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Time, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 August 2011

JEFFREY GREEN  and
KATHERIN ROGERS
JEFFREY GREEN
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Houston Baptist University, 7502 Fondren Road, Houston, TX 77074-3298 e-mail: jgreen@hbu.edu
KATHERIN ROGERS
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, 24 Kent Way, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19716 e-mail: krogers@udel.edu
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Abstract

In this article we respond to arguments from William Hasker and David Kyle Johnson that free will is incompatible with both divine foreknowledge and eternalism (what we refer to as isotemporalism). In particular, we sketch an Anselmian account of time and freedom, briefly defend the view against Hasker's critique, and then respond in more depth to Johnson's claim that Anselmian freedom is incompatible with free will because it entails that our actions are ‘ontologically necessary’. In defending Anselmian freedom we argue that our ordinary intuitions do not support Johnson's case and that Anselmian freedom is compatible with deliberation.

Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , June 2012 , pp. 151 - 164
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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