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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 October 2010
The death of Hirohito on 7 January 1989 provided the Japanese with an opportunity of reappraising the Showa era, as Hirohito's reign is called in the Japanese calendar. This lasted for sixty-two years, which the press described as years of ‘turmoil and drastic changes.’ While the role of the Emperor and, to a greater degree, the role of the military in imperial Japan have been long-running themes for historians, intellectuals, and journalists, Hirohito's death certainly encouraged the publication of a large number of books, including reprints of works about the Pacific War, from semi-official histories, the memoirs of some of the leading decision makers and a series of histories of Japan from 1868 to 1945. Television programmes showed for two full days panel discussions by historians and documentary films of the Showa era—a series of bloody wars in China and eventually with the Americans, the British and the other Allied powers, leading to unconditional surrender and occupation.
1 Asahi Shimbun (daily newspaper) (hereafter cited as Asahi) 7 January 1989; ainichi Shimbun (daily newspaper), 7 January 1989; Asahi Evening News, 7 January 1989.
2 For instance, eight volumes of Taihei yō sensō e no michi (The Road to the Pacific War) originally published in 1962–3 were re-designed and re-printed in 1988 (Tokyo) Sugiyama memo edited by the Imperial Army General Staff (which was originally published in 1967) (Tokyo, 1989); See also the interesting study of the Japanese Emperor by Crump, Thomas, The Death of an Emperor (Oxford and New York, 1991)Google Scholar.
3 The author was in Tokyo at the time of the death of Hirohito.
4 For instance, see Asahi, 9, 12 and 16 January 1989; D. Irokawa (interview),Asahi Journal, 27 January 1989, pp. 14–6. See also Kisaka in Taiheiyō sensō, pp. 16–17; Shin Nihon Bunkagu Kai (New Japan Literary Association), Han Tennou sei ron (Anti-Emperor Views) (6th edn, Tokyo, 1986).
3 For instance, Asahi, 12 January 1989; K Hayashi, ‘Sensō Sekinin to wa nanika’ (What is the War Responsibility?) in Bungei-shunju (Tokyo), 67, no. 4 (March 1989), pp. 264–5.
6 This reflects the main stream of Japanese thinking; for instance, Asahi 9, 12 and 16 January 1989; discussions by critics, writers, and historians on TV (channels 2, 6, 8, 10) on 7 January 1989; S. Oue, Tennou no guntai (The Emperor's Army) (Tokyo, 1988).
7 H. Takahashi, Shocho Tennou (The Emperor as a Symbol), pp. 18–59; see also Sukemasa Iriye (who served at the board of the Chamberlain in the Imperial Household after 1935 and was the Grand Chamberlain from 1969 until his death in 1985), Iriye Jyuchō no shuki (Iriye Grand Chamberlain's Diaries), entries of 11 May and 17 August 1948 printed in Asahi, 1 February 1989; and entry of 2 May 1951 (in which Iriye observes that the Emperor finally gave up his plans to abdicate), in Asahi, 3 February 1989.
8 Author's translation, quoted from Asahi, 9 January 1989.
9 For a succinct account in English of Imperial Japan's decision-making system, see Imai, S., ‘Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen’, in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds.) Pearl Harbor as History 1931–41 (New York and London, 1973), pp. 53–79Google Scholar; Ienaga, S., Japan's Last War (Oxford, 1979)Google Scholar, ch. 3; see also an English translation of the Meiji Constitution in Edwin Hoyt, Japan's War—The Great Pacific Conflict (London and Melbourne, 1986). Appendix E, pp. 439–49.
10 For the origins of the Japanese Imperial army, see Akira Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi (Japanese Military History), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 1–27.
11 S. Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 136–7.
12 Ibid. pp. 163–7; Fujiwara, Nihon gunjishi, pp. 81–2.
13 Ibid. pp. 32–4, 56–8, 62–8; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 69–70.
14 Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 81–4, 103–6, 108–115; Sakano, S., Kindai Nihon no shuppatsu (The Origins of Modern Japan), (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 209–11Google Scholar; Furuya, T., Nichiro Sensō (Russo-Japanese War) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 96–160Google Scholar; Beasley, W. G., Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945 (Oxford, 1987), p. 91Google Scholar. The Imperial military courts dealt with increasing numbers of soldiers who failed—or refused—to obey the regulations: 2,222 cases in 1906, 1,992 in 1907 and 2,203 in 1908 with about 1,600 deserters. See Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 134–5; Sumiya, M., Dai nihon teikoku no shiren (Japanese Empire's Challenge) (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 341–343Google Scholar.
