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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Contemporary discussions of political forms exhibit a concern with constitutional procedures and values seldom encountered in the history of political thought. The search for a parallel development would require a turning to the classical period of Greek and Roman philosophy and politics. In the light of contemporary constitutional self-consciousness, as well as of the sustained inquiry of the ancient world into the various forms of polity, pure and degraded, ideal and historical, the political analyses of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries assume the character of politico-ideological crystallizations of the breakdown of the ancien regime. There are, of course, fundamental underlying differences between these three periods of political reflection. The ancient Greek analyses, although centering on Greek realities and problems, bear, prima facie, a style of detached theory intended to be taken as philosophy, no more, no less.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the assitance of the Rockefeller Foundation in making this and related research possible.
1 Lindsay's, A. D. excellent The Modern Democratic State (London, 1943)Google Scholar, in conceding the distinction between philosophy and theory, aspires to save ethics from historical relativization while affirming its close connection with politics. Obviously the concession dooms both philosophy and ethics to historicism, to the “operative ideals” of each epoch.
2 The converging claims of logical positivism, linguistic philosophy, and empirical political sociology amount to a proposal for “the end of ideology” very similar to their program to exile metaphysics from the realm of cognitive discourse. The fact that such pre-empting of the intellectual world for their own system is based on disguised nominalistic metaphysics and conservative ideology has not served as a sufficient deterrent. One is reminded of Lindsay's comment that the difference between Harold Laski's The Metaphysical and the True Theory of the State and Bosanquet's The Philosophical Theory of the State was not a difference between the “true” and the “metaphysical” theories, but was one between Laski's and Bosanquet's philosophies.
3 The best example of this type of “philosophy” is Weldon's, T. D.The Vocabulary of Politics (London, 1953)Google Scholar.
4 See Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man (London, 1960)Google Scholar. This is an excellent book of political sociology. But, in refusing to see in philosophy and ideology anything but useful devices in the context of world politics and economic development, it comes just short of calling them mere forces or frauds, devoid of truth value and ethical legitimacy. Ibid., pp. 404–417.
5 Most heads of state in the new countries are “intellectuals” in the broad sense: westernized in value orientation and in political technique and ideology. It might not be true, as Edward Shils implies in his accounts of the role of the intellectuals in the new countries, that the London School of Economics is almost responsible for the colonial revolution, but it certainly has provided much of the rhetoric and the ideological expertise, especially in the case of Africa.
6 de Tocqueville, Alexis, Democracy in America (New York, 1945), II, 64–70Google Scholar.
7 Talmon's, J. L.The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London, 1952Google Scholar and Rossiter's, ClintonConstitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies (Princeton, 1948Google Scholar), illustrate the double confusion of calling by the name of democracy any government which claims a mass enthusiasm and following, the commonplace of all modern dictatorial ideologies, and of crying dictatorship when national emergencies are recognized'by the deliberative bodies in a democracy, and extraordinary prerogatives are authorized on behalf of creative leadership.
8 In sharp contrast to the Nkrumahs, Tourés, Ayubs, Soekarnos, one could reproduce numerous statements from statesmen of some of the underdeveloped countries in affirmation of liberal democracy as the only peaceful and balanced avenue to modernization. Leaving out the well-known positions of India's leadership, and of Latin America's leading figures, like José Figueres in Costa Rica, Romulo Betancourt in Venezuela, Alberto Lleras Camargo in Colombia, and Munoz Martín in Puerto Rico, the principal leaders of Nigeria have stated the problem on the African front in the following way: “But it will not do for Britain and her friends in the Western democracies to say anything which would harmfully affect the activities of those who have dedicated themselves to the sacred task of guarding the existence and fostering the sturdier growth of our young plant of democracy. Similarly, it would be an act of bad faith for her to encourage, by trick or other means, any group of people who might wish to contrive the destruction or sterilization of that plant, on the pretext that a nondescript plant of African origin and of better efficacy is more suited to Nigerian soil. I make this point because there is a new-fangled theory now being propounded with erudition and gusto in the countries of the so-called Western democracies. The proponents of this theory hold that it is inappropriate and hardly fair to expect a newly emergent African nation to practice democracy as it is known and practiced in the countries of Western Europe and the United States of America. Every mortal blow that is struck by an independent African nation at the vitals of democracy is rationalized by these theories as the African's peculiar method of adapting democratic usages to his barbaric and primitive environment. The denial of fundamental human rights, the destruction of the rule of law, and the suppression of opposition has been brilliantly and felicitously rationalized. The outrageous declaration by an African leader that a one-party system is in accord with the democratic way of life has been ably defended by these spokesmen of Western democracies.” See AWO: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (Cambridge [England], 1960), p. 301Google Scholar
9 Government for the people is indeed the meeting point of all antidemocratic rationalizations of autocracy, from divine-right theories through fascism, nazism, and authoritarian socialism or communism. The emphasis on equality as against freedom is prima facie a symptom of guided politics, always very sure of what the people need and systematically irritated by what they want.
