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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 October 2009
When French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr in January 1923, ostensibly as a result of Germany falling behind schedule in the reparation deliveries of timber and telegraph poles, “something as far reaching in its effects as the declaration of war in 1914 or the conclusion of the armistice in 1918” had occurred. The often acrimonious Anglo-French debate over the interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles and the role of Germany in post-war Europe had reached a decisive stage. The British government, by not participating in the occupation, at last acted on its belief that an economic restoration of Germany was of paramount importance to the revival of the European and indeed world economies, while France grimly persisted in implementing the Treaty of Versailles by securing the Ruhr as a productive pledge. The ultimate French failure to enforce her will on Germany marked the end of French hegemony in Europe and the reemergence of Germany as a great power and a “central support” of the European economic system.
page 70 note 1. The Times, 6 Jan. 1923.
page 70 note 2. Keynes, J. M., The Economic Consequences of the Peace (London, 1920), p. 14Google Scholar.
page 70 note 3. Kochan, L., The Struggle for Germany, 1914–45 (Edinburgh, 1963), p. 29Google Scholar.
page 70 note 4. There have been surprisingly few recent studies on Britain and the Ruhr crisis - even the relevant volume of Documents on British Foreign Policy (H.M.S.O., 1947Google Scholar onwards) has not yet been published.
The best accounts of British foreign policy for 1923–4 are still to be found in Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs, vol. 1, 1920–1923, vol. 2,1924 (London, 1927Google Scholar and 1928) (hereafter Survey 1 and 2) and Jordon, W. M., Great Britain, France and the German Problem, 1918–1939 (London, 1943)Google Scholar.
A somewhat emotional and biased account of the French occupation of the Ruhr is given by Gedye, G. R., The Revolver Republic (London, 1930)Google Scholar.
For brief studies of British public opinion during the crisis see McCallum, R. B., Public Opinion and the Last Peace (London, 1944)Google Scholar and Gilbert, M., The Roots of Appeasement (London, 1966)Google Scholar (hereafter Gilbert).
page 70 note 5. A term first coined by Miles Lampson of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office. See minute dated 26 Jan. 1923 Public Record Office, London (hereafter P.R.O.) F.O. 371 8707.
page 71 note 1. Martin Gilbert, for example, did not have the space to explore “benevolent passivity” and was only able to give a brief survey of Ramsay MacDonald's attempts “to influence France by sympathy”. Gilbert, op, cit. pp. 102–11.
page 71 note 2. Lloyd-George in Northedge, F. S., The Troubled Giant (London, 1966), p. 99Google Scholar (hereafter Northedge).
page 71 note 3. I use the term to describe such Liberals as Buxton, Morel, Arthur Ponsonby, Wedgewood Benn and Kenworthy who had either joined the Labour Party or were about to do so. See Clarke, P. F., ‘The Progressive Movement in England’, Royal Historical Transactions, Vth Series no. 24 (1974), pp. 159–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
page 71 note 4. ‘Labour and the Peace Treaty’ (July 1919), LP/IAC/2/67, Labour Party Archives (hereafter L.P. Archives), Transport House, London.
page 71 note 5. See the letter signed by Oxford Academics in The Times, 8 Oct. 1920.
page 71 note 6. ‘In Cologne’, The Bystander, 20 Aug. 1919. See also, for example Markham, V. R., A Woman's Watch on the Rhine, Sketches of the Occupation (London, 1920)Google Scholar which was described by Troughton, E. R. in Its Happening Again (London, 1945), p. 32Google Scholar, as “representative of many (books) written under the influence of Keynes which paved the way for the full development of German propaganda”.
page 72 note 1. Professor Schulze-Gaevernitz, ‘Londoner Eindrücke’, Mai 1921, K2002 K5I5978, Foreign … Commonwealth Office Library, London (hereafter F.C.O. Lib.).
page 72 note 2. Many British intellectuals as well as serving officers on the International Boundary Commission in Upper Silesia regarded it as a crime to abandon the Germans to what Mrs Buxton (Noel Buxton's wife) called “the extremely low moral as well as intellectual level in Poland”. Draft memo on Upper Silesia, L.P. Archives, LP/IAC/2/192. Schulze-Gaevernitz observed that in England “die Verachtung der Polen ist nicht geringer als die der ‘Nigger’ ” F.C.O. Lib. K2002 K515978.
