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Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2016

Armel Jacques
Armel Jacques*
Affiliation:
CERESUR, Université de La Réunion
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Résumé

Cet article étudie les interactions entre le choix technologique de flexibilité des firmes et la collusion tacite dans un duopole. On montre que l'émergence des technologies flexibles facilite la collusion tacite lorsque les firmes se livrent une concurrence en prix ; en revanche, si la concurrence est en quantités, les technologies flexibles rendent la mise en oeuvre d'un accord de collusion tacite plus difficile. On caractérise les configurations technologiques qui émergent dans ce contexte de jeux répétés. On en déduit que les accords de semi-collusion encouragent l'adoption des technologies flexibles.

Summary

Summary

The aim of this paper is to study the links between flexibility technological choices and tacit collusion in a duopoly. We prove that adoption of flexible technologies improves tacit collusion, when competition is à la Bertrand, but makes it more difficult, when competition is à la Cournot. We characterize the technological equilibria in this repeated game framework. We show that semi-collusion improves the adoption of flexible technologies.

Keywords

choix technologiquesflexibilitécollusion taciteD43L13L23technological choicesflexibilitytacit collusionD43L13L23
Type
Research Article
Information
Recherches Économiques de Louvain/ Louvain Economic Review , Volume 72 , Issue 4 , 2006 , pp. 385 - 412
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de recherches économiques et sociales 2006 

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Footnotes

*

Je tiens à remercier Michel MOREAUX, Pierre PICARD, Saïd SOUAM et les deux rapporteurs de la revue pour leurs conseils et commentaires, qui ont permis d'améliorer ce travail. Les imperfections de ce texte me sont entièrement imputables.

**

CERESUR, Université de La Réunion, Faculté de Droit et d'Économie, 15, avenue René Cassin, 97715 Saint-Denis messag cedex 9. Email: Armel.Jacques@univ-reunion.fr.

References

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