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A proper de jure objection to the epistemic rationality of religious belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2010

TODD R. LONG
TODD R. LONG*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA93407
*
e-mail: tlong@calpoly.edu
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Abstract

I answer Alvin Plantinga's challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection' (SEO) concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justification for believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic justification in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. I defend philosophical interest in the SEO (and its underlying evidentialism) against objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga's criteria for a proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of ‘impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed epistemology precludes the reasons I offer in favour of giving the SEO its due philosophical attention.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 46 , Issue 3 , September 2010 , pp. 375 - 394
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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