¹ Hereafter cited as Discourse on Inequality.

² Oeuvres complettes [sic] de J. J. Rousseau, Citoyen de Genève (Nouvelle edition, XVIII, Paris, 1793). Confessions, Book IX, 120.Google Scholar

³ Oeuvres complettes, op. cit., XXIIGoogle Scholar, Lettre à M. de Beaumont, 53Google Scholar “J'ai écrit sur divers sujets, mais toujours dans les mêmes principes: toujours la même morale, la meme croyance, les mêmes maximes, et, si Ton veut, les mêmes opinions.”

⁴ Nature, capitalized, hereafter refers to the totality of the physical world.

⁵ Einstein, Alfred, Mozart, Sein Character und sein Werk (Stockholm, 1947), p. 392.Google Scholar

⁶ Especially to be mentioned are Wright, E. H., The Meaning of Rousseau (London, 1929)Google Scholar; Cassirer, Ernst, The Question of Jean Jacques Rousseau, translated and edited with an introduction and additional notes by Peter Gay (New York, 1954)Google Scholar; Cobban, Alfred, Rousseau and the Modern State (London, 1934)Google Scholar; Hendel, C. W., Jean Jacques Rousseau, Moralist, 2 vols. (London, 1934)Google Scholar; and the two works by Derathé, Robert, Le rationalisme de J. J. Rousseau (Paris, 1948)Google Scholar, and Jean - Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps (Paris, 1950)Google Scholar. For a further discussion of literature see P. Gay's penetrating and enlightening review of the problem of Rousseau interpretation which precedes his translation of Cassirer.

⁷ The currency of this interpretation is attested by Sir Ernest Barker's introduction to Social Contract, Essays by Locke, Hume and Rousseau (London, 1947), p. xli.Google Scholar

⁸ See for example, Löwith, Karl, Von Hegel zu Nietzsche (Zurich, n.d.)Google Scholar; Marx, Karl, Die Frühschriften, ed. by Landshut, Siegfried (Stuttgart, 1953)Google Scholar. The Marxists themselves are not unaware of this state of affairs, as their efforts to convert Hegel into an atheist humanist indicate. See the otherwise very rewarding work of Kojève, A., Introduction à la lecture de Hegel (Paris, 1947)Google Scholar, or G. Lukacs' partisan effort Der Junge Hegel (Zürich, 1948).Google Scholar

⁹ Hereafter cited as Discourse on the Arts and Sciences.

¹⁰ “By this way of analysis we may proceed from compounds to ingredients, and from motions to the forces producing them; and in general, from effects to their causes, and from particular causes to more general ones…. This is the method of analysis: and the synthesis consists in assuming the causes discovered and established as principles, and by them explaining the phenomena proceeding from them, and proving the explanations.” Sir Isaac Newton, Opticks, quoted in Burtt, Edwin A., The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (Garden City, N. Y., n.d.), p. 225.Google Scholar

¹¹ Cassirer, Ernst, Das Erkenntnis Problem, I, (Berlin, 1906), 136 ff.Google Scholar

¹² See, for example, the quotation from Pappus, and its discussion in Euclid, The Elements, Translated with Introduction and Commentary by Sir Thomas Heath (Annapolis, 1947), I, 138–140.Google Scholar

¹³ Thus, the other ethico-political works of Rousseau actually are corollaries and scholia which follow out the implications of the principles first laid down in the two discourses. In view of this, Rousseau's contention that all his works contain the same principal teachings gains further credence.

¹⁴ “Commençons done par écarter tous les faits, car ils ne touchent point a la question. II ne faut pas prendre les recherches dans lesquelles on peut entrer sur ce sujet pour des vérités historiques, mais settlement pour des raisonnements hypothétiques et conditionnels, plus propres à éclaircir la nature des choses qu'à en montrer la véritable origine, et semblables à ceux que font tous les jours nos physiciens sur la formation du monde.” Oeuvres complettes, I, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 54. (italics mine).Google Scholar

¹⁵ “Typical” is here used in the sense of Max Weber.

¹⁶ See Hendel, C. W., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Moralist (2 Vols. London, 1934)Google Scholar, Chapter I; Cartesianism is transmitted to Rousseau in the form of the teachings of Malebranche. See also Derathé, R., Le rationalisme de J.-J. Rousseau (Paris, 1948)Google Scholar. The Lettre à M. de Beaumont also indicates the influence of Descartes; “L'homme n'est pas un être simple; il est composé de deux substances,” Oeuvres complettes, XXII, 70.Google Scholar

¹⁷ See Frankel, Charles, The Faith of Reason (New York, 1948)Google Scholar, Chapter II; as well as Vartanian, Aram, Diderot and Descartes (Princeton, 1953)CrossRefGoogle Scholar for the influence of Cartesian physics.

