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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 October 2008
The debate continues concerning the nature of religious truth-claims and their role in dialogue: a seemingly vexatious topic not only in discussions between religious persons and those who question the value of accredited religion, but also within the camp of differently aligned believers themselves. Indeed the present interest in inter-religious understanding has tended to make this problem even more acute. In Part I of this paper I wish to discuss the issue of truth-claims in religion within the context of two apparently conflicting views: the one represented in the writings of Professor John Hick, and the other that advanced by D. Z. Phillips. In the second part I propose to indicate how this issue bears on the further question of inter-faith dialogue.
page 217 note 2 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970. I think it adequate for our purposes to concentrate chiefly on this book.
page 218 note 1 Op. cit. p. 89.
page 218 note 2 Ibid.
page 218 note 3 Op. cit. p. 90. Again, entertaining religious beliefs ‘has to do with living by them, drawing sustenance from them, judging oneself in terms of them, being afraid of them, etc.’; from Death and Immortality (Macmillan, 1970), p. 68.Google Scholar
page 218 note 4 Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 158.
page 218 note 5 Ibid.
page 219 note 1 I am not considering here those religious beliefs that are purely empirical in character, and are expressed in truth-claims such as, ‘This object is a relic of St Francis Xavier’, or ‘The tomb of St Philomena lies in such-and-such a place’. There is no dispute about the claim to fact-assertiveness of such statements.
page 219 note 2 Cf. John Hick±s analysis of ‘verification’ in ‘Theology and Verification’, Theology Today, xvii, 1 (April 1960), 12–17.Google Scholar
page 219 note 3 Op. cit. p. 4.
page 219 note 4 Op. cit. p. 89.
page 220 note 1 ’Theology and Verification’, p. 17.
page 220 note 2 God and the Universe of Faiths, p. 24.
page 220 note 3 Op. cit. p. 28.
page 220 note 4 Op. cit. p. 28.
page 220 note 5 Op. cit. pp. 17–18.
page 220 note 6 Op. cit. p. 60.
page 221 note 1 God and the Universe of Faiths, p. 4.
page 221 note 2 See, for instance, ‘Theology and Verification’, pp. 18–19.
page 221 note 3 Ibid. p. 19.
page 222 note 1 Op. cit. p. 4.
page 222 note 2 Op. cit. p. 30.
page 222 note 3 In Super De Divinis Nominibus Expositio, Mandonnet, ed., vol 2, p. 259.Google Scholar
page 222 note 4 Ibid.
page 222 note 5 Dynamics of Faith (London, 1957), p. 45.Google Scholar
page 224 note 1 Op. cit. p. 57.
page 224 note 2 Op. cit. p. 98.
page 224 note 3 Op. cit. p. 99.
page 225 note 1 Op. cit. p. 101; italicized in the original.
page 225 note 2 They need not be devotionally or theologically trivial.
page 225 note 3 Op. cit. pp. 101–4, 128 for example; also The Concept of Prayer (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), ch. 6.Google Scholar
page 225 note 4 Faith and Philosophical Enquiry, p. 73.
page 225 note 5 Op. cit. p. 68.
page 226 note 1 Op. cit. p. 7. In The Concept of Prayer he says: ‘Philosophy…leaves everything as it is, and tries to give an account of it’ (p. 3).
page 226 note 2 In ‘Dialogue and Encounter’, The Downside Review (January 1975.
page 227 note 1 Reform (October 1974), p. 19.Google Scholar
page 227 note 2 Ibid.
page 230 note 1 Op. cit. pp. 126–39.
page 230 note 2 Op. cit. p. 128.
