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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
This essay strives to counter conventional wisdom about the alleged secondary role of Congress in foreign policymaking. With the post-Vietnam era serving as the immediate backdrop, certain “lessons” are drawn regarding postwar congressional ascendency, both in terms of procedural manifestations and policy outcomes. A central conclusion is that Congress will always remain an essential component in the decision-making process, becoming involved in substantive policy on a selective basis. Some sixteen variables affecting the degree of involvement and likelihood of success are identified and rank ordered. The entire process of congressional-executive relations in foreign policymaking is ultimately viewed as highly untidy but fairly effective in maintaining some semblance of institutional balance throughout history.
1 For the most current historical overview, see Sundquist, James L., The Decline and Resurgence of Congress (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981).Google Scholar
2 Wildavsky, Aaron B., “The Two Presidencies,” in The Presidency, ed. Wildavsky, (Boston, 1969), pp. 230–43.Google Scholar For a critique of Wildavsky's thesis, see Peppers, Donald A., “‘The Two Presidencies’: Eight Years Later,” in Perspectives on the Presidency, ed. Wildavsky, (Boston, 1975), pp. 462–71.Google Scholar An older study also contradicting Wildavsky is Chamberlain's, Lawrence, The President, Congress, and Legislation (New York, 1946);Google Scholar Chamberlain's study was updated and his conclusions reaffirmed by Moe, Ronald C. and Teel, Steven C., “Congress as Policy Maker: A Necessary Reappraisal,” Political Science Quarterly, 85 (09 1970) 443–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In an important footnote, the authors suggest that the entire question of who is more powerful, the president or Congress, may be less relevant today than in past decades. They cite Richard Neustadt's suggestion that the real struggle in contemporary government is, in fact, between the bureaucracy and the politicians. See Neustadt, Richard E., “Politicians and Bureaucrats,” in The Congress and America's Future, ed. Truman, David (Englewood, New Jersey, 1973), pp. 102–20.Google Scholar The field, nevertheless, abounds with studies which echo Wildavsky's basic argument that the legislature has neither the will nor the institutional capacity to play an effective role in foreign policymaking. See, for example, Hilsman, Roger, The Politics of Policy-Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York, 1971);Google ScholarO'Leary, Michael K., The Politics of American Foreign Aid {New York, 1969);Google ScholarPusey, Merlo J., The Way We Go to War (Boston, 1969);Google ScholarEagleton, Thomas F., War and Presidential Power: A Chronicle of Congressional Surrender (New York, 1974);Google ScholarCarroll, Holbert N., “The Congress and National Security Policy,” in Truman, The Congress and America's Future, pp. 150–75.Google Scholar
3 For a representative sample, see Manley, John F., “The Rise of Congress in Foreign Policy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 397 (09 1971), 60–70;CrossRefGoogle ScholarFrye, Alton, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York, 1975);Google ScholarWilcox, Francis O., Congress, The Executive and Foreign Policy (New York, 1971);Google ScholarLehman, John, The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy: Studies of the Nixon Administration (New York, 1976);Google ScholarStern, Paula, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics in the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn., 1979);Google ScholarFranck, Thomas M. and Weisband, Edward, Foreign Policy by Congress (New York, 1979);Google ScholarCrabb, Cecil V. Jr., and Holt, Pat M., Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980);Google ScholarSpanier, John and Nogee, Joseph L., eds., Congress, The Presidency and American Foreign Policy (New York, 1981).Google Scholar
4 The act required secretaries of state to submit the text of any international agreement, other than a treaty, to Congress within sixty days after it had become effective. Although the bill gave presidents the right to submit texts only to the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees if they determined public disclosure to be harmful to national security, it did provide Congress a significant power to modify or cancel such agreements by refusing to grant necessary funds for implementation. See PL 92–403, 86 Stat. 619.
5 PL 93–148, 87 Stat. 555.
6 PL 93–559, 88 Stat. 1804.
7 See Senate Res. 400, Sections 3 (a) and (b).
8 PL 93–559, Stat. 1814.
9 PL 93–344, 88 Stat. 297–339.
10 See International Security Assistance and Arms Export Act of 1976, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate on S. 2662, 30 January 1976.
11 PL 94–412, 90 Stat. 1255. The recent Supreme Court decision striking down many of these so-called legislative vetoes has been hailed in some quarters as indeed strengthening the legislature's hand by forcing it to be much more precise in drafting statutes affecting spending, national security, and foreign aid. See the New York Times, 3 July 1983, p. E12.Google Scholar The institutional and political vagaries of congressional behavior leave me skeptical about the possibility and even desirability of achieving such precision in language.
