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Institutions as swords and shields: multilateral counter-terrorism since 9/11

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2010

PETER ROMANIUK
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Abstract

International institutions are prominent in the ‘global War on Terror’. But there remains variation in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism, across policy domains and over time. I argue that institutions pursue tasks of counter-terrorism when they are backed by power. Institutions function as ‘swords’ as strong states seek to influence others. Weak states, too, are sensitive to the distributional consequences of cooperation and use institutions as ‘shields’ to resist the powerful. These claims are reflected in patterns of cooperation within the UN, and in terrorist financing and maritime security. Looking forward, multilateral counter-terrorism may remain contingent upon state power.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , July 2010 , pp. 591 - 613
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 2010

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References

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47 Ward, ‘Building Capacity’, provides an upbeat assessment of the early work of the CTC.

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50 Resolution 1456 (2003), para. 4 (iii).

51 Resolution 1566 (2004), para. 7.

52 The best practices are listed at: {www.un.org/sc/ctc/bestpractices.shtml}. An analytical summary is provided by Center for Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation, Report on Standards and Best Practices. The technical assistance matrix is at: {www.un.org/sc/ctc/htdocs/}.

53 This activity is summarised at: {www.un.org/sc/ctc/intlcooperation.shtml}.

54 See ‘Index of international, regional and subregional organizations’, UN Doc. S/AC.40/2003/SM.1/2 (23 February 2003).

55 A. Marschik, ‘The Security Council's Role: Problems and Prospects in the Fight Against Terrorism’, in G. Nesi (ed.), International Cooperation in Counter-terrorism, pp. 69–80; Szasz, P., ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’, American Journal of International Law, 96 (2002), pp. 901–905CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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61 ‘Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Strategy – Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc. A/60/825 (27 April 2006).

62 The characterisation of the Strategy as ‘rather anodyne’ is from Rosand, ‘The UN-Led Multilateral Institutional Response to Jihadist Terrorism’, p. 416.

63 Alistair Millar and Eric Rosand, ‘Building Global Alliances in the Fight Against Terrorism’, (Washington, DC: Center for Global Counter-terrorism Cooperation, 2007).

64 Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar and Jason Ipe, ‘The UN Security Council's Counter-terrorism Program: What Lies Ahead?’ (New York: International Peace Academy, 2007).

65 Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk, ‘International Initiatives to Suppress Terrorist Financing’; Kathryn L. Gardner, ‘Terrorism Defanged: The Financial Action Taskforce and International Efforts to Capture Terrorist Finances’, in Cortright and Lopez (eds), Uniting Against Terror, pp. 157–86.

66 Drezner, All Politics is Global, ch. 3.

67 See fn. 39, above, and the discussions of the Libya, Sudan and Taliban sanctions in David Cortright and Lopez, George A., The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), p. 115Google Scholar , ch. 6.

68 FATF, Annual Report 2000–01 (Paris: FATF Secretariat, 22 June 2001)Google Scholar ; FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000–01 (Paris: FATF Secretariat, 1 February 2001)Google Scholar ; FATF, Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999–2000 (Paris: FATF Secretariat, 3 February 2000)Google Scholar .

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72 These were mostly drawn from the developed world and included: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong SAR, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK, the USA, the European Commission and the Gulf Cooperation Council: FATF, Annual Report 2000–01.

73 Eric Helleiner, ‘The Politics of Global Financial Reregulation: Lessons From the Fight Against Money Laundering’, Working Paper No. 15, CEPA Working Paper Series III (Center for Economic Policy Analysis, New School for Social Research, 2000); Helleiner, Eric, ‘State Power and the Regulation of Illicit Activity in Global Finance’, in Friman, H. R. and Andreas, P. (eds), The Illicit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 53–90Google Scholar ; Simmons, Beth A., ‘The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market Regulation’, International Organization, 55 (2001), pp. 589–620CrossRefGoogle Scholar .

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76 Ibid.

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79 Clunan argues that the US has ‘succeeded in globalizing the anti-money laundering framework and recasting it as a regime to combat terrorist financing’: Clunan, Anne L., ‘US and International Responses to Terrorist Financing’, Strategic Insights, 4 (Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005)Google Scholar .

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82 FATF, Annual Report 2004–05 (Paris: FATF Secretariat, 10 June 2005); Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk, ‘International Initiatives to Suppress Terrorist Financing’.

83 C. B. Realuyo, ‘G8 Counter-terrorism Action Group Efforts to Combat Terrorist Financing’ (11 March 2004). Available at: {http://www.osce.org/documents/sg/2004/03/3297_en.pdf} accessed 20 January 2008.

84 ‘G8 Statement on Counter-terrorism’, Gleneagles (July 2005).

85 UNODC, ‘Strengthening international cooperation and technical assistance in promoting the implementation of the universal conventions and protocols related to terrorism within the framework of the activities of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’, UN Doc. E/CN.15/2005/13 (8 April 2005).