page 72 note 3. See, for example, the Meeting of the Grand Council of the Federation of British Industries, 20 July 1921, Confederation of British Industry Archives (hereafter C.B.I. archives), London, F.B.L/C/L
page 72 note 4. Pogge. v. Strandmann, H. (ed.), Walther Kathenau. Tagebucb, 1907–1922 (Düsseldorf, 1967), p. 268Google Scholar.
page 72 note 5. Cobban, A., A History of Modern France, vol. 3 (Penguin, 1967), p. 126Google Scholar.
page 72 note 6. Survey 1, op. cit, p. 187.
page 72 note 7. Ibid. p. 188.
page 73 note 1. Curzon and Baldwin were both out of the country on 11 Jan., the former at Lausanne negotiating a settlement with Turkey and the latter in Washington arranging a settlement of Britain's war-time American debt. In January the divisions in the Cabinet ran between those ministers like the two service ministers, Lord Derby (War) and L. S. Amery (Admiralty), who were more positively pro-French than their colleagues and wanted the government to put pressure on the Germans to abandon passive resistance, and the majority who favoured “benevolent passivity”.
page 73 note 2. Blake, R., The Unknown Prime Minister (London, 1955), p. 485Google Scholar.
page 73 note 3. Conclusions of the Meetings of the Cabinet (hereafter Cab.), P.R.O. Cab. 23/45 (1), 11 Jan. 1923.
page 73 note 4. On 11 Jan. the TUC and the Labour Party “repudiate(d) in the most formal manner all responsibility for approving directly or indirectly the policy now being pursued by the French Government towards Germany” (‘Draft Manifesto’ L.P. Archives LP/IAC/2/270) and on 22 Jan. they expressed “the solidarity of British Labour with the working population of the Ruhr” and called upon Bonar Law to adopt a policy of “definite diplomatic intervention”. Joint International Committee (hereafter J.I.C.), 23 Jan. 1923, L.P. Archives N.E.C. vol. 26.
page 74 note 1. P.R.O. Cab. 23/45 (1), 11 Jan. 1923.
page 74 note 2. Draft reply to Kilmarnock, 17 Jan. 1923, F.O. 371 8704.
page 74 note 3. Kilmarnock to War Office, 19 Jan. 1923, 371 8705.
page 74 note 4. Minuted by Cadogan, 20 Jan. 1923, 371 8705.
page 74 note 5. Draft reply to Kilmarnock (initialled by Bonar Law), 22 Jan. 1923, 371 8705.
page 74 note 6. Kilmarnock to F.O., 20 Jan. 1923, 371 8705.
page 74 note 7. Ibid.
page 74 note 8. D'Aberno n to F.O., 24 Jan. 19233 371 8707,
page 75 note 1. Quarry to Kilmarnock, 22 Jan. 1923, 371 8707.
page 75 note 2. Cab. 23/45 (3), 26 Jan. 1923.
page 75 note 3. Quoted in ‘Rough notes of a Conversation held at 10 Downing St.,…on 16 Feb. 1923’, 371 8705.
page 75 note 4. Ibid. 15 and 16 Feb. 1923.
page 76 note 1. Crewe to F.O., 18 Feb. 23, 371 8714.
page 76 note 2. ‘Memorandum on the Franco-Belgian Railway Rêgie in the occupied territories’ (hereafter Rêgie-memo), Jan. 1924, 371 9738.
page 76 note 3. ‘Report of Conference…’, 371 8721.
page 77 note 1. Kilmarnock to Curzon, 18 Apr. 1923, 371 8728.
page 77 note 2. See ‘Memorandum on the effects on British trade of the Ruhr occupation’ (hereafter Ruhr-memo), 3 Aug. 1923, 371 8737.
page 77 note 3. Kavanagh to D'Abernon, 24 Feb. 1923, 371 8719.
page 77 note 4. In Mar. 1923 Kilmarnock reported that twenty lighters containing British coal were held up in Düsseldorf and Heerdt until a 40 per cent duty was paid. Kilmarnock to Curzon, 13 Mar. 1923, 371 8722.
