69. Grey told Nicolson and Bertie in February and March 1906 that it was Russia who would change the situation in Europe, on which the positions of France and Germany in Morocco depended, to the advantage of France; that it was Russia who would assure the peace of Europe and the ‘civility’ of Germany to France and to Britain. (B.D.iii no. 278; Grey to Bertie 15 Mar. 1906 Bertie MSS F.0.800/160) Grey was fully aware that even at the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian negotiations, the recovery of Russia necessary to fulfil this role had not been effected. (B.D.iv nos 544, 550) In May and October 1909 Hardinge wrote that there still remained much to be done and that it would require at least two or three years before the Russian army was prepared for a European war. (Memo by Hardinge May 1909, B.D.v App.V; Hardinge to Cartwright 18 May, 4 Oct. 1909, Cartwright MSS). Yet throughout this time the British had invoked the power of Russia. Grey in May 1908 had said that not the British but the Russian army ought to be regarded as the ‘great counterpoise to Germany on land’. (Memo by Grey 28 Apr. 1908, Grey MSS F.O.800/92; minute by Grey 29 May 1908, F.O.371/455/18454) In September 1908 he had reported to Asquith yet another encounter with Clemenceau at which the latter had dwelt on Waterloo rather than on Trafalgar; Asquith commented that the Frenchman was ignorant ‘if he imagines we are going to keep here a standing army of VI-VA million men, ready to meet the Germans in Belgium if and when they are minded to adopt that route for the invasion of France. As you point out, he completely ignores the existencefrom a military point of view—of his Russian ally.’ (Asquith to Grey 7 Sept. 1908, Grey MSS, F.O.800/100) The C.I.D. sub-committee on the Military Needs of the Empire that was appointed in October 1908 was encouraged by the FO to presume that if Germany provoked hostilities with France the latter ‘would be able to count on the armed support of her ally Russia’. (Memo by Hardinge 11 Nov. 1908 Grey MSS F.O.800/92) On 9 August 1911, at a meeting between Grey, Haldane, Sir Henry Wilson and Crowe, the question of Russian support was raised yet again. According to the D.M.O.'s account, he ‘shattered rather rudely’ the theory advanced by Grey ‘that Russia was a governing factor’. Grey was told that ‘Russian interference would scarcely relieve the pressure from Paris’. In a paper drafted on 11 August Wilson wrote: ‘It is true that France might have the active assistance of Russia. In point of fact however, this assistance is-more imaginary than real.’ (Wilson Diary 9 Aug. 1911; memos by Wilson 11, 13 Aug. 1911, W.O.106/47A, CAB 38/19/ 47; minutes on Buchanan to Grey 3 Sept. 1911, B.D.vii no. 501) At the C.I.D. on 23 August Wilson said the Russians were so frightened of the Germans that he did not think they would allow a single man to leave the country. The meeting could have been forgiven had it taken away the impression that, of the two armies, the Belgian was the more valuable, (minutes of 114th meeting of C.I.D., CAB 2/2/2) These views made no difference to Grey. He minuted in February 1912 on a letter from the French military attache in Berlin to his colleague in London: ‘This takes no account of the Russian army.’ (letter dated 9 Feb. 1912, in Carnock MSS, F.O.800/353; minute by Parker on Buchanan to Grey 3 Sept. 1911, F.O.371/1164/34653) If it was on Grey's instructions that Nicolson made this point to Cambon, there would appear to be little difference between irresponsibility and downright stupidity. At any rate, the reply was that the Russians were ‘in a transition state. They said they would not be ready for taking a serious part in a campaign for about 16–1 8 months from now.’ Only in the spring of 1913 was it beyond all doubt that the recovery of Russia was complete in European terms. (Nicolson to Grey 15 Feb. 1912, to Goschen 11 Mar. 1913, Carnock MSS, F.0.800/353, /364).
