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Political Power in the Soviet Union
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Extract
During the last months of the war, hopes were bright in this country that, this time, not only victory, but also peace would be won. The Fascist nations were being knocked out. The Soviet Union was not a democracy, but, apparently, was willing to enter into fair competition with the United States for the souls of the many nations in a state of indecision; and in this competition America thought democracy was likely to gain the upper hand. A world consisting predominantly of free, independent and peace-loving nations seemed ready to emerge.
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- Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1952
References
1 Cf. Ferrero, G., The Construction of Europe (1941)Google Scholar; Principles of Power (1942).Google Scholar
2 The best typologies of power structures are those of Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Geselhchaft (1925)Google Scholar, and MacIver, R., The Web of Government (1947).Google Scholar
3 June 20, 1950.
4 Though many members of the Politbureau have been in for ten or more years, their tenure is precarious, as demonstrated by the recent disappearance of Voznessensky who, in the course of the war and the first postwar years, directed the planning activity, the very backbone of Soviet economics. From among the nine members of the Politbureau elected at the XIV Party Congress, the last before Stalin's victory, four (Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov and Bukharin) were executed by Stalin's orders, one (Trotsky) was assassinated at his instigation and one (Tomsky) committed suicide to avoid the inglorious end of his teammates.
5 Selection is highly centralized. Only officers at the lowest ranks are selected by secretaries of the Provincial Party Committees and their advisory bodies.
6 This is true despite the variability of the doctrine: one must conform to the latest version and never commit oneself too ostentatiously to any particular formulation of the doctrine since it is susceptible of change. Stalin's recent statement about linguistics (June 20, 1950) has probably brought consternation to the minds of the writers of almost hagiographic books devoted to the late academician N. Marr, for example, Mikhankora, V. A., N. Y. Marr (in Russian) (Moscow, 1949).Google Scholar
7 Telling remarks have been made by Woods, Ally, Our, The People of Russia, (1950)Google Scholar; this is a story of an American engineer who was, with interruptions, in the service of the Soviets from 1929 to 1942. According to him, inefficiency has gradually invaded even the top levels. This is understandable: with the passing away or aging of men who received solid education prior to the revolution, by necessity, have been occupied by ignoramuses who went to Soviet schools from 1917 to 1932, the year of the great reversal of the trend in Soviet education (cf. Timasheff, N. S., The Great Retreat [1946]).Google Scholar
8 On the organization of propaganda see the excellent book of Inkeles, A., Public Opinion in Soviet Russia (1950)Google Scholar. On the real functioning of the system in the realms of the theatre and music, see Jelagin, J., Taming the Arts (1951).Google Scholar
9 On the contrast between the Western and the Soviet conceptions of democracy see Timasheff, N. S., “The Soviet Concept of Democracy,” The Review of Politics, 10, 1950.Google Scholar
10 The family is almost the only social organization not penneated by ramifications of the Communist power machine, provided that none of the members of the family is a member of the party or the Young Communist League. The Russian Orthodox Church and a few other denominations enjoy a precarious autonomy, only after being “tamed” by the power machine. Cf. Timasheff, N. S., “Religion in Russia, 1941–1950,” in Gurian, W. (ed.) The Soviet Union (1951).Google Scholar
11 Cf. the article quoted in note 9.
12 Excellent evidence on the survival of the spirit of freedam is offered in Barghoorn, F., The Soviet Image of the United States (1950).Google Scholar
13 This impression has been gained by the present writer from many conversations with persons who have rather recently been in the Soviet Union.
14 In 1925–27, Stalin gained over Trotsky not only because he was a better politician and controlled the party machine, but also because the vast majority of the fellow travelers among the intellectuals preferred his program of “socialism in one country” to Trotsky's program of “permanent revolution.” In those days, these intellectuals were still able indirectly to influence political developments, by granting full-fledged support to one leader and withholding it from another while their cooperation was highly important in the drafting of the first five-year plan.
15 Cf. Timasheff, N. S., “War or Peace,” Thought, 09, 1950.Google Scholar