page 77 note 5. Ruhr-memo.
page 77 note 6. ‘British Industry and The Situation in Europe’, C.B.I. Archives, file nos. 3521–3899.
page 77 note 7. Draft Manifesto, 11 Jan. 1923, L.P. Archives, LP/IAC/2/270.
page 77 note 8. J.I.G, 23 Jan. 1923, L.P. Archives N.E.C., vol. 26.
page 77 note 9. The Labour Party was, however, anxious to stress that it was anti-Poincaré rather than merely francophobe. As a member of the Labour and Socialist International it was able to ally with Belgian and French socialists specifically against Poincaré's government. (See, for example, the acrimonious correspondence between J. B. Williams, secretary of the Musicians Union, and W. Gillies, secretary of the J.I.C., Feb. 1923 - Joint International Dept. Correspondence, T.U.C. Archives, London.) There was nevertheless a rapport missing between the British and French socialists when compared to the special relationship between the Labour Party and the SPD. In Dec. 1924, for example, the SPD wanted MacDonald to take part in the German election campaign. (International subcommittee, 2 Dec. 1924, L.P. Archives, N.E.C. vol. 33).
page 77 note 10. Report of the Proceedings of the 1923 TUC Congress, pp. 253–4 (hereafter Congress).
page 77 note 11. Minute by Lampson, 13 Feb. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8712.
page 78 note 1. Report of the Labour Delegation to the Ruhr District, 3 Apr. 1923, N.E.C. vol. 26, L.P. Archives.
page 78 note 2. Congress, p. 417.
page 78 note 3. Press statement issued on 6 Nov. 1923 by the J.I.C., J.I.C. Minutes (1918–1926), TUC Archives, London.
page 78 note 4. When a deputation from the Transport and General Workers Union raised the question of the use of coloured troops in Germany with General Degoutte while visiting the Ruhr i n May and June 1923, he gently teased them by stressing that “Jesus Christ said that all men were brothers…”, Tillett, Benet al. The Ruhr (Labour Publishing Co., 1923), p. 51.Google Scholar
page 78 note 5. ‘Bericht über eine Reise nach England (Frühjahr, 1924) ’ (hereafter Bericht) F.C.O. Lib. K2002 K516028.
page 78 note 6. Cecil Baring was its treasurer, and the bankers Walter Leaf, Owen Hugh Smith and Rothschild “were sympathetic and ready to help with money”. Bell's interview with Dr Schairer, 7 May 1923, Davidson papers (hereafter Davidson), Box 15, Lambeth Palace Library, London.
page 78 note 7. Davidson to Rouse, 14 May 1923, Davidson, Box 15.
page 79 note 1. Copy in Davidson, Box 15.
page 79 note 2. Oxford Magazine, 15 Nov. 1923.
page 79 note 3. In the Winter of 1923–4 the British Labour Party collected £6,648 3s., J.I.C., 16 July 1924, L.P. Archives, N.E.C., vol. 31.
page 79 note 4. See the Middleton Papers, L.P. Archives, JSM/SCF, 1–74.
page 79 note 5. Curzon to Bridgeman, 22 Apr. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8729.
page 79 note 6. Curzon to Davidson, 19 Dec. 1923, 371 8752.
page 79 note 7. Bericht, op. cit. K2002 K516033.
page 79 note 8. G. Greene, A Sort of a Life (London, 1971), p. 136 ff. Oswald Mosley's British Bureau for Ruhr Information, which produced weekly bulletins giving the fullest publicity to every negative aspect of the occupation, also received some financial help from German sources -see F.C.O. Lib. K2002 K516002–003.
page 79 note 9. Minutes of the Oxford Union Debates, 25 Jan. 1923, Oxford Union Archives, Oxford.
page 80 note 1. Red Cross and the Berlin Embassy, 1915–1926. Extracts from the Diaries of Viscountess D'Abernon (London, 1946), pp. 106–7Google Scholar.
page 80 note 2. For example: Osborne, G., ‘In Berlin’, The Gong (Christmas 1923), pp. 5–6Google Scholar, Nottingham University Archives.
page 80 note 3. British Legion Journal, Mar. 1923.
page 80 note 4. F.C.O. Lib. K2002 K516008–10 (dated 27 Mar. 1924).