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88 Wolfsberg Group, ‘Wolfsberg Statement on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ (January 2002).

89 For an overview and criticism of US counter-terrorist financing assistance initiatives, see GAO, Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate US Efforts to Deliver Counter-terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad, GAO-06–19, Washington DC (October 2005).

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91 A summary of section 311 activity is available at: {http://www.fincen.gov/reg_section311.html} accessed 20 January 2008.

92 Tom Ridge, ‘Remarks by Secretary Tom Ridge at Port of Los Angeles’, Long Beach (21 June 2004).

93 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet: US Customs and Border Protection – Protecting Our Borders Against Terrorism’ (22 July 2004).

94 MTSA 2002 §70116(b) (1) and (4).

95 For an overview of IMO activity on maritime security prior to 9/11, see, Hesse, Hartmut G., ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context: IMO Activities to Enhance Maritime Security’, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, 18 (2003), pp. 327–340CrossRefGoogle Scholar ; Hartmut G. Hesse and Nicolaos L Charalambous, ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’, Information Paper, Maritime Safety Division, International Maritime Organization (2004); and IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’, Background Paper, World Maritime Day (2004).

96 The Assembly comprises all member states and also has power over the organization's work plan and budget.

97 ‘Review of measures and procedures to prevent acts of terrorism which threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships’, IMO Doc. A.224 (22) (November 2001).

98 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17, 14 (December 2001).

99 For example, ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/3 (11 January 2002); ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/5 (10 January 2002) (submitted by France).

100 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/ISWG/5/7 (15 January 2002) (submitted by the USA).

101 Summarised in ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17/1 (25 February 2002) (note by the Secretariat).

102 A new Seafarer's ID Convention was subsequently adopted in June 2003. The convention incorporates biometric technology into the identity document. Reaction to the Convention has been mixed. Concerned about the technical specifications of the ID, the US is unwilling to exempt seafarers from visa requirements – as is contemplated by the Convention – and is unlikely to sign: Rajesh Joshi, ‘“Hopeful sign” on seafarer shore leave in US’, Lloyd's List (2 February 2006).

103 ‘Prevention and Suppression of Acts of Terrorism Against Shipping’, IMO Doc. MSC 75/17/12, 12 (April 2002) (submitted by Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden).

104 For a summary of the specific substantive provisions of the Code see Hesse, ‘Maritime Security in a Multilateral Context’; Hesse and Charalambous, ‘New Security Measures for the International Shipping Community’; and IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’.

105 IMO, ‘IMO 2004: Focus on Maritime Security’, pp. 7–10.

106 ‘Helping hand for developing countries vital in compliance’, Lloyd's List (25 April 2005).

107 Adm. T. H. Collins, ‘Address to Houston Maritime Association’ (22 January 2004). Downloaded from: {www.uscg.mil/ha/g-m/mp/pdf/0122_Houston_Mtme.pdf} accessed 22 May 2004.

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112 Mastanduno, ‘US foreign policy’, p. 324.

113 For an overview of CSI, see: {http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_activities/csi/}.

114 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet: Container Security Initiative’ (July 2005).

115 US Customs and Border Protection, ‘Fact Sheet’.

116 Customs Commissioner Bonner used this term frequently in his public statements, for example, R. C. Bonner, ‘Remarks to Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House’, London (20 September 2004).

117 G8, ‘Cooperative G8 Action on Transport Security’, Kananaskis Summit (2002).

118 For example, R. C. Bonner, ‘Remarks to World Customs Organization’, Brussels (28 June 2002).

119 Edmonson, R. G., ‘Taking shape: WCO fleshes out plan to balance security and trade facilitation’, Journal of Commerce (28 February 2005)Google Scholar ; ‘WCO endorses framework annexes for security, facilitation’, Journal of Commerce Online (29 April 2005).

120 WCO, ‘Framework of Standards to Secure Global Trade’ (June 2005).

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123 ‘Members who have expressed their intention to implement the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade’, WCO (27 September 2007).

124 Drezner, All Politics is Global, pp. 63–4.

125 Gruber, Ruling the World.

126 If borne out in future research, this observation may qualify Drezner's claim that ‘A great power concert is a necessary and sufficient condition for effective global governance’. All Politics is Local, p. 5, emphasis added.

127 Schweller and Priess, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms’, p. 12.

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133 A similar series of recommendations, specific to terrorist financing, are set out in Biersteker, Eckert and Romaniuk, ‘International Initiatives to Suppress Terrorist Financing’.

134 Millar and Rosand, ‘Building Global Alliances’; Boulden, Jane and Weiss, Thomas G., ‘Tactical Multilateralism: Coaxing America Back to the UN’, Survival, 46 (2004), pp. 103–114CrossRefGoogle Scholar .