10 According to Price, J. H., as cited in What are the Problems of Parliamentary Government in West Africa? (London, 1958), p. 48Google Scholar, the only way to translate “opposition” in most Ghanaian languages is by rendering it as “the enemy,” which proves the linguistic wisdom of Nkrumah's political attitudes. Cf. Edward Shils’ writings on the new countries, especially his essay on “The Intellectuals in the Political Development of New States,” where the opposition, especially in Ghana and Guinea, is Staatsfeindlich. See World Politics, Vol. XII (04, 1960), 363 ffGoogle Scholar.
11 Raymond Aron's remark to the effect that “particularly in the new states what is first needed is not an opposition but a majority” is true as far as it goes; but this type of aphorism seldom goes far enough, for without the compensating reflexion that an opposition is needed to make a country democratic in its politics and save it from messianic leadership, such statements only tend to legitimize the stronger majority against the possibility of eventual rational consensus. Perhaps one could say that the French case is unique and does not make for universalization? See Manchester Guardian Weekly, Oct. 23, 1958.
12 Soekarno, , “The Birth of Pantja-Sila,” The Indonesian Revolution: Basic Documents and the Idea of Guided Democracy (Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960), p. 47Google Scholar. This booklet will be cited as Basic Documents.
13 Soekarno, , in Political Manifesto: Republic of Indonesia (Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1959), p. 29Google Scholar.
14 Soekarno, , in Hopes and Facts (New Delhi: Information Service of the Indonesian Embassy in India, n.d.), pp. 8–9Google Scholar.
15 Political Manifesto: Republic of Indonesia, pp. 33 ff.
16 Ibid., pp. 7–8.
17 Ibid., p. 80.
18 Basic Documents, pp. 113–114.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., pp. 88–89.
21 Ibid., pp. 89–90.
22 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
23 Ibid., pp. 28–46.
24 Ibid., p. 83.
25 Ibid., p. 24.
26 Ibid., pp. 106–110.
27 Political Manifesto, p. 18.
28 Basic Documents, pp. 113, 91.
29 Ibid., pp. 34–35, 89–90.
30 Abdulgani, H. Roeslan, in “Manipol” and “Usdek”: The Political Manifesto of the Republic of Indonesia and Its Basic Elements (Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960), pp. 34–35Google Scholar.
31 Political Manifesto, p. 62.
32 Ibid., p. 12.
33 Ibid., p. 86.
34 Ibid., p. 8.
35 Ibid., p. 19.
36 Ibid., p. 53.
37 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “The Politics of Underdevelopment,” World Politics, Vol. IX (10, 1956), 57 ffGoogle Scholar.
38 Basic Democracies Order, 1959 (Government of Pakistan Press, 1959)Google Scholar. How a democracy can be legitimized by a return to traditional deliberative methods which have to be used only after a government “order” is an interesting paradox in Pakistani ideology. It sounds very much like the old dialectics of being forced to be free.
