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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
1. The charges against Churchill
Did Mr Churchill, Britain's wartime Prime Minister, display ‘cavalier behaviour5 towards his Cabinet over The Atlantic Charter9 of 1941? Having decided ‘to ignore’ their views, did he somehow seek to ensure, ‘rather ineptly’, that crucial telegrams should conceal his deviousness?
Dr A. P. Dobson makes these accusations in this Review in April 1984,] They relate to ‘RIVIERA’, Churchill’s first wartime meeting with President Roosevelt, between 9 and 12 August 1941 in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Concerned primarily with wartime collaboration, though the United States was not yet formally a belligerent, the two leaders outlined peace aims in a hastily drafted joint declaration, promptly named ‘The Atlantic Charter’. Their fierce debate over its fourth economic ‘Point’ reflected American pressure to secure advantage from assistance, under the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, to Britain's war effort.
1. Dobson, Alan P., ‘Economic Diplomacy at the Atlantic Conference’, Review of International Studies 10 (1984), pp. 143–163CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hereafter ‘Dobson’ in notes. Citations in the first paragraph are from pp. 158–60 and 156.
2. Relevant documents available and listed in the Public Record Office (PRO), their titles in most cases clearly indicating their importance, but not used by Dobson, include CAB 117/52, CAB 120/20–25, FO 371/28903, PREM 4/17/3, T 160/1105. Dobson cites Foreign Office sources inadequately by original internal references, not by PRO references; PREM 3 (Dobson note 82) and ADM 53 (Dobson note 83), are cited, but in fact do not appear to have been consulted.
3. Dobson, p. 159; logs of HMS Prince of Wales in ADM 53/114891. Hereafter ‘ship's Log’.
4. One of the authors, L. S. Pressnell, writes from ciphering experience 1940–41.
5. Hall, H. D., North American Supply (London, 1955), p. 506.Google Scholar
6. J. M. Keynes to Treasury, tei 2351 of 25 May 1941, CAB 117/52, reprinted in The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, XXIII, ed., Moggridge, Donald (Cambridge, 1979)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, hereafter JMK, pp. 101–2, and tel 2439 of 29 May 1941, CAB 117/52.
7. Letter from Keynes to Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 21 June 1941, CAB 117/52, also FO 371/28802; reprinted JMK, pp. 133–40.
8. Chancellor to Keynes, tel 3634 of 29 June 1941, CAB. 117/52, also FO 371/28801.
9. Halifax to Foreign Office, tel 3178 of 7 July 1941 and tel 3177 of 8 July 1941, CAB 117/52, also FO 371/28802. A minor example of the hazards of telegrams as evidence comes with Dobson's puzzlement, note 18 on p. 161, over the date of the meeting of 7 July. Halifax's tel 3177 of 8 July said it had been ‘today’, whereas Dean Acheson reported it as 7 July: Foreign Relations of the United States, hereafter FRUS, 1941, II I (Washington, DC, 1959), pp. 6–7Google Scholar. In a group of related telegrams, despatch dates might differ from respective times of origin from their senders, and series numbers might not correspond with chronological sequence. Moreover, a document might be cabled separately and ahead of the sender's considered comments in a subsequent telegram. Anglo-American communications in mid-1941 were further complicated by delays resulting from a heavy backlog in the Washington Embassy's Cipher Room: Keynes to Chancellor, 20 July 1941, T 160/1105, reprinted JMK, pp. 168–9. Acheson's date, 7 July, is confirmed in a letter from Keynes to Chancellor, 13 July 1941, that he saw the President ‘last Monday’, which would have been 7 July: JMK, p. 154.
10. Dobson, p. 146.
11. Keynes to Chancellor, tel 3180 of 8 July 1941, FO 371/28802, also CAB 117/52.
12. Keynes's proposals were first discussed by a formidable meeting of senior officials, reported 11 July 1941, FO 371/28802; Prime Minister and Chancellor, tel 4022 of 14 July 1941, Ibid., also CAB 117/52.
13. Chancellor to Keynes, tel 4023 of 14 July 1941, CAB 117/52, also FO 371/28802.
14. Acheson, Dean, Present at the Creation (London, 1970), p. 29Google Scholar, citing FRUS, 1941, III, p. 12.
15. Keynes's letter 15 July 1941 to Chancellor, JMK, p. 163.
16. Dobson, p. 147.
17. Acheson's draft and Keynes's accompanying memo on ‘Consideration’, both of 28 July 1941, in PREM 4/17/3; T 160/1105; FO 371/28804; reprinted JMK, pp. 171–5 (where Keynes's memo is dated correctly on p. 171, incorrectly on p. 172).
