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Metaphysics or Theology? A Comment on Michael Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 November 2010

Extract

Michael Gillespie's Theological Origins of Modernity provides a historically grounded and philosophically ambitious, at times even provocative, account of the deep unity of the modern tradition. The book is more historical than most works of political theory, and exhibits a healthy freedom from received wisdom about who the important thinkers are and about what they might have to say. Yet it would be quite wrong to read this book as a simple history: it is also—perhaps even primarily—a philosophical diagnosis of the present. Gillespie's thesis, stated far too crudely, is that the familiar Enlightenment story of an age of reason preceded by an age of darkness, superstition, and religion is far too simplistic. We late moderns, too, have thoughts about first things and divinity; but we hide the enduring presence of those thoughts and questions from ourselves by the pride we take in having overcome the atavisms of theology. Gillespie argues that, so far from being wholly novel, those thoughts are in fact the descendants of the theology of late medieval nominalism. Where others speak of the secularization of Christianity, Gillespie prefers to speak of the transference of divine attributes from God to man or nature.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 2010

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References

1 References in the text are to Gillespie, Michael Allen, The Theological Origins of Modernity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Leo Strauss seems to have held a view of the Enlightenment very close to this in at least one stage of his career. Consider the introduction to Philosophy and Law, where we read the following: “Is it not, ultimately, the very intention of defending oneself radically against miracles which is the basis of the concept of science that guides modern natural science? Was not the ‘unique’ ‘world-construction’ of modern natural science, according to which miracles are of course unknowable, devised expressly for the very purpose that miracles be unknowable, and that thus man be defended against the grip of the omnipotent God?” (Philosophy and Law, trans. Eve Adler [Albany: SUNY Press, 1995], 33–34). The questions I raise in the text obviously also apply to Strauss's argument.

3 Descartes' statement in Meditation IV that the search for final causes is totally useless in physics because God's purposes are impenetrable to us is often interpreted in just this way.