¹ Data and supplemental information necessary to reproduce the numerical results is available on the author’s homepage at: {http://www.lisadellmuth.net}.

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²⁰ Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’.

²¹ Delli Carpini, and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters.

²² For a similar argument, see Converse, Philip E., ‘Assessing the capacity of mass electorates’, Annual Review of Political Science, 3:1 (2000), p. 332 Google Scholar; Highton, , ‘Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication’, p. 1564 Google Scholar.

²³ Zaller, John, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, ch. 2, ch. 3, pp. 333ff; Gabel, Matthew and Scheve, Kenneth, ‘Estimating the effect of elite communications on public opinion using instrumental variables’, American Journal of Political Science, 51:4 (2007), pp. 1019 Google Scholar.

²⁴ Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’; Neuman, W. Russell, The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986)Google Scholar; Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters, ch. 4; Mondak, Jeffery, ‘Reconsidering the measurement of political knowledge’, Political Analysis, 8:1 (1999), pp. 57–82 Google Scholar; Converse, ‘Assessing the capacity of mass electorates’, p. 333; Highton, , ‘Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication’, p. 1568 Google Scholar.

²⁵ Hurd, Ian, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007)Google Scholar; Cronin, Bruce and Hurd, Ian (eds), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 12 Google Scholar.

²⁶ Hurd, After Anarchy, p. 5.

²⁷ See, for example, Frederking, Brian, The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security Since the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2007)Google Scholar; Hurd, After Anarchy; Cronin and Hurd, The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority.

²⁸ The survey data were collected through face-to-face interviews between October and December 2000. The sampling strategies aimed at generating nationally representative samples in Asian and European countries (see fn. 62 for a list of these countries). Sampling strategies varied across some of the countries. In most countries, multistratified random cluster samples with different types of stratification were drawn, while in two countries (France and the United Kingdom (UK)), quota samples were used. See, for a detailed field report and list of survey questions, Takashi Inoguchi, ‘Asia Europe Survey (ASES): A Multinational Comparative Study in 18 Countries 2001: ICPSR22324-v1’ (2001), available at: {http://www.asiaeuropesurvey.org} and {http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/22324}.

²⁹ Kwak, Cf. Nojn, ‘Revisiting the knowledge gap hypothesis: Education, motivation and media use’, Communication Research, 26:4 (1999), pp. 385–413 Google Scholar.

³⁰ Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters; Mondak, ‘Reconsidering the measurement of political knowledge’.

³¹ See, for an overview, Visser, Penny S., Holbrook, Allyson L., and Krosnick, Jon A., ‘Knowledge and attitudes’, in Wolfgang Donsbach and Michael W. Traugott (eds), Handbook of Public Opinion Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2008), pp. 127–140 Google Scholar.

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³³ Krosnick, Jon A., ‘The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: a study of presidential candidate evaluations, policy preferences, and voting behavior’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55:2 (1988), pp. 196–210 Google Scholar; Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’, p. 335; Boninger, David S., Krosnick, Jon A., Berent, Matthew K., and Fabrigar, Leandre R., ‘The causes and consequences of attitude importance’, in Richard E. Petty and Jon A. Krosnick (eds), Attitude Strength: Antecedents and Consequences (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1995), pp. 159–189 Google Scholar; Prislin, Radmila, ‘Attitude stability and attitude strength: One is enough to make it stable’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 26:3 (1996), pp. 447–477 3.0.CO;2-I>CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Holbrook, Allyson L., Berent, Matthew K., Krosnick, Jon A., Visser, Penny S., and Boninger, David S., ‘Attitude importance and the accumulation of attitude-relevant knowledge in memory’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88:5 (2005), pp. 749–769 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

³⁴ Scheve, Kenneth F. and Slaughter, Matthew J., ‘What determines individual trade policy preferences?’, Journal of International Economics, 54:2 (2001), pp. 267–292 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vreeland, James, The IMF and Economic Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations’; Mansfield and Mutz, ‘Support for free trade’.

³⁵ Cf. Boninger, Krosnick, and Berent, ‘Origins of attitude importance’; Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, and Boninger, ‘Attitude importance and the accumulation of attitude-relevant knowledge in memory’; Visser, Holbrook, and Krosnick, ‘Knowledge and attitudes’, pp. 130–1.

³⁶ Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Addison Wesley, 1957), pp. 160–172 Google Scholar.

³⁷ See, for example, Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’; Althaus, Scott L., ‘Information effects in collective preferences’, American Political Science Review, 92:3 (1998), pp. 545–558 Google Scholar; see, for an overview, Visser, Holbrook, and Krosnick, ‘Knowledge and attitudes’, pp. 130–1.

³⁸ Cf. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.

³⁹ Even in the EU, where European political institutions have sought to strengthen a common identity, segmented national public spheres remain. See Koopmans, Ruud and Statham, Paul (eds), The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; Risse, Thomas, A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ de Vreese, Cf. Claes H., Framing Europe: Television News and European Integration (Amsterdam: Aksant Academic Publishers, 2002)Google Scholar; Anderson, Peter J. and McLeod, Aileen, ‘The great non-communicator? The mass communication deficit of the European parliament and its press directorate’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42:5 (2004), pp. 897–917 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ Schattschneider, Elmer E., The Semisovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Reinhart, and Winston, 1960), p. 106 Google Scholar; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality; Solt, Frederick, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’, American Journal of Political Science, 52:1 (2008), pp. 48–60 Google Scholar.