¹⁸ For a brief discussion of sensationalism and associationism see below. It should be mentioned that these views were also conveyed to Rousseau by his study of Hobbes.

¹⁹ Some of the tendencies implicit in this view have been made more explicit, in order that the trends to which Rousseau was opposed, as well as those which he accepted either in part or in entirety, become more readily perceptible.

²⁰ Cassirer, Ernst, Die Philosophie der Aufklärung (Tübingen, 1932), p. 340.Google Scholar

²¹ Thus all knowledge, all operations of the mind, were thought to arise from outside impulses, and under the same law as the former. Hence this psychological doctrine is known as sensationalism and associationism. It was held that the associations were under strict mechanical causation. See the development in English thought as discussed by Willey, Basil, The Eighteenth Century Background: Studies on the Idea of Nature in the Thought of the Period (London, 1949).Google Scholar

²² This, as is well known, is the underlying assumption of the laissez faire theories.

²³ This, of course, was not the sole motivating force of the historical research. To mention but one other, there was the question of the veracity and historicity of the bible. In the course of biblical criticism, the historical problem arises as a matter of course.

²⁴ Frankel, Charles, op. cit., p. 39 ff.Google Scholar

²⁵ Halévy, E., The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (N. Y., 1949), p. 19.Google Scholar

²⁶ Not all were blunt enough to announce themselves as atheists and materialists. Condillac retained his Christian beliefs, although his philosophical position might readily be interpreted as atheist and materialist.

²⁷ In a way then, the position here taken implies “whatever is rational is real—and whatever is real is rational,” Indeed things incapable of explanation were so, either because of insufficient data, of misapprehension, or of downright error. In fact some things, superstitions, etc., were fictions, and to be disregarded. Whatever was beyond reason was to be dismissed; whatever was unintelligible was eo ipso false.

²⁸ The statement can also be inverted. Newton's laws of motion can be viewed as consequences of the original harmony and order of Nature.

²⁹ It is well known that this approach was advanced against the ancien régime.

³⁰ See Lovejoy, Arthur O., Essays in the History of Ideas (Baltimore, 1948)Google Scholar, Essay II “The Supposed Primitivism of Rousseau's Discourse on Inequality,” p. 17Google Scholar. Also Essay III “Monboddo and Rousseau,” pp. 38–61.Google Scholar

³¹ As will be seen later, this statement needs qualification. The final end of evolution is the achievement of a stage where man can enjoy the fruits of freedom securely because the progress of knowledge has provided him with sufficient insight into Nature to retain the conditions of his freedom.

³² Derathé, R.Le Rationalisme de J.-J. Rousseau, pp. 10, 116.Google Scholar

³³ We must keep in mind that reason and the passions belong to man's physical nature.

³⁴ Rousseau denied the evolution of the animals, cf. Derathé, R.loc. cit., p. 10 n. 4.Google Scholar

³⁵ Cajori, F., ed., Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System, of the World (Berkeley, California, 1934), p. 2.Google Scholar

³⁶ Oeuvres complettes, I, Discours sur l'origine, 74Google Scholar f. “c'est par leur (sc. passions) activité que notre raison se perfectionne: nous ne cherchons à connaitre que parce que nous désirons de jouir.”

³⁷ It must be born in mind that reason is part of man's physical nature. “Car la physique explique en quelque manière le mécanisme des sens et la formation des idées.” Oeuvres complettes, I, 72.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., 118–122.

³⁹ Ibid., 122.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 99–101.

⁴¹ Kant, Immanuel, Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft, Immanuel Kant's Werke, ed. Cassirer, Ernst (Berlin, 1914). V, 89Google Scholar. Kant derives many of his principal ethical teachings from Rousseau. The Critique of Practical Reason, not the Critique of Pure Reason, is the center of Kant's philosophy.

⁴² This is the basis of the distinction of the will of all and the general will.

⁴³ The absence of universality could imply that each individual has a morality all his own, an assumption Rousseau would deny.

⁴⁴ This argument and the following are implicit in Rousseau's doctrine of the general will.

⁴⁵ Rousseau cannot subscribe to a Güterethik, since the latter's basis is the correlation of ontal excellence and moral value as expressed in the principle ens et bonum convertuntur, a position which is incompatible with the proposition that essences are not accessible to the human mind. Hence the goodness of particular actions cannot be determined by the goodness of the objects intended.

⁴⁶ Oeuvres complettes I, 81.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Oeuvres Philosophiques de Condillac, ed. LeRoy, G., I (Paris, 1947).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Again the similarity to Kant is noteworthy. According to Kant we do not have any knowledge of things-in-themselves. The sole exception is man. Though man has by no means complete, and certainly not scientific, knowledge of himself as a noumenon, he apprehends some aspects of his intelligible character through the moral law.