page 80 note 5. Bericht, op. cit.
page 80 note 6. Nicholson, H., Curzon, the Last Phase (London, 1934), p. 363Google Scholar.
page 80 note 7. Colonial Secretary to the Dominions, 19 Feb. 1923, P.R.O. 371 8714.
page 81 note 1. See Crowe's minute, 17 Feb. 1923, 371 8714.
page 81 note 2. Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J., Baldwin (London, 1969), pp. 154–5Google Scholar (hereafter Baldwin)
page 81 note 3. Quoted from Sir William Tyrrell's minute (addressed to Curzon), 13 Apr. 1923, P.R.O.F.O. 371 8730.
page 81 note 4. ‘Summary of events arising out of French and Belgian occupation of the Ruhr and out of French and Belgian independent action in the Rhineland, 10 Jan.,-30 Apr. 1923’, 371 8731.
page 81 note 5. Ibid.
page 81 note 6. Sir John Bradbury in Baldwin, op. cit. p. 182.
page 81 note 7. P.R.O. Cab. 23/46 (30), 11 June 1923.
page 82 note 1. Survey 2, op. cit. pp. 330–1.
page 82 note 2. Ibid. p. 333.
page 82 note 3. Baldwin, op. cit. p. 190.
page 82 note 4. Curzon to Crowe, 6 Aug. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8647.
page 82 note 5. Curzon to Poincaré, 11 Aug. 1923, 371 8648 (also in Misc. no. 5 (1923). Correspondence with the Allied Governments respecting Reparation Payments by Germany, Cmd. 1943).
page 82 note 6. Crowe to Lampson, 23 Aug. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8651.
page 82 note 7. Baldwin, op. cit. pp. 197–201.
page 83 note 1. Ibid. p. 202.
page 83 note 2. P.R.O. Cab. 23/46 (47), 26 Sept. 1923.
page 83 note 3. Survey 2, op. cit. pp. 340–7.
page 83 note 4. P.R.O. Cab. 23/46 (52), 30 Oct. 1923. Thus when on the 1 Nov. the report reached Cologne from Koblenz that between 1500 and 2000 “separatists” were about to travel through the British zone to Düsseldorf, the British authorities ordered “precautionary measures to be taken immediately”. Historisches Archiv der Stadt Köln, Abt. 902. nr. 252, Fasz I. (Thanks are due to the British Academy for their generous award enabling me to work in the Historisches Archiv.)
page 84 note 1. Memo by Cadogan, 22 Oct. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8746.
page 84 note 2. Survey z, op. cit. p. 311–12.
page 84 note 3. Bradbury to Niemeyer, 28 Sept. 1923, P.R.O. F.O. 371 8748.
page 84 note 4. Telegram to D'Abernon, 7 Nov. 1923, 371 8748.
page 84 note 5. D'Abernon to Curzon, 4 Nov. 1923, 371 8748.
page 84 note 6. Northedge, op. cit. p. 195.
page 85 note 1. P.R.O. Cab. 23/46 (47 & 48), 26 Sept. 1923 and 15 Oct. 1923. See also Kilmarnock to F.O., 2 Nov. 1923, F.O. 371 8748.
page 85 note 2. Survey 2, op. cit. pp. 290–1.
page 85 note 3. Dufour to Horstmann, 17 Jan. 1924, F.C.O. Lib. K2002 K516003.
page 85 note 4. For example the memorandum on ‘Reparations, Ruhr and inter-Allied debts’ which was compiled in Jan. 1924 by the TUC/Labour Advisory Committee on International Questions (A copy in P.R.O. F.O. 371 9807) heralded no immediate break in British foreign policy. Admittedly it envisaged the eventual reconstruction of the League of Nations, stressed the need for open diplomacy and tactfully reminded the new government “that it should be borne in mind that the party has committed itself to revision…of the Treaty of Versailles”, but as far as the immediate problems of the Ruhr, reparations and inter-Allied debts were concerned a course was urged which in practice meant a continuation of the Baldwin-Curzon policy. As soon as the experts’ reports were published France was to be persuaded to agree to the convening of an international conference to which Germany would be invited as an equal. Significantly, only “in the last resort” would Britain act unilaterally and declare that she was no longer bound by the Versailles Treaty to co-operate with France.