15 Oue, Tennou no gunlai, pp. 71–80; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, p. 173.
16 Ibid. pp. 237–8.
17 Oue, Tennou no guntai, p. 65.
18 Fujiwara, Nihon no gunji shi, pp. 127–34; Oue, Tennou no guntai pp. 98–104.
19 Asahi editorial, ‘Fro m Showa to Heisei’, part 3, 11 January 1989.
20 Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, pp. 237–40; Kisaka, J., Taiheiyō sensō (The Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 170-2Google Scholar; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen sensō (The Chinese-Japanese War), (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 268–70; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 365–87.
21 Fujiwara, Nihon gunji-shi, pp. 239–40; and Nitchu zenmen sensō, pp. 268–70; Kisaka, Taiheiyō sensō, pp. 170–2; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 365–87.
22 T. Kobayashi, ‘Kaigun gunshuku joyaku 1921–36’ (Naval Disarmament Treaty) in Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 1, pp. 3—9ff, 100–1; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 135–8.
23 For the Meiji leaders’ handling of the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, see Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 154–5; Irokawa, D., Kindai kokka no shuppatsu (The Departure to a Modern State) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 413-22Google Scholar; Fujiwara, Nihon gunji shi, ch. 4; Sumiya, Dai nihon-teikoku no shiren (Tokyo, 1987), pp. 243–52; Furuya, Nichiro Sensō, pp. 58–93; Bouei-Cho Senshi shitsu (ed.), Daihon'ei Rikungunbu (I) (The Imperial Army Head Quarters) (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 32–47, 89–127.
24 Oue, Cozen kaigi (The Imperial Conference) (Tokyo, 1991), p. 186.
25 Kazama, A., Konoe Naikaku (The Konoe Cabinet) (Tokyo, 1982), pp. 48–62Google Scholar.
26 Barnhart, Michael, Japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca and London, 1987), pp. 64–76Google Scholar.
27 For the Kwantung Army's militant actions in 1928, 1931 and 1937, see Shimada, T., Kanio-gun (The Kwantung Army) (35th edn, Tokyo, 1986), pp. 47–74Google Scholar; and ‘Manshu jihen no tenkai’ (The Development of the Manchuria Incident), in Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 2, pp. 3–34 ff; Baba, S., Manshu-jihen e no michi (The Road to the Manchurian Incident) (9th edn, Tokyo, 1988), pp. 185–217Google Scholar; K. Seki, ‘Manshu jihen senshi’ (History Prior to the Manchuria Incident) in Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 1, pp. 287–327; Eguchi, K., Jugo-nen senso no kaimaku (The Outbreak of the 15 Years’ War) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 22–30Google Scholar, 58–79; See also Saji, Y., Ishihara Kanji, 2 vols. (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 21–65Google Scholar. For the views of Ishihara and Itagaki (who mobilized the Kwantung army) on Manchuria, see Taiheiyō sensō e no michi-shryō hen (The Road to the Pacific War, Documents) (hereafter cited as Documents), pp. 77–107, 124–6; Honjo, S., Honjō nikki (Honjō Diaries) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 22, 150–3Google Scholar. For the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, see Hayashi, S., Taiheiyō sensō (The Pacific War) (Tokyo, 1980), pp. 40–58Google Scholar; Fujiwara, Nitchu zenmen senso, pp. 62–83, 109–15; I. Hata, ‘Nitchu sensō no gunjiteki tenkai’ (Military Developments of the Chinese-Japanese War) in Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 4, pp. 27–9.
28 For the education of officers, see Takahashi, M., Showa no gunbatsu (The Military Clique of Showa Period) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 11–26Google Scholar; Oue, Tennou no guntai, pp. 104–20; Fujiwara, Nihon no gunji shi, pp. 75–8, 191–5.
