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Weak states and national security: the case of South Africa in the era of total strategy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 October 2009

Alexander Johnston
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Extract

Introduction

The Idea of national security is pervasive because it lies at the heart of the condition of statehood and the nature of the international system. But although the idea of national security is universally on the political agenda, it is difficult to find an unambiguous or uncontested usage of the concept.

Working definitions exist, of course:

a nation is secure to the extent which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war.

Type
Research Article
Information
Review of International Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , April 1991 , pp. 149 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © British International Studies Association 1991

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References

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