Soubeyran, A. Lavigne, J-R Pollin, J-Ch. Rochet et les autres participants aux Journées, ainsi que les deux rapporteurs anonymes de la Revue pour leurs remarques utiles. Évidemment, toute erreur n'engage que la seule responsabilité de l'auteur.
**
Correspondence: Université d'Orléans, Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orléans, Rue de Blois, BP 6739, 45067 Orléans, Cedex 2, France. Email: adrian.pop@univ-orleans.fr
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