⁴² Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 92 Google Scholar.

⁴³ Lukes, Power, p. 28.

⁴⁴ Cf. Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁴⁵ Lukes, Cf. Steven, Power: A Radical View (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 27–28 Google Scholar.

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⁴⁹ Omotunde Johnson and Joanne Salop, ‘Distributional Aspects of Stabilization Programs in Developing Countries’, IMF Staff Papers, 27 (1980), p. 12.

⁵⁰ Cooley, Alexander and Ron, James, ‘The NGO scramble: Organizational insecurity and the political economy of transnational action’, International Security, 27:1 (2002), pp. 5–39 Google Scholar; Kelly, Robert E., ‘Assessing the impact of NGOs on intergovernmental organizations: the case of the Bretton Woods institutions’, International Political Science Review, 32:3 (2011), pp. 323–344 Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People; Ansolabehere, Stephen, de Figueiredo, John M., and Snyder, James M. Jr, ‘Why is there so little money in U.S. politics?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17:1 (2003), pp. 105–130 Google Scholar; Dahl, Robert A., On Political Equality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), pp. 85–86 Google Scholar; Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁵² Cf. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality.

⁵³ Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁵⁴ Hooghe, Cf. Liesbet and Marks, Gary, ‘Calculation, community, and cues: Public opinion on European integration’, European Union Politics, 6:4 (2005), pp. 419–443 Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ See, for example, Norris, ‘Global governance and cosmopolitan citizens’; Norris, ‘Confidence in the United Nations’; Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations’.

⁵⁶ Furia, Peter A., ‘Global citizenship, anyone? Cosmopolitanism, privilege and public opinion’, Global Society, 19:4 (2005), pp. 331–359 Google Scholar; Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann, ‘Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational practices’.

⁵⁷ Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald, Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 182 Google Scholar. The notion of values is evasive and definitions differ across disciplines in the social sciences. I refer to values as relatively stable ‘beliefs about ideal modes of conduct and ideal terminal goals’. See Rokeach, Milton, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1968), p. 124 Google Scholar. An internalised value becomes a standard or criterion for developing and maintaining attitudes toward or identification with objects. See Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values, p. 160.

⁵⁸ Inglehart, Cf. Ronald, ‘Cognitive mobilization and European identity’, Comparative Politics, 3:1 (1970), pp. 45–70 Google Scholar; Fordham, Benjamin O. and Kleinberg, Katja B., ‘How can economic interests influence support for free trade?’, International Organization, 66:2 (2012), pp. 311–328 Google Scholar; Norris and Inglehart, Cosmopolitan Communications, ch. 6; Chalmers, Adam W. and Dellmuth, Lisa M., ‘Fiscal redistribution and public support for European integration’, European Union Politics, 16:3 (2015), pp. 386–407 Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann, ‘Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational practices’; Norris and Inglehart, Cosmopolitan Communications, ch. 6.

⁶⁰ Jan Teorell, Nicholas Charron, Stefan Dahlberg, Sören Holmberg, Bo Rothstein, Petrus Sundin, and Richard Svensson, ‘The Quality of Government Basic Dataset Made From the Quality of Government Dataset Version 15May13’ (2011), available at: {http://www.qog.pol.gu.se}.

⁶¹ The ASES covers 18 countries, but China drops out of the analyses since not all survey questions have been asked in this country. The analyses include France, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand, and the UK.

⁶² Converse, Philip E., ‘Information flow and the stability of partisan attitudes’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 26 (1962), pp. 578–599 Google Scholar; Converse, Philip E., ‘Change in the American electorate’, in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (eds), The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972), pp. 263–337 Google Scholar.

⁶³ Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’; Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics; Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion; Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters, ch. 4; Mondak, ‘Reconsidering the measurement of political knowledge’.

⁶⁴ Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion, ch. 2, ch. 3, and pp. 333ff.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 43.

⁶⁶ Appendix A gives an overview of the wording of the survey questions.

⁶⁷ Summary statistics for and correlations between the variables are reported in Tables B1 and B2 in Appendix B.

⁶⁸ Converse, ‘Assessing the capacity of mass electorates’, p. 333. See also Neuman, The Paradox of Mass Politics, and Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters, ch. 4.

⁶⁹ The time period considered here ranges from the mid-1990s until 2000. See United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolutions’ (2014), available at: {http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/}.

⁷⁰ See also Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’. The calculation of this measure is based on the assumption that the data are representative for the broader populations of the 17 countries, as the accuracy of the measure would be distorted in the case of an over- or under-representation of specific income groups in the survey data. However, sampling in all countries aimed at nationally representative samples. Only in two countries, the fieldwork relied on quota samples instead of random samples (see fn. 25), increasing our confidence in that the assumption is warranted.