29 Hayashi, Taiheiyō sensō, pp. 49–76ff; Kojima, Y., Tennou, vol. 3 (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 188—215ffGoogle Scholar.
30 ‘Showa Tennou no dokuhaku hachi-jikan’ (Showa Emperor's Eight Hours’ Monologue), in Bungei Shunju (December 1990), pp. 105–7 (hereafter cited as Monologue).
31 Japan Defence Agency, War History division (ed.), Daihon'ei rikugunbu (The Imperial Army Headquarters), vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 406–14, 425–36; Inaba et al. (eds.), Kaisen-gaikō shi: Documents (Diplomatic History before the Outbreak of the War) in Taihei-yō sensō e no michi, pp. 256–9; I. Hata, ‘Nitchu senso no gunjiteki tenkai’, pp. 11–14, 24–6, 32.
32 Hata, ibid. pp. 36–8; Iriye, A., The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, (London and New York, 1987), p. 49Google Scholar; I. Nish, ‘The Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’, in K. Neilson and R. Prete (eds.), Coalition Warfare—An Uneasy Accord (Ontario, 1983), pp. 129–30.
33 Japan Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Dihon'ei kaigunbu-rengo kantai (1) (The Imperial Navy General Headquarters—The Combined Fleet) (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 447–57; see also Marder, Arthur, Old Friends, New Enemies (Oxford, 1981), pp. 98–101Google Scholar; H. Agawa, translated by J. Bester, The Reluctant Admiral—Yamamoto and the Imperial Army (Tokyo and New York, 1979), pp. 185–91.
34 Ohata, T., ‘The Conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Problem of its Reinforcement, 1935–1939’, in The Road to the Pacific War, vol. 5, pp. 159–61Google Scholar.
35 Monologue, pp. 108–9.
36 Hayashi, Taiheiyo senso, pp. 133–47.
37 Monologue, pp. 110–11.
38 Documents pp. 319–23; The Imperial Army General Staff (ed.), Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 5–16; ‘Important National Policies Relevant to the Outbreak of the Pacific War’, A-700–9–49, Diplomatic Record Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo (hereafter cited as JDRO). For the origins of Japan's thinking about the move towards the south, see Hata, ‘Futsuin shinchu to gun no nanshin seisaku’ (The Invasion of French Indochina and the Military's Policy for Southward Expansion), in Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 6, pp. 145–60.
39 J. Tsunoda, ‘Nihon no taibei kaisen’ (Japan's Opening of the War with the USA), in Taihei yō sensō e no michi, vol. 7, pp. 53–5; Record of the preliminary conference between Tōjō (War minister), Yoshida (Navy minister), Matsuoka and Konoe at Konoe's residence in Tokyo, on 19 July 1941; see Documents, pp. 319–20.
40 Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 17–24.
41 Kojima, Tennou—the Pacific War (Tokyo, 1988), p. 121; Kido, K., Kido Diaries, vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1966), p. 821Google Scholar.
42 Author's translation of Konoe memorandum in Sugiyama memo, p. 35; See also ‘Konoe memorandum on the tripartite pact’, undated, reel 1 of Fumimaro Konoe papers, the National Diet Library, Tokyo.
43 Ikeda, K., Kaigun to nippon (The Navy and Japan) (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 104–13Google Scholar; C. Hosoya, ‘The Tripartite Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality’, in Taihei yō sensō e no michi, vol. 5, pp. 204–6.
44 Sugiyama memo, pp. 36–7; Kojima, Tennou, vol. 4, pp. 124–5.
45 Ibid. p. 125; Incidentally, Admiral Yamamoto, in a letter to Navy Minister Oikawa, admitted the fact that Japan never defeated the United States through the Naval exercises. See Yamomoto to Oikawa (letter), 7 January 1941, in Self-Defence Agency, Military History Division (ed.), Hawaii Sakusen (Strategy for Hawaii), (Tokyo, 1967), p. 7.
46 Kojima, Tennou vol. 4, pp. 125–7; Kido, Diaries, p. 822; Monologue, pp. 111–2.
47 ‘Konoe memorandum on the tripartite pact’, reel 1, Konoe papers.