⁵⁰ We must remember that within the context of Rousseau's argument the interaction of experience, passion, reason, etc., represents an intensification of the driving force innate to man (perfectibility). Under the repeated impact of these various forces more and more power is imparted to the innate motion, and, simultaneously, the impact of the innate motion upon the forces acting upon it becomes correspondingly greater. An increase in force, however, equals a gradual change in phenomena, the area of effective action of man increases, as well as his interaction with other men. At the same time, this quantitative change produces also a qualitative change, because through the quantitative changes the latent possibilities of men are called into being.

⁵¹ It is noteworthy that the universal rule self-imposed by equals is the general will.

⁵² Rousseau clearly believes that the total perfection of Man is yet to be achieved.

⁵³ It appears that Rousseau conceived of the necessary order of Nature as part of the providential order. See also Derathe, R., Le rationalisme de J.-J. Rousseau, p. 18.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ It might be worthwhile to note that terms of everyday speech, such as inclination, equilibrium, mental balance and the like, are based upon mechanical analogies.

⁵⁵ Oeuvres complettes, I, 122Google Scholar, “une sorte de propriété.”

⁵⁶ Cf. Kant, I., WerkeGoogle Scholar, ed. Cassirer, , VII, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 67.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Oeuvres complettes, 115.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Oeuvres complettes, I, 130 ff.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Oeuvres complettes, I, 133.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Ibid, pp. 134 f. Rousseau subscribes to the labor theory of value and believes that the division of labor makes unjust and excessive profit possible.

⁶¹ The original endowment may be summarized as: perfectibility, which is pursued through the exercise of the amour de soi, after the latter has been transformed from instinct into a rational principle; the natural presuppositions of perfectibility are the passions, reason and experience.

⁶² In effect, Rousseau operates with an either/or proposition: either men act in freedom and deliberately, or they are subject to necessity. Since he holds it inconceivable that anyone would willingly forego the state of moral freedom, it follows that they were driven by necessity. Thus the absence of knowledge makes freedom impossible. Inversely, the safeguarding of freedom rests upon adequate information and insight.

⁶³ See above p. 104.

⁶⁴ Oeuvres complettes, I, 136Google Scholar: “Voilà toutes les qualités naturelles mises en action, le range et le sort de chacque homme établis.”

⁶⁵ The more disharmonious man becomes the less good he is, since harmony and goodness are equated.

⁶⁶ But they lack knowledge, and even relatively good governments deteriorate.

⁶⁷ The similarity between Marx's arguments and Rousseau's is at times very pronounced.

⁶⁸ This is implicit in the argument of the discourse, and Rousseau declares that the principle of man's natural goodness is the foundation of all his writings. Oeuvres complettes, XXII, 2Google Scholar, Lettre à M. de Beaumont, 68 f.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Cassirer, E., The Question Jean-Jacques Rousseau, pp. 56 f.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Oeuvres complettes, I, 81.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Oeuvres complettes, VIIIGoogle Scholar, Emile, Livre IV, “Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard,” 354.Google Scholar

⁷² Nature means then also human nature.

⁷³ Du Contract Social ou Principes du Droit Politique, Oeuvres Diverses de M. Rousseau de Geneve (Neuchatel, 1764), VI, 28.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Derathé, R., Le Rationalisme de J.-J. Rousseau, passim.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Back to Nature means, first, the return to natural relationships, that is, the restoration of harmony within man as well as in his relationships to Nature at large; secondly, the return to man's true nature, and thereby the re-institution of moral freedom. The two foregoing meanings imply, thirdly, that the total order of Nature, that is, providence, is normative as far as all perfection is concerned. In respect to a free being the norm cannot be given in determination, but must take the form of an ought. The moral imperative, however, and its fulfillment belong to man's nature.

⁷⁶ It would appear that Rousseau insists that the true universality of the ethical universal becomes manifest concretely only in the community. In consequence he substitutes the collective universal, which indeed transcends the individual, for the universality of the idea of law. A mistake which, within the essential context of Rousseau's argument, is rectified by Kantian ethics.

⁷⁷ For Rousseau there is only one form of freedom, though many modes of slavery, as e.g. there is but one health, but many diseases.

⁷⁸ The Platonic influence is here to be perceived. For the significance of Plato for Rousseau see Hendel, C. W., Jean-Jacques Rousseau, passim.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ This is evident from the importance he attaches to the climate of opinion, the fourth and unwritten law he discusses in the Social Contract.

⁸⁰ The relationship of the second discourse to Emile or to La Nouvelle Heloise has not been discussed here because they will be considered elsewhere in dealing with Rousseau's ethics. Here it suffices to note that Rousseau's theories of education as well as his conception of passion and sentiment are implied in the doctrines of the second discourse.