page 85 note 5. Ibid.
page 85 note 6. MacDonald (autumn 1923) quoted in Northedge, op. cit. p. 235.
page 85 note 7. For a general account of MacDonald's foreign policy see Lyman, R., The First Labour Government 1924 (New York, 1975), pp. 157–81Google Scholar (hereafter Lyman). This article was in print before I could consult Marquand, D., Ramsay MacDonald (London, March 1977Google Scholar.
page 85 note 8. MacDonald's speech at York, 19 Apr. 1924, P.R.O, F.O. 371 9741.
page 85 note 9. Lyman, p. 160.
page 86 note 1. Survey 2, op. cit. p. 360 ff.
page 86 note 2. Lyman, op. cit. p. 70.
page 86 note 3. In March a Joint meeting of the TUC General Council and the Executive Committee of the Labour Party anxiously requested him to state publicly that Britain could not ally “herself with a policy affecting the sovereign position of Germany”. L.P. Archives, Joint Meeting, 27 Mar. 1924, N.E.C vol. 30.
page 86 note 4. Memorandum by Mr Niemeyer on the Reparation Experts Report, 14 Apr. 1924 (hereafter Niemeyer memo.), P.R.O. F.O. 371 9740.
page 86 note 5. Ljyman, op. cit. p. 165.
page 86 note 6. Ibid. p. 165.
page 86 note 7. Joint Meeting of the General Council of the TUC and the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, 24 July 1924, Joint Executive Minutes (1917–1925), TUC Archives.
page 87 note 1. Bradbury to Snowden, 12 Mar. 1924, P.R.O. F.O. 371 9739.
page 87 note 2. Minute by Lampson, 11 Apr. 1924, 371 9740.
page 87 note 3. Minute by Sterndale Bennett, 28 Apr. 1924, 371 9742.
page 87 note 4. ‘The Objects of His Majesty's Government’, 23 Apr. 1924, 371 9741 (hereafter Objects of H.M.G.).
page 87 note 5. See minute on ‘Outline Agreement drafted by Sir John Bradbury’, 3 May 1924, 371 9743.
page 87 note 6. Niemeyer memo, op. cit.
page 87 note 7. Objects of H.M.G.
page 87 note 8. Poincaré to MacDonald, 14 May 1923, 371 9745.
page 88 note 1. MacDonald was particularly worried when the German Chancellor, Marx, struggling to win support of the Nationalists threatened to link the acceptance of the Dawes Report with immediate French concessions in the Ruhr. MacDonald bluntly informed the German Ambassador that it was both “useless and unwise” and complained later to D'Abernon that “once again we were faced with the difficulty of saving Germany from herself”. MacDonald to D'Abernon, 29 May 1924, 371 9746.
page 88 note 2. ‘Notes taken during a conversation between M. Edouard Herriot…and Mr Ramsay MacDonald…at Cheqeurs’, 21 and 22 June 1924, 371 9749.
page 89 note 1. ‘Franco-British Memorandum concerning the Application of the Dawes Scheme…’ 9 July 1924, 371 9750 (also in Cmd. 2191 of 1924).
page 89 note 2. Survey 2, op. cit. pp. 371–84.
page 89 note 3. P.R.O. Cab. 23/48 (44), 30 July 1924.
page 90 note 1. House of Commons Debates Vth Series, vol. 176, col. 134 (14 July 1924).Google Scholar
page 90 note 2. A. Chamberlain, ‘The Dawes Report and the German Loan’, in 1924 General Election, Conservative Party Archives, London (hereafter Chamberlain).
page 90 note 3. F.B.I. Reparations Committee Memorandum (ref: 340/W/18), C.B.I. Archives, serial nos. 6401–6800.
page 90 note 4. Chamberlain, op, cit.
page 90 note 5. Survey 2, op. cit. pp. 385–99.
page 90 note 6. Baldwin, op. cit. p. 352.
page 90 note 7. See the minute by Lampson, ? 9 July 1925, P.R.O. F.O. 371 10755.
page 91 note 1. Kilmarnock to A. Chamberlain, 4 Sept. 1925, 371 10755.