12 See Stern, , Water's Edge;Google ScholarLehman, , The Executive, Congress, and Foreign Policy;Google ScholarFranck, and Weisband, , Foreign Policy by Congress;Google ScholarSundquist, , The Decline and Resurgence of Congress;Google ScholarCrabb, and Holt, , Invitation to Struggle;Google ScholarSpanier, and Nogee, , eds., Congress, The Presidency and American Foreign Policy;Google ScholarWatanabe, Paul Y., “Ethnic Groups, Congress, and American Foreign Policy: The Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1980);Google ScholarLivingstone, N. C. and von Nordheim, M., “The United States Congress and the Angola Crisis,” Strategic Review, 5 (Spring 1977);Google ScholarKolodziej, Edward A., “Formulating Foreign Policy,” in The Power to Govern: Assessing Reform in the United States, ed. Pious, Richard M. (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1981), pp. 174–89.Google Scholar
13 The Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (referred to as the Murphy Commission, after its chairman, Robert D. Murphy), was established by Congress in 1972 to study the methods utilized by the executive and legislative branches to formulate and implement American foreign policy. For the proposal to create a Joint Committee on National Security, see U. S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Report), 06 1975 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 208.Google Scholar
14 The most current analyses of congressional staff members are Fox, Harrison W. Jr and Hammond, Susan W., Congressional Staffs: The Invisible Force in American Lawmaking (New York, 1977);Google Scholar and Malbin, Michael J., Unelected Representatives: Congressional Staff and the Future of Representative Government (New York, 1979).Google Scholar
15 See “The Indochina War and the Changing Pattern of World Politics,” in The Vietnam Legacy: The War, American Society, and the Future of American Foreign Policy, ed. Lake, Anthony (New York, 1976), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar
16 For a discussion of the breakdown in the national consensus on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam, see Quester, George D., American Foreign Policy: The Lost Consensus (New York, 1982).Google Scholar
17 In this regard, see Ornstein, Norman J., ed., Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform (New York, 1975), esp. part 4;Google Scholar“The New Congress: People and Process on Capitol Hill,” National Journal Reprints (Washington, D.C.: The Government Research Corporation, 1978);Google ScholarMann, Thomas E. and Ornstein, Norman J., eds., The New Congress (Washington, D.C., 1981);Google ScholarDodd, Lawrence C. and Oppenheimer, Bruce I., eds., Congress Reconsidered, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981).Google Scholar
18 On the splintering of parties, see Ladd, Everett Carll Jr, Where Have All the Voters Gone? The Fracturing of America's Political Parties (New York, 1978);Google ScholarBroder, David S., The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America (New York, 1972);Google ScholarMayhew, David R., Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven, 1978), pp. 26–27;Google ScholarRieselbach, Leroy N., Congressional Reform in the Seventies (Morristown, New Jersey, 1977), pp. 14–17;Google ScholarNie, Norman H., Verba, Sidney and Petrocik, John R., The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass., 1979);CrossRefGoogle ScholarGoldwin, Robert A., ed., Political Parties in the Eighties (Washington, D.C., 1980).Google Scholar
19 Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1972).Google Scholar
20 See The Senator Gravel, ed., The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decision Making on Vietnam (Boston, 1971–1972).Google Scholar
21 See “The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read,” Special Supplement to The Village Voice, 16 February 1976, pp. 70–92.Google Scholar
22 In underscoring the importance of changing public attitudes, Rossiter, commenting at the time on the Eisenhower presidency, noted: “The President has no weapons that were not available to Harding or, for that matter, to McKinley. The appeal to the people is more easily brought off in the age of electronics; on the other hand, the dangled patronage has lost much of its influence thanks to the success of civil service reform. The White House conference, the appeal to party loyalty, the threat of a veto–these weapons, too, are no keener than they were a half-century ago. The President's own machinery for drafting legislative proposals and for maintaining good relations with Congress is vastly enlarged and improved; Congress itself calls ever more insistently upon the President for reports and recommendations. Yet the two houses, despite the pleas of Senators Kefauver and Monroney, have made no important institutional changes in recognition of his increased responsibility for providing them with leadership. And the Constitution, needless to say, reads exactly as it did 169 years ago in those passages that govern the relations of executive and legislature. The remarkable change in these relations has been neither institutional nor constitutional, but rather meteorological—a change in the climate of politics and custom. The country now expects the President to have a program and to work for its enactment. … What the country expects, Congress also expects” (The American Presidency [New York, 1962], p. 108,Google Scholar my emphasis).