18. Keynes's further memo on ‘Consideration’, 2 August 1941, PREM 4/17/3, reprinted JMK, pp. 194–6.
19. Reynolds, David, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937–41 (London, 1981), p. 275Google Scholar, and note 96 on p. 368.
20. Keynes's letter of 20 July 1941 to Chancellor, T 160/1105, reprinted JMK, pp. 165–6
21. Prime Minister's note 29 July 1941, T. L. Rowan's note 30 July 1941, Chancellor's memo 30 July 1941: PREM 4/17/3.
22. Keynes's memo: see note 18. Chancellor's memo, PREM 4/17/3.
23. Cadogan, ms Diary entry for 9 August 1941, Churchill College Archives, Cambridge, ACAD 1/10; FRUS, 1941, I (Washington, DC, 1958), pp. 345–354Google Scholar, with Cadogan's comments on p. 354.
24. Dobson, p. 149.
25. Ibid.
26. Cadogan, draft chapters for an autobiography, Churchill College Archives, ACAD 7/2.
27. ‘…I heard a great commotion and a good deal of shouting. It turned out to be the P.M. storming round the deck and calling for me. He ran me to ground and said he wanted immediately drafts of the “parallel” and “;joint” declarations [respectively on Far Eastern policy and peace aims. Cadogan adds here, at the side, ‘He gave me, in broad outline, the sort of shap e the latter should take’.] I hadn't quite finished my eggs and bacon, but I pulled a sheet of note paper out of the stationery rack before me [his improvised accommodation was normally used for secretarial purposes] and began to write’: Ibid.
28. Ibid.; FRUS, 1941, I, p. 355; Welles, Sumner, Where are We Heading? (London, 1947), p. 6Google Scholar,
29. Cadogan, loc. cit., was present, but simply noted that, after general conversation, ‘the party got down t o some business’. The report of the animated discussion is from Roosevelt, Elliot, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), pp. 35–37Google Scholar, cit. Wilson, Theodore A., The First Summit (Boston, Mass., 1969), pp. 189–192.Google Scholar
30. Welles, op. cit., pp. 7–9.
31. Ibid., pp. 8–9.
32. This account of the discussions is based on Welles, op. cit., pp. 9–14; FRUS, 1941, I, pp. 360–3; ‘Memorandum’ by Mr Churchill on his conversations with President Roosevelt, W.P. (41) 202 of 20 August 1941, CAB 66/18; Churchill, Winston S., The Second World War, III (London, 1950), pp. 386–392Google Scholar.
33. ‘Record of Meeting…\ C.O.S.(R)8 of 11 August 1941, signed by Col. L. C. Hollis, of the Ministry of Defence, F O 371/28903.
34. Dobson, p. 152.
35. ‘Joint Declaration…known'as the Atlantic Charter’, Cmd. 6321 Br. Pari Papers 1940–41, VIII.
36. Tel AVENUE 15 of 9 August, CAB 120/22; Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones of the War Cabinet Offices to defence and other departments, 10 August 1941, CAB 120/20; FRUS, 1941,1, p. 363; Welles, op. cit., p. 13.
37. Dobson, p. 153.
38. Hancock, W. K., Empire in the Changing World (New York, 1943), pp. 103–104Google Scholar, cit. Gardner, R. N., Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy (Oxford, 1956), p. 155Google Scholar.
39. Tels TUDOR 15 and TUDOR 16 of 11 August 1941, CAB 120/24. Telegrams prefaced ABBEY from London and TUDOR from HMS Prince of Wales formed personal series for communications with the Prime Minister. ABBEY telegrams in CAB 120/25, TUDOR in CAB 120/24. Selection of these and other telegrams in ‘Conference between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States’, W.P.(41) 203 of 18 August 1941, CAB 66/18.
40. CAB 65/19.
41. Letters to the two Ministers from Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary to the War Cabinet, 12 August 1941, CAB 120/20.
42. The Chancellor took over wording originating from the Treasury (CAB 117/52) and from Lord Catto, Governor of the Bank of England and formerly in the Treasury (T 160/1105).
