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R&D Organization: Cooperation or Cross-Licensing?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2015

Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin  and
Rim Lahmandi-Ayed
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Summary

Under the Cross-Licensing system (CL), firms are allowed to trade non cooperatively the results of R&D efforts, and compete in the innovation and production stages. First, the paper proposes a simple modeling of this system. Second, a relevant comparison is made with the Cartelized Research Joint Venture (RJV), the form of R&D cooperation recognized to be the best one.

We prove that the Cross-Licensing system may be socially better than the Cartelized RJV. In terms of antitrust policy, for firms, the most favorable collusion mode is Joint Exploitation. We prove that firms are equally tempted by this mode, whether they are under CL or under Cartelized RJV.

Dans le système des licences croisées, les firmes ont la possibilité de se céder mutuellement et de manière non-coopérative, les résultats de leurs efforts en R&D. Tout d'abord, le papier propose une modélisation simple de ce système. Ensuite, nous comparons ce système avec le « RJV Cartel », une forme de coopération en R&D considérée comme étant la meilleure. Nous montrons que le système de licences croisées peut être meilleur que le RJV cartel, du point de vue du bien-être social. En termes de politique concurrentielle, pour les firmes, le meilleur mode de coopération est l'exploitation jointe. Les firmes sont tentées par ce type de coopération de la même manière, qu'elles opèrent initialement dans un système de licences croisées ou dans un RJV cartel.

Keywords

Cross-LicensingR&D cooperation, Cartelized Research Joint VentureR&D spilloversEfficiencyAntitrust policylicences croiséescoopération en R&DRJV Cartelexternalités technologiques, politique de la concurrenceC72L24D23C72L24D23
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , March 2011 , pp. 31 - 52
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2011 

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Footnotes

*

CES, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan, Paris School of Economics, 61 avenue du Président, Wilson, 94230 Cachan, France. Fax: +33 1 47 40 24 69, e-mail: cabon@sociens.ens-cachan.fr

**

Corresponding author: LIM (Groupe MES)-École Polytechnique de Tunisie, BP 743, 2078 La Marsa Tunisia. Fax: +216 71 748 843, e-mail: rim lahmandi@yahoo.com

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