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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
In the treatment of my topic, I shall begin with the human person and go on from there to the question of ownership of material goods. This will be done in the deep conviction, which accords also with the best philosophical tradition of 2,000 years, that the institution of ownership must be theoretically derived and must take its practical cues from the human person, and not vice versa. If there is one supreme characteristic of our modern civilization in this regard, it is the fact that we have turned this matter quite around. Our civilization has given the supreme position to ownership, whether public or private, and has made the person quite subservient in practical life to this supposedly highest of all individual and social values. By modern civilization I mean the general dominant trend of human events in our Western world during the past four centuries or so, which was in some regards a trend away from the general Christian tradition of thought and life that existed progressively for much over a thousand years before what is technically known as the modern era of history began.
1 Cf. Michel, , “Liberalism Yesterday and Tomorrow” in an early issue of Ethics. An International Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol.XLIX, 1939Google Scholar.
2 Cf the article on “Property” in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences by Hamilton and Till; and Hamilton, “Property According to Locke,” in the Yale Law Journal (1931–1932), Vol.41Google Scholar. Again, Paschal Larkin, Properly in ihe Eighteenth Century, Cork University Press, 1930Google Scholar.
For a popular treatment: Michel, , The Nature of Capitalism (p.32f.)Google Scholar, pamphlet IV of The Social Question series (Wanderer Printing Co., St. Paul), “Capitalism Owneri ship and Finance” in Economics and Finance, Bk. II of The Social Problem (St. John's Abbey, Collegeville, Minn.), and “The Dehumanization of Property” in Free America (1938), Vol.II, No.2 p.7Google Scholar.
3 Quoted in McKeon, , “The Development of the Concept of Property in Political Philosophy: A Study of the Background of the Constitution.” Ethics (1937–38) Vol. XLVIII, pp.351–352Google Scholar.
4 Cf. the above-mentioned articles in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences and the Yale Law Journal.
5 Yale Laa Journal (1931–32), Vol.41, pp.879–880Google Scholar. Cf. also Rawe, John, “Corporations and Human Liberty” in the American Review (1934–1935), pp.257 and 473Google Scholar.
6 Summa Theologica, I, q. 29, a.3.
7 Quaesliones it fustitia, pp. 6 and 7. Bruges. 1901Google Scholar.
8 Summa Theologica, I, q.96, a.2 c.
* The questions of human freedom and of man's right attitude towards it receive additional light for the Christian when they are viewed in terms of the integral or true humanism of which M. Maritain spoke — that is, in terms of human nature elevated to the supernatural status of membership in the mystical body of Christ. It is specially important in our hectic day of anti-personal tendencies to meditate profoundly on these questions with the aid of the basic principles of this integral humanism. Several points can be no more than indicated here:
1) The Christian has been told by Christ to strive to be as perfect as is the Father in heaven, and so the Christian should take time to meditate on the supreme degree in which God Himself respects the human freedom that He endowed man with. This divine respect or tolerance could not be greater towards those Christians who consciously use their freedom to offend against God.
2) Any exercise of authority in the name of Christianity, whether it be by a bishop, a priest, a teacher, a parent, or any other, is justifiable only in so far as it is a service of Christ in His members. Any exercise based on lesser considerations, such as vindication of authority or of order for their own sake, and still more a disguised personal revenge or satisfaction, or the feel of power, is in so far a departure from the true Christian spirit. To disregard the supreme prerogative of the human person, his right to be a person, is always to insult Christ in His members.
3) Christian obedience is never blind or unintelligent obedience. Even where the vow of obedience has been taken in religious orders is this true. In such instances a person may not always understand fully the immediate why or wherefore of the particular command he obeys, but he must always know well why he obeys the command and he must understand it to exact nothing contrary to Christian truth. Any lesser degree of intelligence in the obedience renders the latter sub-personal and therefore unchristian.
4) The forgetfulness of these Christian principles accounts for attitudes among Catholics that shade off into various degrees of fascist or totalitarian authoritarianism. They help us to understand better why Pope Pius X, the inaugurator of a Christian spiritual revival, expressed his desire so ardently to see “the true Christian spirit flourish again among the faithful in every way.”
9 Freedom in the Modern World. p.30. Charles Scribner's Sons. N. Y. 1936Google ScholarPubMed.
10 Article “Persoenlichkeit,” Vol. IX, p.498Google Scholar.
11 For a discussion of the individual and the person in relation to society, Maritain, , Three Reformers, pp. 20–26. Sheed and Ward, London, 1929Google Scholar.
12 Summa Theologica, I, q.96, a.1.
13 Summa Theologica, I-II. q.2, a.l c. Thomas is, of course, speaking of what both common sense and reason dictate, and not of what may happen to be true of a perverted civilization: “All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person, whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.” Loc. cif. ad 1. (English Dominican translation).
14 Horvath, O.P. Eigentixmsrechl nach Jem hi. Thomas Von Aquin, pp. 151 and 152. Ulric Moser's Verlag. Graz, Schoenaugaise 64. 1929Google Scholar.
15 Summa Theologica, II-II, q.66, a2.
16 Summa Theologica, II-II. q.57, a.3.
17 Summa Theologica, II-II, q.66, a.2, ad 1; MI. q.94, a.5 c. and ad 3.
18 Summa Theologica, II-II, q.66, a.1 and a.7.
19 The modern counterpart in the medieval “station in life” which was considerably fixed by heredity, would according to the Quadragcsimo Anno be a man's professional contribution to the common good or to socially beneficial human enterprise.
20 Summa Theologtca, II-II, q. 118, a.l.
21 Summa Theologica, III, q.40, a.3, ad 1; II-II, q.66, a.2, ad 2.
22 In IV. Sent. D.xv, q.ii, a.4 and q.2, a.1. Cf. also Summa Theologica, II-II, q.32, a.5 and 6.
23 Summa Theologica, II-II, q.32, a.5 c. and ad 3.
24 Summa Theologica, II-II, 66, 7.
25 Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 105, a.2 c and ad 4. For a popular presentation of die above ideas Michel, , St. Thomas and Today, Comments on the Economic Views of Aquinas (pamphlet, Wanderer Printing Co.)Google Scholar and Michel, , Purpose and Duly of Ownership, According to Thomas Aquinas (Central Bureau of die Central-Verein of America, St. Louis)Google Scholar.
