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Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2018

SIMON KITTLE Open the ORCID record for SIMON KITTLE [Opens in a new window]
SIMON KITTLE*
Affiliation:
Department for Christian Philosophy, University of Innsbruck, Karl-Rahner Platz 1, InnsbruckA-6020, Austria
*
e-mail: simon@kittle.co.uk
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Abstract

Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl and Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes – a feature of the choices leading to impeccability – can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone.

Type
Original Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , December 2020 , pp. 455 - 472
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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