43. ABBEY 35, CAB 120/25.
44. Dobson, p. 156, citing Churchill, op. cit., p. 392.
45. Churchill, op. cit., p. 394.
46. Dobson, p. 156, and reference in note 41 above.
47. Dobson, p. 159..
48. CAB 120/24.
49. Dobson, p. 156.
50. Dobson, p. 157.
51. We are greatly indebted to Sir Ian Jacob for a copy of this entry from his Diary (omissions made by authors).
52. Dilks, David (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan O.M. 1938–1945 (London, 1971)Google Scholar, entry for 11 August, p. 399.
53. Dobson, p. 156. His note 69 on p. 163 refers to Wilson, op. cit., without page reference. Wilson, using Lt.-Col. Jacob's diary, states that ‘Hollis assured him [Churchill] th e Cabinet had raised very few objections and that all was well’: op. cit., p. 205 and note 7 on p. 303.
54. Even before Churchill sailed, London and Washington considered anxiously how best to deal with reports about a possible meeting. Speculation and increasingly accurate guesses, not least from Germany, intensified as the voyage and Conference progressed: CAB 120/20.
55. Message for First Sea Lord on HMS Prince of Wales, 10 August 1941, CAB 120/20, and telegram SLOANE 13 of same date, CAB 120/22. Thepopular writer, H. V. Morton, was aboard ship to report the Conference; he noted the state of alert, with ‘our last day a t sea…probably the most hazardous…A U-boat was reported to be in our path…others were reported not far away…’: Atlantic Meeting (London, fourth edition, 1944), p. 143Google Scholar, and other references pp. 124–5, 131. Cadogan was later to write enigmatically of…the confusion of the last day of our stay…and…our hurried departure, due to naval and navig[ational] difficulties’: Churchill College Archives, ACAD 7/2. On the Bismarck's sinking, Roskill, S. W., The War at Sea, I (London, 1954), pp. 396–417.Google Scholar
56. CAB 65/19, 12 August 1941.
57. Ship's Log.
58. Dobson, p. 160.
59. Ibid., p. 159.
60. CAB 120/24.
61. Times have been adjusted to ship time to simplify comparisons. Dobson mishandles international time differences (see section 14 below). On p. 159, he correctly describes ship time at the Conference as five hours behind London time, but mistakenly assumes London receipt times to have been at GMT. That would imply a ship time, which he incorrectly describes as ‘Newfoundland local time’, of five hours behind GMT, whereas it was four hours behind. London receipt times for the telegrams in contention were local BST, one hour ahead of GMT (until the second day of the Conference, they had been at Midsummer Time, two hours ahead). Newfoundland local time was 21/2 hours behind GMT (subject to ‘summer Time’ variation) and in fact HMS Prince of Wales had altered clocks to 21/2 hours behind GMT before entering Placentia Bay. The US Navy, however, was observing Atlantic Time of four hours behind GMT, and failed to rendezvous. The battleship had therefore to turn about to kill 1 1/2 hours, meanwhile putting back its clocks to Atlantic Time. Sources: Ship's Log; Cadogan's diary, entry for 9 August 1941, Dilks, op. cit., p. 397; Ex-Det. Insp. Thompson, W. H., I was Churchill's Shadow (London, 1951), p. 71Google Scholar; Lamb, James B., The Corvette Navy (London, 1979), pp. 105–106Google Scholar. For international time zones, see Howse, Derek, Greenwich Time (Oxford, 1980)Google Scholar, chapter 6, with map of zones, pp. 158–9; see also ‘Review of British Standard Time’, Cmnd 4512 of October 1970, Brit Parl Papers, 1970–71, XVI.
62. FO 371/28903.
63. Ship's Log.
64. Dobson, pp. 159–60.
65. Ship's Log.
66. Wheeler-Bennett, Sir John (ed.), Action This Day. Working with Churchill (London, 1968)Google Scholar, passim; particular examples on pp. 27–8 (Sir John Colville), and p. 229 (Sir Edward Bridges). Ismay, Lord, The Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay (London, 1960), pp. 196–201Google Scholar.
67. ABBEY 40 of 13 August, CAB 120/25.
68. Mr L. S. Amery, Secretary of State for India and Burma, to Sir Kingsley Wood, 18 August 1941, CAB 117/52.