39 Khan, Field Marshal Mohammed Ayub, “Pakistan Perspective,” Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII (07, 1960), 547–556CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
40 Khan, Ayub, The Rule of Law (Karachi: Department of Advertising of the Government of Pakistan), p. 9Google Scholar.
41 Subhrawardy, Huseyn Shaheed, “Political Stability and Democracy in Pakistan,” Foreign Affairs, XXXV (04, 1957), 422–431CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an able and lucid statement of the “intellectual schizophrenia” of Muslim ideologists with respect to theocracy, autocracy, and democracy, see Najjar, Fauzi M., “Islam and Modern Democracy,” in Review of Politics, XX (04 1958), 164–180CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
42 India, Nigeria, and most of the former French colonies seem to be making a case against this apparently “iron law” of postindependence political life. The case of India seems to give a different meaning to Soekarno's facile identification of strong-man methods with democracy and leadership. Indeed in the whole excolonial world India seems to be giving a unique content to the demand for “democracy with leadership.” Its proximity in space and history to Pakistan creates some legitimate doubts as to the necessity of the destruction of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan, if the communalistic politics against which Nehru and Gandhi vainly warned had not become official ideology.
43 Nkrumah, Kwame, Autobiography (Edinburgh, 1957), p. xGoogle Scholar.
44 Ibid., p. 69.
45 Ibid., p. 164.
46 Ibid., p. 177.
47 Phillips, John, Kwame Nkrumah and the Future of Africa (London, 1960), pp. 58–70Google Scholar.
48 Even John Phillips, whose book is rather dithyrambic, questions the necessity of much of Nkrumah's repressive legislation. Ibid., pp. 65 ff.
49 Nkrumah, op. cit.
50 Apter, David E. and Lystad, Robert A., “Bureaucracy, Party, and Constitutional Democracy: An Examination of Political Role Systems in Ghana,” in Garter, Gwendolen M. and Brown, William O., eds., Transition in Africa: Studies in Political Adaptation (Boston, 1958), p. 48Google Scholar.
51 Nkrumah, , op. cit., pp. 20, 45, 49Google Scholar.
52 Basic Documents, p. 86. This is a basic point in the rejection of Western democracy, a negative first principle of Soekarno's whole political philosophy. Cf. Political Manifesto.
53 Vogelin, Eric, The New Science of Politics (Chicago, 1952), pp. 32 ffGoogle Scholar. provides an equivalent nomenclature to validate the same preference for authoritarian over liberal politics. The first is “existential,” the second merely “elemental” in social legitimacy.
54 Political Manifesto, pp. 41 ff. In the case of Pakistan the Islamic element bases politics on eternal and absolute values, from which political action is deducted. The right ideology, practiced rightly, becomes the day-to-day basis of the state, instead of depending on a politics of consensus and “agreement.”
55 See, for example, Almond, Gabriel A. and Coleman, James S., eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, 1960Google Scholar), especially Coleman's, concluding article, “The Political Systems of the Developing Areas,” pp. 532–576Google Scholar.
56 Lipset, , op. cit., pp. 68–72Google Scholar.
57 Mackenzie, W. J. M., “The Export of Electoral Systems,” in Political Studies, Vol. V (10, 1957), 241Google Scholar: “… the imperialists … are no longer Wilsonian: they insist nowadays that it is absurd to suppose that Western institutions can possibly be made to work in oriental or African countries without long apprenticeship. We have not imposed Western institutions; they have been extorted from us …”
58 Mandelbaum, Wilfred and Stolper, Wolfgang, “Political Ideology and Economic Progress,” in World Politics, Vol. XII (04, 1960), 420Google Scholar; “It is not an ideology or an economic theory that will bring growth; it is more energetic and imaginative responses to the record as revealed by intensive study.” Cf. Clark, Colin, Growthmanship (London, 1961), p. 12Google Scholar, where this ideological gimmick is defined as “an excessive preoccupation with economic growth, advocacy of unduly simple proposals for obtaining it, and the careful choice of statistics to prove that countries with a political and economic system which you favor have made exceptionally good economic growth, and that countries administered by your political opponents have made exceptionally poor economic growth.”