⁷¹ Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’. This variable is made available for 2001 by Teorell, Charron, Dahlberg, Holmberg, Rothstein, Sundin, and Svensson, ‘The Quality of Government Basic Dataset Made From The Quality of Government Dataset Version 15May13’.

⁷² Dolan, Kathleen, ‘Do women and men know different things? Measuring gender differences in political knowledge’, Journal of Politics, 73:1 (2011), pp. 97–107 Google Scholar.

⁷³ Althaus, Scott L., Collective Preferences in Democratic Politics: Opinion Surveys and the Will of the People (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003)Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’.

⁷⁵ Cf. Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, Visser, and Boninger, ‘Attitude importance and the accumulation of attitude-relevant knowledge in memory’.

⁷⁶ Highton, ‘Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication’.

⁷⁷ Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁷⁸ Johnson, Joel W. and Wallack, Jessica S., Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote: Update of Database from Particularism Around the World (San Diego: University of California, 2006)Google Scholar.

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⁸¹ Lijphart, Arendt, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1999)Google Scholar; Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁸² Both measures are derived from Gerring, John, Thacker, Strom C., and Moreno, Carola, ‘Centripetal democratic governance: a theory and global inquiry’, American Political Science Review, 99:4 (2005), pp. 567–581 Google Scholar.

⁸³ Using this model requires testing whether the covariate effects are constant across categories. A test of this assumption suggests that this assumption is reasonable given the data at hand. See Sophia Rabe-Hesketh and Anders Skrondal, Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata (Texas: Stata Press, 2008).

⁸⁴ The intra-class correlation, which reveals how much of the total variation in knowledge lies at the country level, is estimated according to the following equation (cf. Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata): ρ=Var(ζ_1j )/(Var(ζ_1j )+π²/3)=0.22/(0.22+π²/3)=0.05.

⁸⁵ Note that the Variance Inflation Factor is less than 2, indicating that multicollinearity should not inflate the coefficient estimates (see Fox, John and Monette, Georges, ‘Generalized collinearity diagnostics’, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 87:417 (1992), pp. 178–183 Google Scholar).

⁸⁶ Berry, Cf. William D., DeMeritt, Jacqueline H. R., and Esarey, Justin, ‘Testing for interaction in binary logit and probit models: Is a product term essential?’, American Journal of Political Science, 54:1 (2010), pp. 248–266 Google Scholar. The response probabilities for Figure 2 are calculated following Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), p. 505 Google Scholar, equation 15.88. Probabilities are implemented in Stata by extending the code by Brambor, Thomas, Clark, William R., and Golder, Matt, ‘Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analyses’, Political Analysis, 14:1 (2006), pp. 63–82 Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Cf. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo, and Snyder Jr., ‘Why is there so little money in U.S. politics?’; Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁸⁸ Cf. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, pp. 105–7; Dahl, On Political Equality, ch. 7.

⁸⁹ Norris, ‘Global governance and cosmopolitan citizens’; Norris, ‘Confidence in the United Nations’.

⁹⁰ Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters.

⁹¹ Cf. Dolan, ‘Do women and men know different things?’

⁹² Cf. Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters; Highton, ‘Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication’.

⁹³ Johnson and Wallack, Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote.

⁹⁴ Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁹⁵ Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy; Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

⁹⁶ Tweksbury, Cf. David, Weaver, Andrew J., and Maddex, Brett D., ‘Accidentally informed: Incidental news exposure on the World Wide Web’, Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 78:3 (2001), pp. 533–554 Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ See, for a similar coding, Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations’.

⁹⁸ United Nations Security Council, ‘Security Council Resolutions’.

⁹⁹ See, for example, Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans Know about Politics and Why it Matters; Highton, ‘Revisiting the relationship between educational attainment and political sophistication’; Luskin, ‘Explaining political sophistication’.

¹⁰⁰ See, for example, Johnson and Wallack, Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote.

¹⁰¹ See, for example, Solt, ‘Economic inequality and democratic political engagement’.

¹⁰² See, for example, Mau, Mewes, and Zimmermann, ‘Cosmopolitan attitudes through transnational practices’; Norris and Inglehart, Cosmopolitan Communications, ch. 6.

¹⁰³ Feldman, Stanley, ‘Structure and consistency in public opinion: the role of core beliefs and values’, American Journal of Political Science, 32:2 (1987), pp. 416–440 Google Scholar; Hurwitz, Jon and Peffley, Mark, ‘How are foreign policy attitudes structured? A hierarchical model’, American Political Science Review, 81:4 (1987), pp. 1099–1120 Google Scholar; Brewer, Paul R. and Gross, Kimberley, ‘Values, framing, and citizens’ thoughts about policy issues: Effects on content and quantity’, Political Psychology, 26:6 (2005), pp. 929–948 Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁴ To this end, we need better survey data on citizen awareness of IOs, preferably in the form of multi-item knowledge measures that result in more valid representations of what people know about IOs. See Mondak, ‘Reconsidering the measurement of political knowledge’.

¹⁰⁵ Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Divided We Stand: Why Income Inequality Keeps Rising’ (2011), available at: {http://www.oecd.org/social/soc/49499779.pdf}.