Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-x5gtn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-06-08T06:40:30.937Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

In defence of partial faith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2022

Sylwia Wilczewska*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00-330 Warsaw, Poland

Abstract

Some people display a general attitude towards God which does not fulfil the criteria of full-blown faith but also does not amount to lack of faith. I argue that in some cases such an attitude, best described as partial faith, is likely to be the all-things-considered best option – even if God exists and the best possible relationship with God is the greatest possible good. This is because, in a universe as religiously ambiguous as ours, some people seem unable to have full-blown faith, and for some others such faith is likely to be possible only at the cost of contradicting some values relevant for the relationship to God. Somehow paradoxically, God-related worries and doubts leading to spiritual struggles and enquiries can improve one's relationship with God, so that, for some people at some times, the advantages of partial faith may override those of full-blown faith. If I am right, it offers some reason to think that partial faith does not deserve the criticism which has traditionally been directed at it. In addition to that, I argue that, independently of the normative assessment, partial faith is a useful descriptive concept, which can throw light on many issues surrounding faith in general and make it easier to describe some themes belonging to continental philosophy of religion in analytic terms.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, RM (1984) The virtue of faith. Faith and Philosophy 1, 315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Alighieri, D (1971) The Divine Comedy: Inferno, Singleton CS (trans.). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Audi, R (2011) Rationality and Religious Commitment. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609574.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Augustine of Hippo (1912) Confessions, Watts W (trans.), vol. 1, The Loeb Classical Library. London: William Heinemann.Google Scholar
Bishop, J (2007) Believing by Faith: An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of Religious Belief. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchak, L (2014) Rational faith and justified belief. In O'Connor, T and Callahan, LF (eds), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 4973.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cuneo, T (2017) The inaccessibility of religion problem. Ergo 4, 669691.Google Scholar
Dormandy, K (2020) True faith: against doxastic partiality about faith (in God and religious communities) and in defence of evidentialism. Australasian Philosophical Review 5, 428.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eklund, D-JS (2018) The cognitive aspect of Christian faith and non-doxastic propositional attitudes. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 60, 386405.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forbes, G (2006) Attitude Problems: An Essay on Linguistic Intentionality. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hick, J (1989) An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. London: Macmillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howard-Snyder, D (2018) Three arguments to think that faith does not entail belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100, 114128.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Howard-Snyder, D and McKaughan, D (2021) Faith and resilience. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91, 205241.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jackson, E (2020) The nature and rationality of faith. In Rasmussen, J and Vallier, K (eds), A New Theist Response to New Atheists. New York: Routledge, pp. 77–91.Google Scholar
James, W (2002) The Varieties of Religious Experience. Centenary Edition. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Kahane, G (2011) Should we want God to exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82, 674696.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lohrey, A (2019) Partial faith and the postsecular. Cultural Studies Review 25, 290292.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McClure, JA (2007) Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison. Athens, GA and London: University of Georgia Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKaughan, DJ (2013) Authentic faith and acknowledged risk: dissolving the problem of faith and reason. Religious Studies 49, 101124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McKim, R (2012) On Religious Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Milton, J (2005) Paradise Lost: A Norton Critical Edition. New York: W. W. Norton.Google Scholar
Phillips, DZ (1988) Faith After Foundationalism. London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Schellenberg, JL (2015) The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy's New Challenge to Belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sider, T (2002) Hell and vagueness. Faith and Philosophy 19, 5858.10.5840/faithphil20021918CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Williams, B (1981) Utilitarianism and moral self-indulgence. In Williams, B (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 4053.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilt, JA, Grubbs, JB, Exline, JJ and Pargament, KI (2016) Personality, religious and spiritual struggles, and well-being. Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 8, 341351.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, J (2003) The Book Against God. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.Google Scholar