48 Yabe, T., Konoe Fumimaro (Tokyo, 1976), p. 571Google Scholar; Shigenori Togo, Jidai no ichimen (memoirs), (Tokyo, 1989), pp. 150–1.
49 Monologue, pp. 113–14; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 569–71; Oue, Cozen kaigi, pp. 69–70; Kido, Diaries, p. 884; C. Hosoya, ‘The Tripartit e Alliance and the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality’, in Taihei yō sensō e no michi, vol. 5, p. 310.
50 Monologue p. 113–14.
51 For the records of 32nd to 37th Liaison Conferences, on 25, 26, 27, 28 and 30 June and 1 July, see Documents, pp. 445–63; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 71–2, 76–7; Yabe, Konoe, p. 571; Daihon'ei kaigun bu, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1979), pp. 336–42.
52 ‘National Guidelines in the light of Developments of International Situation’, on 2 July 1941, A-700–9–49, JDRO.
53 Hosoya, The Tripartite Alliance …’, pp. 323–31; Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 87–8.
54 Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 349–52ff; Oue, Cozen kaigi, pp. 85–7; Monologue, p. 114.
55 Kido, Diaries, pp. 895–6; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 452–3.
56 Sugiyama memo, vol. 1, pp. 309–11.
57 Ibid. pp. 311–12; Kido, Diaries, pp. 905–6; Monologue, p. 116; Yabe, Konoe, pp. 604–5.
58 Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 484–504ff; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 90–137.
59 Yabe, Konoe, p. 622; Kido, Diaries, pp. 914–16; Togo, Jidai no ichimen, pp. 195–6.
60 See Daihon'ei rikugunbu (5), pp. 186—261ff; M. Hosaka, Tōjō Hideki to tennou no jidai, vol. 1 (Tōjō Hideki and the Emperor's Era) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 254–99ff. At a Conference with Hirohito on 2 November 1941, Tōjō cried when he reported to the Emperor that Tōjō could not persuade his ministers to decide for peace. See: Daihon'ei rikugunbu, (vol. 5) p. 261; Hosaka, Tōjō, p. 299; Sugiyama memo, pp. 386–7.
61 Oue, Gozen kaigi, pp. 211–12; Hosaka, Tōjō, p. 277; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 266–7.
62 For instance, Conference with military leaders on 2, 3, 5 and 15 November, in Sugiyama memo, pp. 387–8, 431, 525.
63 Sugiyama memo, p. 387.
64 Sugiyama memo, p. 625.
65 Ibid. p. 387–8; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 336–40.
66 See the record of meeting between Yamomoto and Nagano on 29 September 1941 in Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 5, p. 484.
67 Hawaii sakusen, pp. 5–33, 73–89ff; Shigeo Fukuda, ‘America no tainichi sansen’ (US Participation in the War with Japan), Taiheiyō sensō e no michi, vol. 7, pp. 370–5.
68 Hawaii sakusen, p. 12.
69 Folders (3) and (20), A-700–9–51, JDRO.
70 Folder (22), A-700–9–51, JDRO.
71 Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 486–92; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 2, pp. 546–9; Togo, Jidai no ichimen, pp. 247–65.
72 Monologue, pp. 119–20; Sugiyama memo, pp. 535–6; Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 495–9.
73 Daihon'ei rikugunbu, vol. 5, pp. 504–5; Daihon'ei kaigunbu, vol. 5, pp. 548–9.
74 Ito, Hirohashi and Katashima (eds.), Tōjō naikaku sōri-daijin kimitsu shiroku (Secret Documents of Prime Minister Tōjō), (Tokyo, 1990), p. 479.
75 Monologue, pp. 118–20, 145.
76 Monologue, pp. 101–2, 105; see also Britain's attitude towards the Manchurian crisis, Lowe, Peter, Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War—A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937–1941. (Oxford, 1977), pp. 6–8Google Scholar.
77 Monologue, p. 100.
78 Author's translation, quoted from Takahashi, H., Shōchō Tennou (The Emperor as a Symbol) (Tokyo, 1988), pp. 2–3Google Scholar.
