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A Discussion of Aristotle, De Caelo I, xii
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
In a discussion-note in Mind (July 1958), Father P. M. Farrell, O.P., gave an account, in what he admitted to be an embarrassingly brief compass, of the Thomist doctrine concerning evil. There is one sentence in this discussion which at first glance appears paradoxical. Father Farrell has been arguing that a universe containing ‘corruptible good’ as well as incorruptible is better than one containing ‘incorruptible good’ only. He continues: ‘If, however, they are to manifest this corruptible good, they must be corruptible and they must sometimes corrupt.’ The final words, despite Father Farrell's italics, strike one as expressing, not a self-evident truth, but a non sequitur. The fact that I am capable of committing murder does not entail that I will at some time commit it. It is not immediately obvious that a similar entailment holds in the case of corruption and corruptibility.
Page 95 note 1 P. 400.
Page 95 note 2 P. 402. ProfMackie, , whom Fr Farrell was criticising, replied in Philosophy, vol. xxxvii (1962),Google Scholar and addressed himself particularly to the point in question on pp. 155–6.
Page 95 note 3 I am grateful to Fr Farrell for supplying me with the references to Aquinas, and also to his confrères, Frs Edward Booth and P. T. McKenna, O.P., who have corresponded with me on this question and supplied much useful material, and whose disagreement with my conclusions has been most stimulating. Mr B. F. McGuinness, Mr P. T. Geach and Mr T. C. Potts were also kind enough to read an earlier draft of this paper and to send me helpful criticisms.
Page 95 note 4 A similarly unsupported statement occurs in the tertia via (S. T. I, qu. 2, a. 3) and was discussed by me in The Philosophical Quarterly (10 1961), p. 357.Google Scholar
Page 95 note 5 In lib. I, De Caelo et Mundo, lectio xxix, n. 8.
Page 97 note 1 (a) ‘Necessity, Universality and Time in Aristotle’, in Ajatus 20 (1957), pp. 65–90,Google Scholar and (b) ‘An Aristotelian Dilemma’, ibid. 22 (1959), pp. 87–92.
Page 98 note 1 Cf. Bocheński, I. M., O. P., ‘Notes historiques sur les propositions modales’, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques (1937), pp. 673–92;Google Scholar also Prior, Formal Logic, pp. 185 sq.
Page 98 note 2 As used by Prior, op. cit.
Page 98 note 3 It is true that Aristotle's contrast is, properly speaking, between ‘A man is now capable of standing and not standing’ and ‘A man is capable of standing now and not standing now.’ To represent this accurately in symbolic form it would be necessary to attach time-references to the modus as well as to the dictum, viz. NKMt1NPt1Mt1pt2 as opposed to NMt1KNPt1pt1. However, the multiplication of possible combinations which this introduces is largely irrelevant. Aristotle's confusion is basically between what I have called, respectively, the modal and temporal forms of the compositus/divisus distinction. The fact that his examples are not pure cases of either distinction is merely a product of this confusion. (I am grateful to Mr McGuinness for drawing my attention to all this.)
Page 98 note 4 As an example of a sentence to which the compositus/divisus distinction applies text-books give ‘Caeci vident’ (Matt. xi. 5). The use of this example goes back at least to the thirteenth century: cf. Kilwardby, Dubitationes super Mixtionibus, MS. Merton College 280, fol. 104 va, ‘Ad ultimum dicendum quod haec est distinguenda contingit aliquod videns esse caecum secundum compositionem et divisionem’. I am grateful to Fr Ivo Thomas, O.P., sometime Prior of Oxford, for this reference.
Page 99 note 1 Nor have modern scholars noticed the confusion. There is no indication that anything is wrong from either Stocks, the Oxford, or Guthrie, the Loeb translator, and M. Gérard Verbeke paraphrases the argument with apparent approval (Revue Philosophique de Louvain (Mai 1948), pp. 140 sq.).Google Scholar
Page 99 note 2 In lib. I, De Caelo et Mundo, lectio xxvi, n. 6.Google Scholar
Page 100 note 1 Cf. Boche ski, op. cit., and in particular the discussions on pp. 677 and 685.
Page 100 note 2 This point is made by Mgr Augustin Mansion in his Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne (Louvain, 2nd ed. 1947)Google Scholar: ‘Le raisonnement d' Aristote nous paraît sophistique. Saint Thomas essaie de le justifier, mais la raison qu'il apporte y introduit un élément étranger, qui ne semble pas être réellement contenu dans la pensée de l'auteur’ (p. 284, n. 9).
Page 101 note 1 Buridani, Iohannis, Quaestiones super Libros IV De Caelo et Mundo (ed. Moody, E. A.), The Mediaeval Academy of America, Cambridge, Massachusetts (1942), pp. 120, 17–33; 124, 20–125, 4.Google Scholar
Page 102 note 1 Ibid., p. 127, 7–23.
Page 102 note 2 Op. cit., p. 199. Cf. ProfKneale, , ‘Universality and Necessity’, B.J.P.S., xii, p. 98.Google Scholar
Page 102 note 3 Time and Modality, pp. 2 sq.
Page 103 note 1 Verbeke also takes it this way in his paraphrase, op. cit., p. 141.
Page 103 note 2 Greek Word Order (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 20 sqq.Google Scholar
Page 104 note 1 Fortasse non semper esse legendum?
Page 104 note 2 Ibid, lectio xxvii, n. 1. Cf. Simplicius, p. 331, 2–3.
Page 105 note 1 Ibid., lectio xxvii, n. 5: Quod autem hoc sit impossible, ostensum est prius: quia dictum est quod semper esse et non semper esse opponuntur contradictorie. (The Leonine editors refer at ‘dictum est’ to n. 1, which contains the exegesis of 282 a 5 sqq.)
Page 106 note 1 I am quoting here an objection made by Mr McGuinness.
Page 106 note 2 Lectio, xxvi, n. 3.
Page 107 note 1 Op. cit. pp. 676 sqq.; cf. Prior, , Formal Logic, pp. 190 sqq.Google Scholar
Page 107 note 2 As Verbeke thinks, op. cit. p. 141, n. 14.
Page 107 note 3 Strawson, P. F., Introduction to Logical Theory, p. 179, n. 1,Google Scholar where Strawson acknowledges his indebtedness for this insight to Mr H. P. Grice.
Page 107 note 4 Ibid., p. 178.
