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A user's guide to design arguments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 January 2008

TRENT DOUGHERTY  and
TED POSTON
TRENT DOUGHERTY
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627
TED POSTON
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of South Alabama, Mobile, AL 36688
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Abstract

We argue that there is a tension between two types of design arguments: the fine-tuning argument (FTA) and the biological design argument (BDA). The tension arises because the strength of each argument is inversely proportional to the value of a certain currently unknown probability. Since the value of that probability is currently unknown, we investigate the properties of the FTA and BDA on different hypothetical values of this probability. If our central claim is correct this suggests three results: (1) It is not very plausible that a cumulative case for theism include both the FTA and the BDA (with one possible qualification); (2) Self-organization scenarios do not threaten theism but in fact provide the materials for a good FTA; (3) A plausible design argument of one sort or another (either FTA or BDA) will be available for a wide variety of values of the key probability.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 44 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 99 - 110
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Cambridge University Press

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