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A paradoxical risk aversion effect on the consumers' demand for quality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

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Summary

In this article, we consider a demand model for a durable good with unknown quality. The quality of the good is uncertain in the sense that the consumer ignores (ex ante) whether the good will break down or not, higher quality implying a higher probability of survival. Taking into account this uncertainty around the quality, we show that the demand for quality can, paradoxically, decrease when consumers are more risk averse. We prove that this risk aversion effect can disturb the second-order price discrimination policies applied by some firms. We reveal the link between quality demand and self-protection theory.

Résumé

Résumé

Dans cet article, nous considérons un modèle de demande d'un bien durable de qualité inconnue. La qualité du bien est incertaine dans la mesure où le consommateur ignore (ex ante) si le bien va se décomposer ou non, une meilleure qualité impliquant une meilleur probabilité de maintien. Prenant en compte l'incertitude concernant la qualité, nous montrons que la recherche de qualité peut, paradoxallement, diminuer lorsque les consom-mateurs sont plus averses au risque. Nous prouvons que l'effet d'aversion au risque peut perturber les politiques de discrimination de prix de second ordre mises en place par certaines firmes. Nous montrons le lien existant entre la recherche de qualité et la théorie de l'auto-protection.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2004 

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Footnotes

*

I thank Anne Perrot, Philippe Choné, Maia David, Maiseu Dumans, Jorge Ferrando, Romain Lesur, Laurent Linnemer and Michael Visser for their comments and remarks. I'd like to thank the anonymous referee of the review for his helpful comments.

**

UMR CNRS 5604, Université des Sciences Sociales, Manufacture des Tabacs, Bat F - 2ème étage, Bureau 207, 21 Allée de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France. E-mail: david.bardey@univ-tlse1.fr

References

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