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‘God told me to do it’: sceptical theism and perceiving God

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2011

JOSHUA SEIGAL
JOSHUA SEIGAL*
Affiliation:
Brasenose College, Oxford OX1 4AJ
*
e-mail: joshuaseigal1986@hotmail.co.uk
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Abstract

In this article I highlight a tension between Alston's core thesis in his seminal book Perceiving God – that beliefs about God formed on the basis of mystical perception are prima facie justified – and a currently popular method for disarming a certain form of the argument from evil, a method which involves adopting a view known as sceptical theism.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 1 , March 2012 , pp. 95 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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